Summitry in New
York
Guest Writer: G. Parthasarathy
Columnist and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
Spin doctors who accompany Indian Prime Ministers and Foreign
Ministers on visits abroad routinely use terms like 'breakthrough'
and 'historic' to describe meetings that their bosses hold.
This is particularly true when summit meetings take place
either in the White House, or with Pakistani leaders. When
India's youngest Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met Pakistan's
youngest Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad in 1989,
there was no dearth of hangers-on in Rajiv Gandhi's entourage
gushingly telling him how good the two young Prime Ministers
looked on television and how the new generation of leaders
would set aside the mindsets of the past and usher in a
new era of eternal friendship. Barely a few months after
this Summit, Pakistan's leaders were fomenting insurrection
in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) with shrill calls for "Azadi" (Freedom).
A decade later, Prime Minister Vajpayee embarked on his
now famous bus journey to Lahore, only to find his dreams
of a 'breakthrough' shattered on the high hill tops of Kargil.
What India's Pakistan-obsessed media and bleeding-heart
liberals failed to understand was that both in 1989 and
in 1999, elected Indian Prime Ministers were dealing with
counterparts in Pakistan who had little say in influencing
the policies that Army Chiefs like Generals Aslam Beg and
Pervez Musharraf were controlling - policies aiming to 'bleed
India with a thousand cuts'. Unlike sentimental Indians,
the Pakistani military establishment conducts its policies
towards India not out of any sentimentality, but on the
basis of prevailing domestic and international power dynamics.
What were
the prevailing domestic and international factors influencing
Musharraf when he met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on September
24? Domestically, he was finding a lack of adequate support
for his plans to continue as Army Chief beyond December
31. While he could quite easily stage another bogus 'referendum'
and announce that he had secured public support for his
plans, this route could further expose his lack of democratic
and constitutional legitimacy. Secondly, with two four star
generals scheduled to retire on October 7, he could never
be sure of the unquestioned loyalty of an officer at least
seven years his junior, who would become Army chief, if
he decides to go the constitutional way, and relinquish
his job as Pakistan's Army Chief. Musharraf knows better
than anyone else, that political power in Pakistan grows
out of the barrel of a gun. Things would become infinitely
more complicated for him, if he became internationally isolated
and lost the support of the Americans. The Americans, in
turn, do not want him to get embroiled in tensions with
India, but rather to focus his attention on stabilizing
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where around 70,000 Pakistani
troops are now deployed, fighting remnants of the Al
Qaeda and its supporters.
Adding to Musharraf's complications is the fact that his
favourite jihadis from groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
are now targeting him personally. The other hot Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) favourite, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
is now a house divided, with the leadership of Hafiz Mohammed
Saeed being called into question and a senior leader, Maulana
Ibrahim Salfi, assassinated in broad daylight. Within Kashmir,
the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
remains another house divided, despite attempts by diplomats
like Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri and Foreign
Secretary Riaz Khokar to bring them together, under the
tutelage of Syed Ali Shah Geelani. It is interesting that
even as Musharraf was meeting Manmohan Singh in New York,
the 'moderate' APHC leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was said
to be busy meeting the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) leader
Sardar Qayyum and ISI Chief General Ehsan-ul-Haq in Saudi
Arabia. Failure to re-establish a united fifth column like
the Hurriyat would be a setback for Pakistan's efforts to
keep the pot boiling in the Kashmir Valley. Given these
developments, it is only logical for Musharraf to buy time
by continuing the dialogue process with India, while making
it clear to his domestic audience that he still remains
committed to the ISI's larger strategic objective of weakening
India from within. Musharraf played his cards very well
in New York, telling his domestic audience that he had not
forsaken larger objectives, while persuading the international
community that he was a changed man, fully opposed to terrorism.
Not surprisingly, the statement that Musharraf read out
after his meeting with Manmohan Singh was worded to lend
itself to different interpretations. This is going to be
controversial, especially as Delhi's United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) Government has been less than pro-active
in focusing domestic and international public and media
attention on the details and implications of Pakistan sponsored
terrorism. The Government has also not effectively rebutted
Pakistan's charges of human rights violations, or exposed
the gross violations of human rights in PoK. Musharraf made
it clear that there could be no improvement in economic
relations till the Kashmir issue was resolved to his satisfaction.
He had earlier described Indian allegations of Pakistani
support for terrorism as being 'hackneyed'. Dr. Manmohan
Singh, however, subsequently asserted: "Terrorism did come
up in our discussions and I mentioned unambiguously to President
Musharraf that the starting point of the whole dialogue
process is the commitment given by Pakistan in the January
6 statement, that territory under Pakistan's control will
not be used for terrorist activities." For good measure
Dr. Singh added: "We cannot discuss substantive issues and
Confidence Building Measures if terrorist activities are
not controlled. Therefore, there is no doubt that this is
the pre-condition to moving forward."
