Re-engineering
Balochistan
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant
Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
The stage for escalated, and possibly extraordinary, violence
has been set in Balochistan. Addressing the media at Turbat
in the province on December 16, 2004, President Pervez Musharraf
declared that his Government would crush all anti-Pakistan
movements: "We are gathering information through intelligence
and other sources that who is doing what in the area and
I warn them because when the Government starts action against
them, they will be crushed."
This declaration
of intent only completes what has been on the cards, at
least since 31st March 2004, when the General had declared
on the Pakistan Television (PTV) "Newsnight" programme,
that the problem with Balochistan was that only 5 per cent
of the area was 'A area', while 95 per cent was 'B', where
the police did not operate. Soon, he had stated, the entire
95 per cent 'B area' would be made into 'A area'. Already,
he disclosed further, five districts in the 'B area' had
been declared 'A area'.
[The British colonial administration divided Balochistan
into A and B Areas: the former were under direct British
control and administration; in the latter, the British exercised
proxy control through the Sardars or tribal chiefs.
The system was continued after Independence by the Pakistan
Establishment.]
With its vast potential for a wide range of natural resources,
including oil, uranium, copper and other minerals, its critical
strategic location - it commands over 900 miles of the Arabian
Sea coastline, and the development, particularly, of the
Gwadar Port with massive Chinese financial and technical
assistance, 'stabilizing' Balochistan and consolidating
Islamabad's administrative hold over the province is emerging
as an overarching objective of the present regime. These
objectives militate directly both against the long-standing
system of near autonomy most of the province has enjoyed
since and even before the creation of Pakistan, and against
a number of critical demands consistently held by the Baloch
people and leadership. Specifically, the Baloch Ittihad
(Baloch Unity) movement seeks, among a range of other objectives,
to bring an end to the exploitation of Baloch resources
by Islamabad, particularly by North Punjab; to secure fair
royalties for Baloch gas; to secure employment for locals
in projects being executed in Baloch areas; and to ensure
that revenues from various projects in Balochistan are invested
in the province itself.
More significantly, the Baloch have long and bitter memories
of Islambad's repression and betrayal over the past, and
there is great venom against the 'Punjabis' in the Baloch
discourse. In the 1950s, after an unsuccessful insurrection,
Pakistan offered a General Amnesty to the rebels, but when
their leaders came out they were hanged. This betrayal weighs
heavily in the consciousness of the Baloch, as does the
brutality with which the rebellion of the 1970s was suppressed,
with indiscriminate use of superior firepower - including
air power - against Baloch camps and villages in which thousands
were killed.
But the current sentiment goes well beyond the bitterness
of historical memories to a fear of an existential threat,
as Islamabad unfolds its plans to transform the very character
of all of Balochistan. The military regime has reportedly
decided to replace the Levies (the local enforcement apparatus)
and to provide full powers to the police to control law
and order. This would bring 25 districts of Balochistan
into province-wide policing, and do away with the traditional
institution of Levies, which are manned substantially by
the locals. The Federal Interior Ministry is reported to
have finalized a Rupees 9.6 billion security plan under
which the 'B areas' would be converted into 'A areas' under
this scheme, and for which 9,866 personnel would be recruited.
Changing the structure of policing in Balochistan is central
to a deeper re-engineering of the entire power structure
in Balochistan. Many of the tribes have already been bought
over or neutralized and it is only among a few dominant
tribes such as the Bugtis and the Maris that an independent
power base survives. The Pakistan Establishment has systematically
diluted the traditional system of working through the Sardars,
because the local leadership is no longer trusted. The Sardars,
in turn, jealously guard their socio-political and financial
control in the regions, and seek to 'keep the destiny of
Balochistan in their own hands'. Each of Islamabad's new
experiments at social engineering is, consequently, deeply
resented, as is the increasing dominance of the 'Punjabis'
in Islamabad.
Clearly, the Sardars now realize that Musharraf has confronted
them with a 'do-or-die' choice. If the General succeeds
in transforming all of Balochistan into 'A areas', the power
of the Sardars will have ended. The current struggle is,
consequently, quite different from the insurrections of
the 1950s and the 1970s. The Sardars, in the present instance,
are completely united. Earlier movements had individual
tribes rebelling, and these were individually targeted in
concentrated areas in the mountains into which they escaped.
The current and mounting insurgency is radically different.
Presently, a majority of Balochistan is covered, and almost
all tribes have been united in their opposition to Islamabad
in the enveloping Baloch Ittihad. The political leadership
of the Ittihad comprises Khair Buksh Murri, Akbar
Bugti, Attaullah Mengal, Abdul Hayee Baloch and Hasil Bizenjo.
