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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 38, April 5, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Disturbing Mandate
Guest Writer: Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor, Sunday Times, Colombo
The message in the verdict was loud and clear. Though the
people have voted out the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration,
they have not voted in a party with a clear majority. A
hung parliament scenario confronts Sri Lanka as its people
prepare for the Sinhala and Tamil New Year in the coming
week, while the country faces multiple uncertainties regarding
the nature of the new Government and how it would address
the ethnic issue and the economic challenge. At the time
of writing, the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA)
- a coalition between President Kumaratunga's Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP) and the ultra-national socialist Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - which emerged as the party with
the largest number of seats, was all set to form a minority
Government.
But the uncertainty with regard to the course of the peace
process and the economy still remains.
In two years, the Wickremesinghe administration succeeded
in stopping a 20-year separatist war and salvaging the economy,
with the GDP recovering from a negative rate to a healthy
6 percent - achievements that were rewarded by the international
community with a promise of US $ 4.5 billion in aid over
the following three years.
With the election results returning a coalition that has
radically different views on the economy and the peace process,
the gains made over the past two years may be frozen or
squandered, as the international community is unlikely to
commit itself before it is confident of the direction and
intentions of the new Government.
The results also demonstrate clearly that Sri Lanka has
become a polarized nation. The South has responded in kind
to the North's effort to rally behind the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
which backed the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) - better
known as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).
Election results show that more than 90 percent of the Tamils
in the North and East have voted for the ITAK, while 55
percent of the people in the South have not voted in favour
of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National
Front (UNF) in spite of the administration's relative success
in keeping the guns silent for more than two years.
In fact, one of the main reasons for the defeat of the UNF
was the erosion of its vote bank in favour of the all-monks
party, the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), which has won nine
seats, creating a landmark in the parliamentary history
of Sri Lanka.
The UNF's defeat is an indication that the masses had accepted
the opposition charges that the Wickremesinghe administration
was corrupt and had made too many concessions to the LTTE.
The economic dividends of peace, which the Prime Minister
spoke highly of during the election campaign, it appears,
have not traveled beyond Colombo to win over the support
of the rural masses, for whom the most pressing issues are
fertilizer subsidies and poverty-reduction doles. They have
also, significantly, rejected the notion of peace at any
cost and helped the anti-devolution JVP to gain a maximum
number of seats. In fact, the JVP accounts for 40 of the
105 seats that the UPFA has won.
Ironically, the results of the April 2, 2004, general elections
have only strengthened the hands of the LTTE, which had
been somewhat weakened by the rebellion of its eastern commander,
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna. While it will
be a matter of time before the LTTE can overcome the Karuna
crisis, the elections results have handed the LTTE-backed
TNA, which won 22 seats, the power to make or break the
Government.
Though the UPFA has emerged as the party with the largest
number of seats, it still falls short of the magical 113
required to form the Government. With the JHU refusing to
align with either of the main parties, the UPFA can only
form a minority Government - meaning that Sri Lanka has
once again slumped into political instability, putting the
peace process and the economy into jeopardy.
In an effort to form a stable Government, the UPFA is reported
to have made overtures to the Karuna faction, which has
issued a directive to the five TNA members elected from
Batticaloa and Amparai districts - where the Karuna faction's
writ reigns. But it is unlikely that the five members would
back the UPFA even if Karuna orders them to do so, because
they would not dare to provoke the wrath of the LTTE's Wanni
leadership. Besides, such a flirtation with the Karuna faction
will certainly antagonize the LTTE's Wanni leadership, which
holds the key to both war and peace. It needs also to be
noted here, that the LTTE had obtained undated resignation
letters from all TNA candidates even before they were elected
as MPs.
The only option available for the UPFA is to woo the Ceylon
Workers' Congress (CWC), which contested the elections on
the UNF ticket and is projected to have won as many as six
seats. Even if the CWC, which represents the plantation
people of Indian origin, joins the UPFA in a coalition,
President Kumaratunga's new alliance will still be two short
of a simple majority.
At the time of writing, moves were under way to woo small
parties. Even if the UPFA manages to garner 113 seats with
the help of small parties, it is not clear how it would
resume the peace process.
The LTTE has said that, whichever party comes to power,
it wants the peace process resumed by the end of April with
its proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)
forming the basis for negotiations. It has also said it
will not renegotiate the ceasefire agreement.
In the light of the LTTE stance, can the President who is
now a political hostage in the hands of the JVP, go ahead
with the peace proposals she put forward in 2000? The Kumaratunga
proposals contained an extensive devolution package, which
the JVP had then rejected. The JVP still opposes devolution
of power as a solution to the ethnic problem, but sees decentralization
of the administration as a means of solving the national
question.
