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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 16, November 1, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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"Food for Thought"
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
President and General Pervez Musharraf has successfully
engineered another media storm over a new set of 'proposals'
for the 'resolution' of the 'Kashmir issue', which he offers,
with a studied air of insouciance, as 'food for thought'.
The remarks were made at a gathering of editors and senior
journalists at an iftar dinner hosted for him and
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz by Information Minister Sheikh
Rashid Ahmed and State Minister Anisa Zeb Tahirkheli on
October 25, 2004, at Islamabad. As was the case with the
General's earlier proposals regarding the 'four steps process'
[December 18, 2003], the new proposals are both arbitrary
and nonsensical, though this has not prevented a number
of informed commentators from taking them very seriously
and beginning a debate on the exigencies of their translation
into policy.
In sum, Musharraf proposes:
-
Pakistan
would no longer insist on a plebiscite in Kashmir.
-
Since
India would not accept a 'religion-based solution',
a solution could be formulated in 'geographical terms'.
-
'Kashmir'
can be divided into seven regions - five with India
and two with Pakistan.
-
A three-stage
process should be employed to secure a 'solution': First,
identify the region at stake. Second, demilitarize it.
Third, change its status.
-
As
regards the 'status', various options could be examined
including "ideas for joint control, UN mandates, condominiums,
and so on."
There are
several aspects of these proposals that are, at best, disingenuous.
In the first instance, Musharraf adroitly transforms the
three regions within Indian controlled Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)
into five. At the same time, he cleverly notes that "The
beauty of these regions is that they are still religion-based
even if we consider them geographically." In other words,
what Musharraf offers is, again, the principle of religious
exclusivism - the unfinished agenda of the two-nation theory
- which underpins the ideology of extremist political Islam
and the creation of Pakistan, and which is in irreducible
conflict with the pluralist democratic polity of India.
Though the proposals are formulated in 'geographical terms',
they remain at best, and by Musharraf's own admission, proposals
for the communal vivisection of J&K - an outcome that cannot
be acceptable to India.
Further, Musharraf presents the geographical division of
J&K as a fait accompli, making only the modalities
of its realisation a matter of negotiation with India (India
has consistently rejected the possibility of any territorial
concessions in J&K). In this, he develops on his earlier
'four steps' thesis, in which 'Step 3' required that all
those options for a solution of J&K that were not acceptable
to either side be "eliminated from the dialogue". This is,
in essence, a dog in the manger perversity masquerading
as 'high policy'. The sheer audacity of what is proposed
here is concealed by the 'reasonableness' of the language
in which the proposition is cast. To take an analogy, if
a usurper and a legitimate claimant, or a thief and his
victim, are in conflict, our objective should not be to
determine whose claims are supported by law and considerations
of justice, but rather to equally deny the claims of either
side, and to create an alternative structure of possession
that offers conditional access to the goods, properties
or rights in dispute to both parties - an option that quite
naturally favours the usurper and the thief. Such an outcome
cannot be consistent with any considerations of morality
or law, which would require that competing claims be settled
on the justice, the legality and the principles underlying
respective claims, and at least in some measure, the methods
by which these have been pursued. The fact that one party
in the Kashmir 'dispute' has engaged in a murderous terrorist
campaign for a decade and a half - a campaign that has already
claimed nearly 38,000 lives in Indian-controlled J&K, and
that still continues, and which has found a majority of
victims among the very people, the Kashmiri Muslims, who
it claims to seek to 'liberate' - cannot be irrelevant to
such considerations of morality, justice and law. Nor, indeed,
can the fact be irrelevant that the regions of J&K - 'Azad
Kashmir' and the Northern Areas - which have been occupied
by Pakistan for over half a century, have witnessed a complete
denial of human and political rights, as of all vestiges
of development. The mere fact that the aggressor in a particular
case is unwilling to relinquish his claim cannot create
moral or legal grounds for the rightful possessor to relinquish
or dilute his entitlement.