There have, however been two important, but unpublicized
developments in recent talks with Pakistan. During discussions
with Khurshid Kasuri, External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh
made it clear that India was concerned about the lack of
representative institutions, democratic freedoms and meaningful
autonomy in PoK and the Northern Areas in the PoK. It also
seems that Dr. Manmohan Singh has thrown the ball back in
Musharraf's court by asking him to spell out what he believes
could be the basis of 'reasonable' and mutually acceptable
solutions to the issue of J&K.
General Musharraf's game plan is now reasonably clear. He
will not raise the level of terrorist violence beyond India's
threshold of tolerance. Given the dissensions within jihadi
outfits supported by the ISI, General Ehsan ul Haq will
be given time to prepare new strategies to keep the pot
boiling with terrorist violence. At the same time, coercive
pressure and threats to their lives will be used to get
the Hurriyat leaders to fall in line. In negotiations with
India, the effort will be to get India to accept the gas
pipeline project and agree to a pullback of its forces from
Siachen. There is no dearth of people in India, including
some in Manmohan Singh's Cabinet, who would like us to accept
these Pakistani wishes with no quid pro quo, either
on developing normal trade and economic relations, including
transit rights to Afghanistan, or on ending cross-border
terrorism. But it appears unlikely that Dr. Manmohan Singh
will oblige them!
While it is in India's interests to press ahead with moves
for demanding more democratic freedoms in PoK and suggesting
measures to open the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service,
much is now going to depend on how the Government manages
the situation within Kashmir, so that people there realize
that increasing pressure has to be put on Pakistani jihadis,
by identifying their hideouts and eliminating them. No effort
can be spared to demonstrate to people in J&K that playing
the Pakistani game, as elements in the Hurriyat are now
doing, has no future. The scope of Delhi's interlocutor
in J&K, N.N. Vohra's political dialogue needs to be expanded
to take into account the views of all sections of the people
in the State.
Given the way that developments in Kashmir and Manipur have
been handled in recent months, there is little reason to
be optimistic that this task can be carried out imaginatively
by the Home Ministry. Delhi will have to formulate policies
to respond appropriately and pro-actively to Pakistan's
efforts to destabilize the situation within India.
There is no place for sentimentality on this score.
Crouching Government,
Hidden Maoists
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On September 23, 2004, the Nepal Government led by Prime
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, officially invited the Maoists
for peace talks to resolve the eight year old insurgency,
which has already claimed more than 10,000 lives. Reacting
to the Government's official call, Communist Party of Nepal
- Maoist (CPN-M) Chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda,
questioned the status and legitimacy of the incumbent Government,
though he has not explicitly rejected the call. Prachanda
had denounced Deuba's Government when it was installed by
King Gyanendra in June 2004, and has now reiterated his
contempt for a Government 'dominated by foreign reactionaries,
feudal Palace, and Army generals.' He also demanded that
the Government should clarify the King's position on the
Maoists prime agenda - the 'Constituent assembly' - and
has condemned military assistance received from foreign
countries, especially India.
After his
return from the five-day official visit to India, Prime
Minster Deuba has urgently worked to restore peace talks.
During his Indian tour, the magnitude and intensity of the
conflict had been discussed extensively and the Indian Government
had expressed concern about the Maoist insurgency, asserting
that it was a 'shared threat' for both the countries. India
also pledged more military assistance for the Royal Nepalese
Army (RNA) and offered counter-insurgency training for Nepali
security forces. India did, however, qualify that a purely
'military solution' could not resolve the crisis in Nepal.
India's support has helped Kathmandu adopt a posture of
some strength against the Maoists, but has also intensified
the resolve to seek a solution through talks.
The 'All Party' Government, which was appointed by the King
under Article 127 of the country's constitution, neither
has the mandate, nor has it been able to define its 'bottom
line' for negotiations with the insurgents. This was evident
in the high-level peace committee's invitation to the insurgents
for negotiations, without any clarity on the agenda of the
peace process. Deuba has had a bitter experience with the
Maoists during his previous tenure as Prime Minister in
2001, and is now very cautious and unwilling to take the
blame for any possible future failure of the negotiations.
Meanwhile, the Government's critical ally, the Communist
Party of Nepal - United Maoist Leninist (CPN-UML), has been
organizing political meetings all over the country to pressurize
the Government for peace process, even as it seeks to distance
itself from any responsibility for possible failure. Earlier,
the CPN-UML General Secretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had held
secret talks with the Maoists in the Indian state of Uttar
Pradesh, shortly after the breakdown of the peace process
in August 2003.