The JVP has also rejected outright the LTTE's ISGA proposals,
while the SLFP has given tacit acceptance to these as a
basis for negotiations.
The JVP position is obviously unacceptable to the LTTE.
The sharp difference in the policies of the two main coalition
partners in the UPFA is likely to hamper the peace process
and heighten the chances of a breakdown, and war. Both the
SLFP and the JVP say they are for peace and will resume
talks with the LTTE. But the difference is that, while the
SLFP is ready for unconditional talks, the JVP wants to
resume talks on what it calls 'reasonable' conditions.
The coalition partners do, however, agree that the LTTE
is not the 'sole representative' of the Tamils, and such
a position would certainly not be acceptable to the LTTE.
With the coalition partners divided on the approach to peace
and not willing to recognize the LTTE as the sole representative
of Tamils, the country could possibly be dragged back into
war. The only factors that can hold the LTTE from tearing
up the ceasefire and going back to war are: first, the Karuna
rebellion; second, the post-September 11 global war on terrorism;
and third, connected to the second, is the LTTE's effort
to gain international recognition as 'freedom fighters'.
Added to this uncertainty are the questions regarding the
direction of the economy. The JVP is pushing for a mixed
economy with import restrictions and an anti-privatization
drive, as opposed to the SLFP's free-market policies. Besides,
the UPFA manifesto has promised welfare measures, which
the country can ill afford, given the current weakness of
the economy. Economists say that the resultant uncertainty
will erode investor confidence, which in turn will result
in a foreign exchange crisis, prompting the new administration
to resort to austerity measures.
A minority Government and uncertainties regarding the peace
process and the economy are a combination that creates a
troubling picture of Sri Lanka's future.
'Why do they hate
us?'
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
After the shock and horror of 9/11, many Americans turned
inwards in incomprehension: 'Why do they hate us?' they
asked, and a substantial literature of rationalization was
constructed, drawing largely on America's past foreign policy
errors and excesses, as well as the 'historical wrongs'
inflicted on the 'Islamic world' by the 'West'. Not everyone
was seduced by this literature of dubious justification,
and at least some rightly pointed to the proliferating 'assembly-lines
of jehad', the well funded 'schools of hatred' -
the numerous and powerful marakiz (Islamic religious
centres) and madrassahs (religious seminaries) that
have systematically poisoned the minds of children, demonised
non-Muslim cultures, and mobilized, motivated and trained
armies of radicalised terrorists for their 'global jehad'
against 'unbelievers', 'crusaders', Jews, Christians and
Hindus. As attitudes towards terrorism hardened globally,
some of the regimes that have historically sponsored and
supported Islamist extremism and terrorism turned eagerly
to seize upon this alibi, denouncing these 'aberrant institutions',
and promising 'madrassah reforms'.
Prominent among these terrorist-sponsoring states has been
America's new 'major non-NATO ally', Pakistan. General Pervez
Musharraf's regime has, over the past years, been insisting
that the madrassahs and the radical clergy that leads
the most extreme among them, will be 'regulated', and a
process of registration - ignored with impunity by the overwhelming
majority of such institutions - has been established.
Behind this elaborate smokescreen, however, not only have
the madrassahs continued with their subversion of
innocent minds, but a deeper and more sinister reality has
been, till now, rather successfully concealed: the psalms
of hatred are not only taught in some supposedly 'renegade
madrassahs', but are an integral component of Pakistan's
state administered public educational system. This has long
and widely been known among those who study Pakistan with
any measure of diligence, and has been systematically documented
by several reports in the past - but has largely escaped
the attention of most Western 'experts' on terrorism in
South Asia. Even such experts may, however, find it difficult
to remain ignorant, as a succession of controversies explodes
in Pakistan on precisely these issues.
Early in March, the fundamentalist alliance, the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) disrupted the National Assembly and
staged a walk-out on the grounds that a certain reference
to jehad as well as other Quranic verses had been
'excluded' from the new edition of a state prescribed biology
textbook. Later, the Punjab Teachers Union announced
its decision to launch a protest movement from Gujranwala,
commencing April 15, if the verses were not 'reinstated'.