Murri rejects the Parliamentary system, and is more prone
to 'direct action'. Bugti leads a political party - the
Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), but also retains armed cadres.
Mengel has adopted the path of political protest and mobilization,
and is the Chairman of the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement
(PONAM). Hayee Baloch and Bizenjo are leaders of the National
Party (NP). While Murri, Bugti and Mengel are Sardars, Baloch
and Bizenjo come from ordinary middle class backgrounds.
All have come together in a loosely cooperative structure
under the banner of the Ittihad. This present movement,
consequently, is an inclusive movement representing wide
Balochi interests, not just the Sardars and there has been
increasing popular consciousness of exploitation among the
common Baloch, which now transcends elite interest groups.
This has translated into a calibrated and widely dispersed
campaign of attacks virtually across the length and breadth
of Balochistan. Total casualties have, however, remained
relatively small - given the South Asia context - with some
94 dead and 303 wounded in the current year (till December
14). However, vital installations and state actors have
been repeatedly targeted and the strife in Balochistan is
emerging as a critical internal security problem for Islamabad.
The most alarming aspect of this crisis, from Islamabad's
perspective, is the sheer spatial and temporal distribution
of attacks on the Army and security forces, vital installations
and sporadic skirmishes. These have been reported throughout
the year from north-central Balochistan (Kohlu and Dera
Bugti), the capital Quetta (also the hub of sectarian terrorism)
in the west, and Gwadar, Kech, and Khuzdar in the south.
Encounters between the troops and 'Baloch nationalists'
have been on the upswing since the middle of 2004 and furthermore,
increased army presence ('protective deployment' according
to military regime spokesperson Major General Shaukat Sultan)
has led to high-profile targets like Chief Minister Jam
Muhammad Yousaf falling under the compass of violence.
Nevertheless, the pattern of insurgent violence thus far
suggests that the Balochis are essentially demonstrating
their capabilities, rather than using them to the fullest.
Hence, the low fatality levels, uncommon for violence-wrecked
South Asia. Actions are being calibrated to a threshold
that keeps the movement alive, while a fuller commitment
is kept at abeyance till clearer assurance of support is
secured from one or another external power. It is significant,
in this context, to note that, though fatalities have been
kept low, rocket attacks and improvised explosive device
explosions have been an almost daily affair throughout 2004.
In May 2004 alone, for instance, approximately 140 rocket
attacks were recorded, targeting the gas pipelines in Sui,
while some 120 rocket attacks were reported in June.
The insurgency has gradually spread across the whole of
Balochistan, and is not concentrated in any one sector.
Strikingly, there is no locus of command either, and the
Balochis, wiser for their experience in the 1970s, appear
to have ensured that their movement will not easily be 'decapitated'.
A deeper scrutiny of the insurgency also reveals that no
single leader is central to its survival, and there are
indications derived from operational patterns that suggest
that the movement has, in fact, been dispersed down to the
level of cells comprising 2 to 10 persons.
Widening the strategic depth of the insurgency, the Baloch
have sought to exploit the situation prevailing in Waziristan
as well. Insurgents from the tribal belt have reportedly
begun crossing into the mountain ranges of Balochistan.
Tarique Niazi notes that, "they seamlessly melt into the
latter's capital city, Quetta, which houses predominantly
Pakhtun population, alongside the burgeoning demographic
growth of Baluchs on its skirts."
However, the current insurgent activities are like warning
shots fired over the bow, not an open insurgency as yet.
While it is true that grievances which form necessary conditions
for an insurgency are a reality in Balochistan, they have
not been adequate enough, thus far, to trigger a major conflagration.
Most violence is 'nationalist' and there is no co-operation
between Islamists in the North and the Balochs, and there
is little love lost between the Mullahs and the Sardars.
Fortunately for Islamabad, though the Balochis are devout,
they are not fundamentalist. Indeed, efforts by the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to consolidate the influence of the
Mullahs in Balochistan is seen as a direct threat to the
power and influence of the Sardars.
The crisis has acquired additional urgency as a result of
a multiplicity of 'externalities' linked to the strategic
location and natural resources of the province. Chinese
involvement is clearly growing in Balochistan, and as the
region becomes increasingly important, its security dimensions
cannot be neglected. Gwadar is, in fact, being projected
as a major economic hub in the region, facilitating imports
and exports between Pakistan and China. While negotiations
are currently underway for investment and collaboration
in coal-fired power generation, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
during his visit to China from December 14 to 18, 2004,
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the expansion of
Gwadar seaport channel capacity for facilitating large vessels.