On the other hand, the Opposition Alliance led by the Nepali
Congress (NC) has again stepped into the streets to continue
their 'anti-regression' demonstrations and strikes in the
country and has sought to indict the Government at every
possible opportunity. The continuing political chaos and
inadequate cooperation among various Constitutional forces
has facilitated the consolidation of the insurgents' position,
and encouraged them to escalate their demands.
Earlier, on September 2, 2004, 'Chairman' Prachanda had
bluntly ruled out the possibility of talks with the Government,
stating that his party would enter into a dialogue only
with the "owners of the old regime", with the eventual objective
of direct talks with King Gyanendra. In parallel efforts,
the Maoists are trying to internationalize the issue, seeking
Governmental assent for third party mediation by the United
Nations or other international 'human rights' agency, on
the grounds that such 'nonpartisan' intervention was necessary
to hold the King and the Government to their assurances
in case of talks. However, even as the Maoists urge the
Government to create a 'concrete environment' for peace
talks, they have continued with their campaign of violence
against the Security Forces, Government officials and common
civilians.
The recent success of Maoist affiliates, the All Nepal Trade
Union Federation (ANTUF) and All Nepal National Independent
Students Union-Revolutionary (ANNISU-R) forcing concessions
on their demands after they had cut off Kathmandu through
an 'economic blockade' for over a week, has demonstrated
the efficacy with which the Maoists can exploit their sister
organizations for disruptive activities in support of their
own terror tactics. To comply with their demands, the Government
released two ANTUF leaders, Resham Lama and Bishnu Bahadur
Thapa Magar, and also announced the status of the detained
Maoist leaders and their cadres in prison. Significantly,
such campaigns of political disruption tend to avert or
moderate direct condemnation by the 'international community'.
In complementary moves, the Maoist strategy of 'protracted
war', which was earlier confined to the rural districts,
has now rapidly begun to spread towards urban centres, including
the capital Kathmandu as well. The recent economic blockade
of Kathmandu, bomb attacks on hotels in the Capital and
the demand for closure of 47 industries all over the country
are a direct attack on the national economy, and on the
regime's capacity to govern. The tourism industry, a major
source of revenue - which had largely been exempted from
Maoist violence in the early phases of the movement - has
now been totally paralyzed. Maoist efforts are now focused
on building a strong base in the 'Ring Area' region (the
districts surrounding the capital, Kathmandu) to construct
what would be a final challenge to the central authority.
Since the collapse of the cease-fire on August 27, 2003,
the Maoists have abducted
more than 19,500 people, largely teachers and students,
for their 'educational training' and 'military training'
programmes. At the same time, recruitment has been intensified
to increase the strength of their cadres. More than 4,500
Village Development Committee (VDC) offices have been demolished
and VDC secretaries across the country resigned in order
to save their lives. A virtually country-wide network of
extortion has been established and, the Maoists now demand
'taxes' for their 'People's Governments' from national and
international NGO's, as well as money from district authorities.
They now run parallel governments in 21 Districts, and recently
started announcing 'economic budgets' for their stronghold
areas. Separately, they reportedly conducted an 'election'
at Sundarkhala in Kailali district in the Far Western Region
to elect the chairman and vice-chairman of the 'Village
People's Government'. It is clear that the Maoists have
now either established dominance in large parts of the country,
or demolished the state's authority in regions that they
are still to bring under their control.
There are reports that the Revolutionary International Movement
(RIM) and the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and
Organisation of South Asia (CCOMPOSA)
are encouraging the Nepali Maoists to resist or reject any
offer of negotiations by the Government. The survival and
success of the Nepali Maoists is seen by these entities
as integral to the broader enterprise of the 'peoples' war'
in the entire region.
The Government is, at present, confronted not only with
a crisis but also a dilemma. The Maoists insist that the
regime rejects all further military aid by foreign powers
- and particularly India - as a precondition to any possible
peace process; they have also demanded that the 'terrorist'
tag be removed from their organization, and that they be
allowed to freely engage in 'political activity' without
let or hindrance from the state's Forces. However, conceding
these demands would simply leave the entire country open
to unimpeded Maoist operations and expansion - since the
Maoists have never accepted the Government's reflexive conditionality
of a laying down of arms. This has been the pattern of the
past, when the Maoists have used periods of negotiations
for massive recruitment, training and consolidation, even
as they have protested every Military operation or arrest
against them as a breach of the 'peace process'.
As things stand, it is evident that the Maoists see their
'people's war' as having entered its penultimate stage,
with the encirclement and collapse of the central authority
appearing increasingly imminent. Under the circumstances,
the rebels have little motivation - beyond the purely tactical
- to negotiate an effective peace with the state. The situation
in the war-torn Himalayan Kingdom could, consequently, be
slated for further deterioration in the proximate future.