On March 30, 2004, however, Education Minister Zobaida Jalal
clarified that no chapter or verses relating to 'jehad'
or 'shahadat' (martyrdom) had been deleted from textbooks,
stating further that the particular verse referring to jehad
had only been 'shifted' from the biology textbook for intermediate
students (Classes XI & XII) to the 'matriculation level
courses' (Class X). The education ministry in Pakistan has
not found it expedient to inquire - as most people familiar
with the discipline of biology would - what references to
jihad were doing in the biology curriculum in the
first place. This is unsurprising, since it is the Ministry
of Education, and its subsidiary Curriculum Wing, that put
these references there.
The systematic slanting of the state prescribed curricula
for all levels of the public education system in Pakistan
has, once again, been exposed in great detail by a report
recently published by the Sustainable Development Policy
Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, titled The
Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks
in Pakistan, which is attracting a storm
of protest from Islamist fundamentalist groupings in Pakistan.
The report is abundantly clear on where the responsibility
for these persistent distortions lies: "Over the years,
it became apparent that it was in the interest of both the
military and the theocrat to promote militarism in the society.
This confluence of interests now gets reflected in the educational
material." The state's curriculum directives demanded, and
textbooks included, according to the Report,
- Material creating hate
and making enemy images
- A glorification of war
and the use of force
- Incitement to militancy
and violence, including encouragement of Jehad
and Shahadat ·
- Insensitivity to the
actually existing religious diversity of the nation, and
perspectives that encourage prejudice and discrimination
towards religious minorities.
"It is clear,"
the SDPI Report notes further, "that in the presence of
such material, peace and tolerance cannot be promoted."
The process began in the 1960s, and has been consistently
sustained and elaborated since then. Despite "subtle and
significant differences" in curricula during the Ayub, Bhutto
and Zia era, however, "there is an immense overlap which
lends credence to the argument that Pakistan has remained
essentially a military state even during ostensibly civilian
rule."
To understand, within this scheme, how jehad ends
up in a biology textbook, it is useful to note the "basic
principle that recurs repeatedly in the Pakistani curriculum
documents":
In
the teaching material, no concept of separation between
the worldly and the religious be given; rather all
the material be presented from the Islamic point of
view. [Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Class
K-V, 1995, p. 41]
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This principle
conforms to the position argued by Syed Abul A'la Maudoodi,
the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and an inspiration to
many contemporary radical Islamist ideologies, that "all
that is taught would be in the context of the revealed knowledge,
therefore every subject would become Islamiat."
The process begins at the earliest stage of schooling, and
permeates every single subject - language, literature, the
sciences, social studies, and, of course, the specialized
courses in Islamiat. The last of these are compulsory
for all Muslim students, but the minority of non-Muslims
is also offered an incentive of 25 marks for taking up the
subject.
It is useful to see how the state imposed curricular requirements
work their poison. The National Curriculum, Social Studies
for Classes I-V, issued by the Curriculum Wing in March
2002, (very much within the tenure of the present 'moderate'
regime headed by the 'democratising dictator', General Pervez
Musharraf') for instance, provides the following instructions:
"Concept: Jehad
Activities: To make speeches on Jehad
Learning outcome: Evaluate the role of India with reference
to wars of 1956 (???) (sic), 1965 and 1971 AD.
Evaluation: To judge their spirits while making speeches
on Jehad, Muslim History and Culture."
These instructions, it is useful to note, are for classes
of students in the age group 5-11 years, and constitute
part of a 'Social Studies' curriculum.
The SDPI Report notes "four primary themes that emerge most
strongly as constituting the bulk of the curricula and textbooks
of the three compulsory subjects" (Social Studies/ Pakistan
Studies, Urdu and English):
- that Pakistan is for
Muslims alone;
- that Islamiat is to be
forcibly taught to all the students, whatever their faith,
including compulsory reading of Qu'ran;
- that Ideology of Pakistan
(sic) is to be internalised as faith, and hate
be created against Hindus and India;
- and students are to be
urged to take the path of Jehad and Shahadat.
The 'Ideology
of Pakistan', the Report notes further, is Islam, and curricular
policies insist, is to "be presented as an accepted reality,
and never be subjected to discussion or dispute" or to "be
made controversial and debatable." Further, "Associated
with the insistence on the Ideology of Pakistan has been
an essential component of hate against India and the Hindus…
the existence of Pakistan is defined only in relation to
Hindus, and hence the Hindus have to be painted as black
as possible."
The 140-page SDPI report illustrates the many and complex
ways in which these ideologies of hatred are disseminated
through the state's educational system, creating a fanatical
and unrelenting mindset at an early age, and systematically
reinforcing such tendencies throughout the schooling process.