This, however, is precisely what Musharraf is proposing,
and he is not alone in this logic. In recent years, terrorists,
their various advocates, and their sponsors in different
theatres have repeatedly advanced the thesis that the only
'solution' to terrorism is that its victim-societies offer
its perpetrators some concessions - and much of the liberal
democratic world has bought into this argument, with devastating
impact on political will in the free world.
The potential consequences of this policy of appeasement,
and of Musharraf's 'options for control' of the various
'demilitarized regions' need to be examined in some detail,
particularly in view of the fact that Musharraf's proposals
build on or echo several 'solutions' that have been doing
the rounds over the past years, including the Kashmir Study
Group (KSG) formula, and some loose talk of an 'Andorra
solution', and the fact that these various formulae have
been eagerly embraced by many among the weak-willed and
weak-minded among the regional and global leadership. First,
another communal partition of India - and that is precisely
what is being proposed by all these 'alternatives' - simply
cannot be 'sold' in India, politically. Any sundering of
territories in Kashmir will be politically volatile, and
will unleash a backlash of violence across the sub-continent.
The 'Andorra formula' had a peculiar and benign history
in Europe, and will find little resonance here. This is
South Asia - where passions run deep and long histories
of hatred and mutual slaughter have been compounded by ideologies
of envy, exclusion and communal polarisation that inflame
every sore into a cancerous wound.
Moreover, even if such a 'solution' was hypothetically possible,
the area of 'joint control', the 'condominium', or whatever
else may be created, would remain a region in which Indo-Pak
squabbling and covert efforts for domination would be a
permanent feature, and would intertwine continuously with
the larger enterprise of Islamist extremist terrorism that
currently plagues so much of the world. Such a 'solution'
would, in other words, fail altogether to address the basic
conflict between the two countries - and this conflict,
as has been repeatedly emphasised, is a conflict of irreducible
ideologies, the one committed to exclusionary religious
identities and quasi theocratic-domination, and the other
to liberal, secular and democratic values.
Both on grounds of justice and considerations of the future
stability in the region, it is, consequently, a survival
imperative for South Asia that no further part of it be
transformed by vivisection into another communal ghetto,
and that those who have long harnessed terrorism to secure
this end be comprehensively defeated, not appeased.
On a diplomatic level, India has refused to respond to Musharraf's
new proposals on the ground that these have not been formally
presented, though many a feather has obviously been ruffled.
The proposals have, moreover, been widely rejected both
within Pakistan and in Indian circles. Significantly, this
is a time when Musharraf is alienated from virtually every
element of his domestic political constituency as a result
of his engagement with the US in the 'war against terrorism',
of holding on to the uniform, proclaimed madrassah reforms,
reforms for the protection of women and prevention of 'honour
killings', the military campaigns in Baluchistan and the
NWFP, etc. However tardy or tentative his reform initiatives
may be, each has won him a different set of enemies in the
country. He has, of course, consolidated his position within
the military hierarchy through the reshuffle on October
3. But, his dilution of Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite,
virtually gospel for the Army and a sheet anchor of the
Pakistani position for over five decades, can only create
more enemies in key institutions.
What, precisely, could Musharraf have hoped to gain by articulating
these proposals at this time and in this manner. Taking
the negotiations process with India forward cannot have
been an objective: the hard core of diplomatic negotiations
is never advanced through media posturing, and is often
obstructed by ill conceived proposals aired in public fora
at the highest levels of leadership. The rare occasion on
which such announcements serve a positive purpose are cases
where diplomatic relations have broken down or are so strained
as to make meaningful discourse impossible - as was the
case with then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's 'offer
of friendship' to Pakistan at a public meeting in Srinagar,
which eventually translated itself into the present dialogue
process. Such a situation clearly does not prevail at present,
and an institutional process of negotiations has been established
and has widely been proclaimed to be 'moving forward'.
Despite their air of spontaneity, there is evidence that
Musharraf's statements are part of a considered strategy.