Further, China is to continue work on the Rupees 16 billion
Saindak Project as Pakistan has reportedly expressed its
willingness to extend the lease of Saindak copper-gold mines
in Balochistan for another 20 years. Crucially, the Gwadar
Port is part of China's long-term strategy to consolidate
its strategic presence in the region, and its maritime dominance
in the Persian Gulf. The security of these and a widening
spectrum of projects for 'economic cooperation' in the province
is, consequently, pivotal, and it is believed that China
has made it amply clear to Islamabad that a repeat of the
incident of May 3, 2004, at Gwadar Port, in which three
Chinese engineers lost their lives, would be 'unacceptable'.
US interests in the province are also increasing. While
the Government has sought to dispel notions that the US
may be permitted to locate military bases in Balochistan,
analysts point out that the US military has, for long, targeted
the development of a base near Dalbandin and Pasni, 180
miles west of Karachi, close to the Gwadar Port. A further
deepening of Pakistan's relations with the United States,
including plausible base access, are to a certain extent
co-terminus with the plans underway to consolidate the Army's
control over Balochistan, which could project 'strategic
depth' into Central Asia and the Gulf region.
Another, albeit ambivalent, externality relates to Iran's
interest in Balochistan. Iran's population includes about
two per cent of Baloch, who nevertheless dominate or have
very significant presence in the Zahedan , Khorasan, Seistan
and Balochistan (Iran). The Baloch are Sunnis, and Baloch
separatism - and the unity of the Baloch across the Iran-Pakistan
border - is seen as a threat by Teheran as well. Indeed,
at the height of the suppression of the Baloch movement
in Pakistan in the 1970s, US-supplied Iranian combat helicopters,
at least some of them manned by Iranian pilots, had joined
the Pakistan Air Force in its strafing and bombing of Baloch
camps and villages. At other times, Iran's general hostility
to predominantly Sunni Pakistan, and its involvement in
the sectarian conflict within Pakistan, has tempted it to
support the Balochis. Currently, however, there is no evidence
of such support.
Other complexities also colour the situation in Balochistan.
At least one of these involves an internal clash of interests
in US policy. While the US is broadly committed to the general
'stabilization' of Pakistan, it does have a vested interest
in delaying projects that would establish a dominant Chinese
strategic presence in the region, particularly the Port
of Gwadar. There would, consequently, be some US interest
in persistent, though low grade, violence in the province.
The cumulative force of these considerations, however, is
that the Islamabad now places the highest priority on the
'pacification' of Balochistan. Given his temperament, Musharraf's
first inclination is to crack down. By nature an impatient
man, he would seek to cement Islamabad's dominion in the
province during his own tenure, and his decisions would
be based more on his assessment of how necessary tranquility
in the region is for Pakistan's economic and strategic interests,
and not on objective assessments of the Baloch insurgency.
The primary response, consequently, has been military. In
October this year, Lieutenant General Hamid Rab Nawaz was
handpicked to head the 12 Corps based at Quetta, which is
in charge of the Baloch Operations. Nawaz, a Punjabi from
Chakwal and, like Musharraf, a Commando, shares Musharraf's
belief structures and orientation, and is believed to have
been sent specifically to Quetta to 'take care' of the situation.
The 12 Corps comprises two divisions, the 33rd and the 41st,
both headquartered at Quetta, but currently projected in
'protective deployments' across the province. In addition,
the Frontier Corps (FC) - a paramilitary force - has its
units present all over Balochistan. The FC is officered
and overwhelming manned by non-Balochis, and is deeply resented,
with most recent rebel rocket attacks targeting its personnel.
There has, till now, been no additional allocation of Forces
to Balochistan, though available evidence suggests that
counter-insurgency operations are being carried out in wide
areas of the province, including in Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Gwadar,
Turbat and Makran.
There is, however, a danger here that Islamabad may well
be biting off more than it can chew. In November 2003, in
what was possibly a moment of braggadocio, Musharraf had
declared that only five per cent of Balochistan was a 'trouble
spot' and that he would 'straighten out' the trouble-making
Baloch leaders. This is clearly a misreading of the situation
on the ground, and while the present Force deployment may
be sufficient to 'contain' the violence at existing levels,
particularly given the present proclivities of the rebels
themselves, it is far from adequate to secure the radical
structural transformations that Musharraf appears to be
committed to, and to suppress the natural local responses
these can be expected to provoke in an entrenched, deeply
traditional and historically hostile society.