While the report does not cover University education, the
same processes continue at work there. Very significantly,
the Federal Public Service Commission, which selects the
country's superior bureaucracy, in its competitive examination
(according to the Rules issued on August 25, 2003) also
prescribes a compulsory paper on Islamiat with a
full 100 marks, which includes the concept of Jehad
among the "Fundamental Beliefs and Practices of Islam".
It is, thus, not renegade madrassahs that have seeded
the hatred in the minds of the people of Pakistan, raising
armies of international terrorists. On the one hand, these
madrassahs themselves have been supported and sponsored
by the Pakistani state. There are, moreover, only a small
part of the elaborate structure of indoctrination that has
systematically been exploited by successive governments
over the past three decades and more.
When the rich don't understand a problem, they throw money
at it. So it is with Western aid to Pakistan. Uncomprehending
of the floodtide of hatred they provoke among Muslims, Western
policy makers are trying to 'solve' the problem of the radicalisation
of the Pakistani mind by investing very substantial sums
of money in 'madrassah reform' and investment in
education. Part of the investment is going towards creating
the infrastructure for 'technical and scientific education'
and the teaching of English in Pakistani madrassahs
and schools. But if you combine technical competence with
a fanatical mindset, the probabilities are - as terrorists
coming out of the 'Gucci mosques' of Europe demonstrate
- that you will only produce more efficient terrorists.
Investing in these spheres can only increase the distortions
inherent in these systems.
Riding the Jehadi
Tiger
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
New Delhi Chief of Bureau, Frontline magazine, and
also writes for its sister publication, The Hindu
Terror, like chickens, comes home to roost. Arrests made
earlier this month near Baghdad have blown the lid off links
between the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
and Islamist groups fighting the United States military
in Iraq: evidence that ought to cause at least some embarrassment
to USA's South Asia establishment, currently in the throes
of a grand détente with Pakistan. Part of the deal seems
to have been to give Pakistan's military considerable freedom
to continue its support to officially-authorised jehadis.
If nothing else, the Iraq arrests illustrate the profound
unwillingness of the US' counter-terror czars to learn that
riding the jehadi tiger is a profoundly dangerous
occupation.
In March - and possibly even earlier - United States forces
detained Pakistani national Dilshad Ahmad and four others
in Baghdad. Details of these detentions, and of the LeT's
activities in Iraq, are hazy. However, Ahmad, a long-time
Lashkar operative from the Bahawalpur area of the province
of Punjab, had played a key role in the Lashkar's trans-Line
of Control (LoC) operations, serving between 1997 and 2001
as the organisation's commander for the forward camps from
where infiltrating groups of terrorists are launched into
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) with Pakistani military support.
Ahmad is believed to have made at least six secret visits
to Lashkar groups operating in J&K during this period. He
also authored several articles on the now-defunct Lashkar
website, one describing in particularly macabre terms the
merits of severing Indian soldiers' limbs from their bodies.
A close associate of Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, the second-in-command
in the Lashkar military hierarchy, Ahmad long had a key
role in shaping the organisation's ideological and military
agenda: a fact that raises obvious questions about his work
in Iraq. In 1998, he addressed a major LeT conference in
Muridke, arguing for the need to extend the organisation's
activities outside J&K. Ahmad is believed to have played
a key role in building the infrastructure for the dozens
of Lashkar cells, which have since carried out bombings
in several major Indian cities. At least four other Lashkar
operatives are known to have been arrested in the intelligence-led
operation that ended in Ahmad's arrest, but nothing else
is publicly available on their intentions or origins. US
officials had kept a tight lid on news of the arrests until
it was first reported in The Hindu on April 1.
For the US, the arrests are a potentially embarrassing election-time
reminder that the LeT, proscribed by all major western capitals
including Washington, continues to operate freely in Pakistan.
In January, as politicians across the sub-continent prepared
for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) Summit in Islamabad, Pakistan took stern measures
to put a lid on the LeT's anti-India polemic. The Lashkar's
web-site was shut down, and its overall political and religious
chief, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed was barred from addressing a
rally in the town of Multan. Soon after SAARC, however,
the restraints on the Lashkar were lifted. In February,
Saeed was allowed to travel to Islamabad to attend the funeral
prayers organised by Pakistani bureaucrat-businessman Zahoor
Ahmad Awan, whose son, a Lashkar operative, was killed by
Indian troops. Saeed told the assembly that the fighting
in Jammu and Kashmir was "the greatest jehad in the
entire history of Islam."
As important, the Lashkar has again been given considerable
freedom to continue building its military infrastructure.