For one thing, they elaborated on earlier statements that
he made during an interview with an Indian journalist, published
on October 13, 2004. Moreover, past experience suggests
that Musharraf's public declarations are often of the nature
of establishing new goalposts, and he can be relied on to
follow his declared ends, albeit with a great deal of tactical
flexibility. Clearly, then, the new 'formulae' are intended
to be pursued as goals of national policy over the foreseeable
future. It is evident, now, that the processes of jehadi
attrition, which Pakistan had deployed against India, cannot
be sustained indefinitely at required levels of intensity.
As a result, a process of political and diplomatic attrition
would need to be intensified if even limited Pakistani objectives
with regard to J&K are to be secured. Musharraf's proposal
for a resolution of the 'Kashmir issue' in 'geographical
terms' remains part of the continued effort to fulfil his
country's communal mandate and agenda 'through other means'.
Salvaging a Relationship
Guest Writer: E.N. Rammohan
Member, National Security Advisory Board; Former Director
General, Border Security Force
During the five-day state visit to India by the Chairman
of Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), Senior General Than Shwe, from October 25-29, 2004,
three agreements were signed between the two countries,
including a critical 'Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation
in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues'. The Agreement
affirmed the commitment to "enhance cooperation against
terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking,
organized crime, international economic crime and cyber
crime". General Than Shwe also assured the Indian leadership
that Myanmar would not permit its territory to be used by
any hostile element for harming Indian interests and whenever
information on such activity came to Myanmar's notice, they
would not hesitate to take appropriate action against such
groups. This agreement signaled a return to classical diplomacy,
as India abandoned its rigidly moralistic posture on the
restoration of democracy in Myanmar and acknowledged that
it needed Yangon's full cooperation to ensure that insurgent
groups operating in India's Northeast did not continue to
secure sanctuary on Myanmarese soil. Other ways would have
to be found to encourage democracy movements in neighbouring
countries.
The location of Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar dates
back to the 1950s, when Independent India's first insurgent
group, the Naga Underground Army first sought shelter in
the Sagaing region there. Since then, several insurgent
groups from India's Northeast have followed suit. This is,
in a sense, natural for insurgent groups from Nagaland,
Manipur and Mizoram, since these States have extensive borders
with Myanmar.
During the first thirty years of independence, the Myanmar
Government did not have much control over its border areas.
Going in an arc from the southwest to the southeast, the
Arakanese, Chins, Nagas, Kachins, Was, Shans, Karens and
Karennis were all against the mainland Burmese. This had
a parallel in India's northeastern regions - the Khasi Hills,
Jaintia Hills, Garo Hills, Mizo Hills, Naga Hills, and the
tribes in the Churachandpur, Ukhrul and Senapati districts
of Manipur. These tribes were, by and large, Christian while
the plains people were Hindus or Muslims. In Myanmar, the
tribes listed were also predominantly Christian, while the
Myanmarese in the mainland were Buddhist. All the tribes
on the periphery feared domination by the more powerful
and culturally dissimilar Centre, and all of them, without
exception, took to arms and fought bush wars against Yangon
(then Rangoon). As a result the border areas were neither
properly developed nor adequately policed and it was natural
for insurgent groups from India's Northeast to cross over
and seek support from groups like the Kachin Independent
Army (KIA). The process was facilitated even further by
the fact that tribes had a great deal in common with contiguously
located tribes across the border - the Nagas, for instance,
have long settled on both sides of what is now the Indo-Myanmar
border (and, indeed, the 'Greater Nagalim' that Naga rebel
groups seek to secure claims significant parts of Myanmarese
territory). After, the Shillong Accord was signed with the
Naga Underground Army in 1975, one section broke away to
subsequently form the National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN), and it was in the Sagaing Division of Myanmar, that
its headquarters was set up, with the Hemi Naga leader,
Khaplang as its Chief, along with Thuingaleng Muivah and
Isaac Swu. After the split in the NSCN on April 30, 1988,
the Khaplang faction continued to maintain its headquarters
in the Sagaing Division in Myanmar.
Similarly, during Manipur's long history, their Rajas controlled
the whole of Kebaw Valley for the better part of a thousand
years, and during this period hundred's of Meiteis settled
in that Valley and even beyond in what is now Myanmar. When
Meitei insurgent groups were formed in Manipur, such as
the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
in 1978, the Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
in 1977, and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
in 1964, they all took sanctuary in Myanmar and established
camps there.