The troubles in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
(FATA) have already stretched Islamabad's Forces, with over
70,000 troops stationed in South Waziristan alone. Additional
commitments in Balochistan would demand a dramatic redrafting
of national strategies, and it appears that the military
regime has not, in fact, visualized the deployments that
would be required in a rapidly worsening internal security
scenario in Balochistan. Crucially, Balochistan's unforgiving
terrain would not yield to marginal increments in deployment.
Topography provides undetectable gateways to the Baloch
on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Some areas
of Afghanistan (Nemroz, Helmand and Farah) also have significant
Baloch population, and historically these have constituted
safe areas for rebels during earlier uprisings.
More significantly, harshness of the terrain and the sheer
expanses of the province - 347,641 square kilometers, nearly
43 per cent of Pakistan's total area - are such that, in
conventional counter-insurgency operations, virtually the
whole of the Pakistan Army could sink into the province
without being able to establish full control. Sir Charles
Napier once remarked that Balochistan was "the place where
God threw the rubbish when He made the world." Selig Harrison
in his authoritative work, In Afghanistan's Shadow,
notes that "getting from one of these valleys to the next
on foot can be a precarious business: there are few passes,
and many of them are not negotiable even by local donkeys
accustomed to the jagged terrain." But for the Baloch, according
to a 16th century war ballad, he adds, "the lofty heights
are our comrades… the pathless gorges our friends." With
an insurgency dispersed across the whole geographical area
of Balochistan, it will be impossible to repeat the successes
of the 1970s, when small locations in the mountains where
particular rebellious tribes had fled were targeted with
overwhelming force.
Further, vast areas of Balochistan can easily be cut off
from the rest of Pakistan and there are just two routes
from provincial capital Quetta to Karachi, both of which
can be disrupted or interdicted. The evidence of earlier
Baloch rebellions indicates that the Baloch knows and can
live off the terrain, is a hardy fighter, virtually 'born
with weapons', and makes a formidable adversary. There is,
moreover, no shortage of weapons among the rebels. These
can easily be purchased from the Afghan surplus, both within
Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Wide and relatively indiscriminate
state violence will be necessary if the Baloch are to be
'crushed' once again.
Such violence is, of course, not beyond Islamabad's capacities.
The insurrections of the 1950s and 1960s were, in fact,
suppressed through unrestrained violence, with air power
widely used to strafe and destroy civilian concentrations.
Musharraf himself may, also, not be particularly averse
to such extreme measures - he had, after all, earned himself
the sobriquet of the 'Butcher of Baltistan' during his campaigns
as a Brigadier in the Northern Areas.
It is questionable, however, whether such state repression
would be sustainable within the current international context
- despite the extraordinary indulgences the 'international
community', and particularly the US, has inclined to extend
to this persistent offender against international standards.
Pakistan appears, currently, to be preparing grounds to
justify extreme use of force in the province, planting reports
that Osama bin Laden may be in Balochistan and that some
Al
Qaeda leaders, who were discovered in
Iran, had escaped to that country through Balochistan. The
presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda elements (essentially supported
by the Pashtuns in the North Balochistan areas) is being
projected in order to justify action against wider Baloch
targets further South.
Some diversionary 'political initiatives' have, however,
also been announced to manage the dissent in Balochistan.
The most significant of these was the appointment during
Shujaat Hussain's brief tenure as Prime Minister, of a Parliamentary
Committee comprising two sub-committees, one to look into
the problems in Balochistan, and the other to examine the
question of 'Provincial Autonomy'. The former was headed
by Mushahid Hussain, who has since made more than one visit
to Balochistan and has met all the chieftains. The Balochistan
Sub-Committee's report is to be submitted on January 7,
2005. The Provincial Autonomy sub-committee, which has only
met a couple of times, has seen little movement. These committees
essentially constitute a classical South Asian tactic that
relies on delay to diffuse political crises. Given the circumstances
in Balochistan, it is improbable that such stratagem will
significantly influence the larger course of events.
The military crackdown in Balochistan is clearly slated
for intensification. The operations against the jirgas
in Waziristan have already demonstrated that no one
can be exempt from punitive action if Islamabad's authority
is challenged, and that Musharraf believes that there are
certain areas of Pakistan that have to be 'quietened' in
the immediate future. With the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) relatively secured, it is now Balochistan's turn.
Other events that may propel such action beyond a 'turning
point' would include an act of major sabotage at Gwadar;
a major disruption of the gas pipeline; or the linking up
of Baloch forces across international borders. Even absent
such extreme provocation, the province appears to be headed
for an extended period of bloody violence that may well
have defining consequences for the future of Pakistan itself.