During all these years, the Myanmar Army conducted sporadic
operations in their tribal areas, but the Army returned
to its bases in the mainland after each operation. It was
only after the military took over the Government after the
coup in 1988 that the problem in the border areas was properly
addressed. The Army conducted operations in the Karen areas,
driving their insurgent groups into Thailand. The Karens
were also divided, as Yangon bolstered a Buddhist faction
among them. Rangoon also managed to convince the Kachins
to sign a peace treaty. Khun Sa, the drug baron, also negotiated
a settlement with the Military Government and the Shan State
Army was neutralized. The drug trade, however, continued
and it was widely known that the architect of some of these
agreements, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt the former Military Intelligence
Chief, had a share in its control. (Prime Minister Khin
Nyunt was removed from his post in a recent purge authored
by Than Shwe)
After the military coup in 1988, the Foreign Minister of
Myanmar begged India to help rebuild their country, but
Delhi, regrettably, turned a deaf year and Myanmar was treated
as a pariah nation. China saw the vacuum and stepped in.
Today, the Myanmar Army is fully equipped with Chinese arms,
the Myanmar market is flooded with Chinese goods that find
their way into the Northeast through the porous borders
between Myanmar and India. In the meanwhile, the Indian
Government continued moralizing about the way the Military
Government had crushed democracy in Myanmar by not allowing
Aung San Su Kyi to form the Government after her National
League for Democracy (NLD) won the elections in 1990.
In 1995, after some persuasion, the Myanmar Army agreed
to conduct joint counter-insurgency operations with the
Indian Army. Operation Golden bird was launched to intercept
a party of the NSCN - Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM),
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
which was ferrying arms from Bandarban through the Chin
Hills to Manipur. In the midst of the operation, after thirty-eight
militants had been killed and more than a hundred weapons
captured, New Delhi announced the Nehru Award to Aung San
Su Kyi. Offended, the Myanmar Army abruptly called off the
Operation, and it is estimated that more than a hundred
militants escaped with their weapons.
At least one major group of Indian insurgents, the UNLF
from Manipur, has procured all its weapons from Myanmar.
With an estimated strength of 2,000 cadres and as many AK
rifles, the group has also acquired some RPG-7 rocket launchers,
RPD 7.62 light machine guns, and even one Air Defence gun.
In 2000-2001 the Myanmar Army reportedly captured more than
a hundred cadres of the UNLF in the Kebaw valley. The cadres
were released, but the weapons were confiscated. Clearly
the Myanmar Army did not care to hand the militants over
to the Indian side.
What is not well known is that India's intelligence agencies
had, at one time, helped the Khaplang faction with weapons
to fight the Myanmar Army. This was done to persuade Khaplang
to fight the NSCN-IM after their split, and this is something
Yangon will not easily forget.
Incidentally the NSCN-IM has used Myanmar territory to go
to Bangladesh to collect arms that they procured through
Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Bangladesh
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). The arms
were procured from Thailand, brought by coastal steamer
to Cox's Bazaar and then carried overland via Bandarban
into Myanmar and then into Manipur across the Chin Hills.
The first consignment was brought in 1992, and two consignments
are presumed to have followed in 1993 and 1994.
It is rather late in the day to salvage something from India's
tattered relationship with Myanmar. India had completely
thrown to the winds all practical norms of diplomacy and
international relations in taking an arrogant and judgmental
moral stance towards a country bordering its sensitive and
volatile Northeast. China has already donned the key role
in aiding and assisting Myanmar in every sphere, and has
established a Naval station in the Cocos Islands on Myanmar's
western coast, which monitors the movement of the Indian
Navy in the Bay of Bengal. It is not clear how much of this
can be reversed and whether India's proposed cultural, economic
and 'non-traditional security' cooperation can help restore
relations to the strength and profundity that strategic
considerations would demand.
Insurgent groups in India's Northeast have found secure
safe havens in three countries in their neighbourhood over
the years - Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar. With Bhutan's
military operation against the insurgent camps of the ULFA,
the NDFB and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO)
in December 2003, Bhutanese soil was cleared of the insurgent
presence. However, a significant proportion of the cadres
of the ULFA and the NDFB who were squeezed out of Bhutan,
have crossed over to Myanmar. Both these groups had already
established camps in Myanmar with the NSCN-K's support,
long before the Bhutan Operations. Effective joint operations
after the new agreement between Delhi and Yangon on non-traditional
security cooperation - if it is implemented in good faith
and with some vigour on both sides - may help clear Myanmar
of the scourge as well, leaving Bangladesh as the only safe-haven
for insurgent and terrorist groups in the region.
Some elements in India's foreign office believe that the
'isolation' of Bangladesh in this manner would force the
country to rethink its support to Indian insurgent groups
and anti-state terrorism in India. This expectation, however,
is far from realistic. Bangladesh has its objectives clear:
they want the whole of India's Northeast and Myanmar's Arakans
for their 'homeland', and have repeatedly articulated this
idea, often under the objectionable title of "Lebensraum
for Bangladesh" (as in an article published in Holiday
of October 1991). All India's pleas for action against camps
of Indian insurgent groups in Bangladesh have met with bland
denials, and it is folly to persist in giving Dhaka lists
of camps with grid references. Subsequent reports have repeatedly
shown what happens on the ground after each such list is
given to Dhaka: Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) officials or representatives
of the DGFI visit the camps and have them shifted a few
hundred yards. No automatic changes can be expected in Bangladesh's
postures and policies in the wake of any major cooperative
action between India and Myanmar. Much more pragmatic action
is required if insurgent groups are to be discouraged from
camping comfortably in Bangladesh.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
October
25-31, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
1
|
0
|
5
|
6
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
5
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
4
|
3
|
20
|
27
|
Left-wing
extremism
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Manipur
|
2
|
2
|
7
|
11
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Tripura
|
3
|
0
|
3
|
6
|
Total (INDIA)
|
12
|
5
|
36
|
53
|
NEPAL
|
1
|
0
|
14
|
15
|
PAKISTAN
|
19
|
1
|
3
|
23
|
SRI LANKA
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Next
round
of
talks
with
Naxalites
linked
to
laying
down
of
arms,
says
Andhra
Pradesh
Director
General
of
Police:
The
Director-General
of
Police
in
Andhra
Pradesh,
S.R.
Sukumara,
has
stated
that
the
laying
down
of
arms
by
left
wing
extremists
(also
known
as
Naxalites)
will
be
the
key
to
holding
the
second
round
of
talks
with
them.
In
an
interview
to
a
national
daily
on
October
27,
the
senior
police
official
said
that
the
Government
had
made
its
stand
clear
and
was
awaiting
a
response
from
extremists.
Depending
upon
the
extremists'
reply,
the
Government
would
take
a
final
decision
on
holding
the
next
round
of
talks
or,
in
the
extreme,
"resume
combing",
he
added.
To
a
question
whether
the
Government
was
heading
towards
a
situation
where
the
ceasefire
would
be
violated
by
taking
up
'combing',
Sukumara
said
there
was
never
a
ceasefire
agreement
with
the
Naxalites.
It
was
only
a
"no
first
fire
agreement".
The
Hindu,
October
28,
2004
Assam
Government
asks
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
to
depute
representatives:
The
Assam
government,
on
October
25,
asked
the
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB)
to
depute
representatives
to
finalise
the
ground
rules
of
ceasefire.
Addressing
a
press
conference
in
Guwahati,
Chief
Minister
Tarun
Gogoi
said
that
the
State
Government
has
written
to
the
NDFB
'chairman'
Ranjan
Daimari
alias
D.R.
Nabla
to
nominate
a
few
leaders
who
would
represent
the
organization
during
formulation
of
the
ceasefire
ground
rules
and
in
the
peace
talks
that
would
follow.
Sentinel
Assam,
October
26,
2004
PAKISTAN
Pakistan
bureau
of
Al
Jazeera
received
latest
Bin
Laden
tape:
The
Pakistan
bureau
of
Al
Jazeera
television
received
the
latest
videotape
of
Osama
bin
Laden,
in
which
he
warned
the
United
States
of
more
attacks
like
those
on
September
11,
2001,
its
bureau
chief
said
on
October
30
in
Islamabad.
"Someone
came
on
Friday
and
dropped
an
envelope
at
our
gate.
When
I
opened
and
played
it,
it
was
a
great
scoop,"
Ahmad
Muaffaq
Zaidan
told
Reuters,
adding
that
he
did
not
know
who
had
delivered
the
tape.
Zaidan,
a
Syrian,
had
reportedly
met
bin
Laden
several
times
before
the
September
11
attacks
and
had
published
a
book
based
on
his
interviews
with
him
in
2002.
The
News,
October
31,
2004
17
tribesmen
killed
in
South
Waziristan:
17
tribesmen
of
the
Mahsud
jirga
were
killed
and
many
were
injured
in
a
rocket
attack
near
Jandola,
65
kilometres
east
of
Wana
in
the
South
Waziristan
agency
on
October
26
afternoon.
Army
spokesman
Maj.
Gen.
Shaukat
Sultan
blamed
militants
for
the
incident
that
occurred
in
Sheikh
Ziarat
near
Jandola
and
said,
"Militants
fired
a
107mm
rocket
at
the
jirga".
However,
resident
tribesmen
disputed
the
spokesman's
claim
and
accused
the
security
forces
of
targeting
the
tribesmen.
Daily
Times,
October
27,
2004
President
Pervez
Musharraf
proposes
new
solutions
for
resolving
Kashmir
issue:
Addressing
a
gathering
of
editors
and
senior
journalists
at
an
iftar
dinner
in
Islamabad
on
October
25,
President
General
Pervez
Musharraf
said
a
stage
had
come
to
move
forward
for
a
solution
to
the
Kashmir
issue
since
a
great
deal
of
progress
in
this
direction
had
been
made
already.
Rejecting
the
Line
of
Control
(LoC)
as
a
permanent
border,
he
explained
the
geographical
status
of
Kashmir,
which,
he
said,
was
divided
in
seven
regions
-
five
with
India
and
two
with
Pakistan.
"The
beauty
of
these
regions
is
that
they
are
still
religion
based
even
if
we
consider
them
geographically."
President
Musharraf
offered
"food
for
thought"
by
suggesting
that
the
debate
could
be
initiated
in
the
context
of
a
three-pronged
discourse.
First,
identify
the
region
at
stake.
Second,
demilitarize
it.
Third,
change
its
status.
He
suggested
there
were
many
options
which
could
then
be
considered,
and
legal
experts
on
both
sides
could
then
look
at
the
pros
and
cons
of
ideas
for
joint
control,
UN
mandates,
condominiums,
and
so
on.
He
added
Pakistan
had
proposed
demilitarization
of
'held
Kashmir'
and
if
India
came
up
with
a
similar
proposal
asking
Pakistan
to
do
likewise
in
'Azad
Kashmir',
then
these
issues
would
need
to
be
discussed
and
Pakistan
would
have
to
build
a
consensus
for
moving
forward.
Dawn,
The
News,
Daily
Times,
October
26,
2004
SRI
LANKA
LTTE
has
not
abandoned
the
'right
to
secede',
states
Anton
Balasingham:
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE)
'ideologue'
and
chief
negotiator,
Anton
Balasingham
has
remarked
that
Tamil
Tigers
have
not
abandoned
their
'right
to
secede'
despite
agreeing
to
explore
a
federal
solution,
amid
fresh
diplomatic
moves
to
salvage
a
faltering
peace
bid.
"The
Liberation
Tigers'
decision
to
explore
federalism
...
does
not
entail
an
unconditional
abandonment
of
the
Tamils'
right
to
external
self-determination
and
secession,"
he
stated.
Balasingham's
remarks
has
been
taken
from
his
yet
unpublished
new
book
"War
and
Peace".
The
H
indu,
Tamil
Net,
October
28,
2004
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