In the build-up to the Eid festival in March, the organisation,
now operating under the new label of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa,
was reported to have raised Rs. 780 million from the sale
of hides of sacrificial animals donated by followers. The
Lashkar proclaimed, through advertisements and announcements
by loyal clerics, that the proceeds would be used for the
"Mujahideen who have sacrificed their lives for Islam" and
for "the parents, widows and children of martyrs who waged
jehad in Kashmir and Afghanistan." Although this
activity seems in express violation of the Pakistan Government's
ban on raising funds for jehad-related activities,
no real action appears to have been taken against those
involved. Two Lashkar cadres were briefly detained in Karachi
during the fundraising drive, a purely token gesture.
Such activity has serious consequences for India. Police
authorities in New Delhi recently arrested three members
of a Lashkar squad tasked to attack the Indira Gandhi International
Airport. The organisation has also been active in targeted
attacks on candidates involved in the ongoing Parliamentary
elections in J&K, and have issued warnings to voters not
to exercise their franchise. According to police officials
in J&K, a little over half of all terrorist acts in the
State are now committed by the organisation. This escalating
military activity is part of a pattern. Pakistan formally
banned the LeT in the wake of the 2001-2002 'near-war' with
India, but soon allowed the organisation to resume operations
under a new label, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa
is on a terrorism watch-list in Pakistan, but publicly collects
funds and recruits cadre for its operations.
In other words, Pakistan seems willing to temporarily close
the terror tap - cross-border infiltration is at an all
time low, and violence levels in J&K have fallen significantly.
But it is becoming clear that the country's military establishment
isn't willing to seal the pipeline that feeds terror just
yet. Washington's tolerance seems to be driven by Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf's claims that he cannot take
on the entire religious right without provoking a major
backlash. As a result, Pakistan's military establishment
has been able to keep the infrastructure of anti-India terrorism
intact. It is worth noting that this infrastructure has,
historically, imposed great costs on the US. General Zia-ul-Haq's
diversion of Afghan war equipment for jehadis in
J&K helped build the LeT in the first place, as well as
allied jehadi groups now active against Coalition
Forces in Afghanistan.
Jehadi groups seem to have largely respected the
unspoken US-Pakistan deal - a romance that obviously cannot
speak its name - this time around. Although Lashkar cadre
were in the past believed to have fought in northern Afghanistan
and Chechnya, no similar global activity was noticed in
Iraq until the recent arrests. The Lashkar's house journal,
Majallah ad Dawa, has been relatively restrained
in its criticism of the US occupation of Iraq. In the current
issue of the magazine, Saeed calls on believers to "never
to make friends with Jews and Christians," but there is
no express call for jehad directed at the US. By
contrast, Majallah ad Dawa's position on India is
more aggressive. One article claims that Indian Muslims
have come to realise that "without migration and jehad
there is no future"; another, in a recent issue, asks
Pakistani school-children to join the jehad and advises
them on how to identity Indian soldiers to be attacked.
The lessons seem fairly obvious to anyone who doesn't work
in the President George Bush's Administration. "As long
as someone has a gun in his hand," says a senior Indian
military official, "he decides when he wants to use it,
not you. If someone is walking around with a gun, and you
want to stop him from using it, the only really sure-fire
solution is to take it away."
Arms Trafficking: Transit Route
or Destination?
Anand Kumar
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
The Bangladesh police and coastguard stumbled across what
could be the largest-ever consignment of sophisticated illegal
arms and ammunition, when they raided the Government-controlled
Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited (CUFL) jetty on April
2, 2004. The weapons and explosives were being unloaded
from two fishing trawlers, MV Khawja and FT Amanat,
on the east bank side of the river Karnafully by about 150
labourers when the police arrived. The seizure list of the
Chittagong Metropolitan Police (CMP) states that the arms
and ammunition recovered include 690 7.62 mm T-56-I Sub-Machine
Guns (SMGs); 600 7.62 mm T-56-2 SMGs; 150 40mm T-69 Rocket
launchers; 840 40mm rockets; 400 9mm semi-automatic spot
rifles; 100 'Tommy Guns'; 150 rocket launchers; 2000 launching
grenades; 25,020 hand grenades; 6,392 magazines of SMG and
other arms; 700,000 rounds of SMG bullets; and 739,680 rounds
of 7.62 mm calibre; and 400,000 bullets of other weapons.
Most of the arms and ammunition were reportedly of Korean,
Italian, Chinese and American make.
While this is the largest, it is by no means the only significant
arms seizure in the country, and the last year alone has
seen several. Substantial caches of arms have been recovered
from Chittagong and its three hill districts; Bogra in northwestern
Bangladesh (this was the largest earlier seizure); and even
from the capital, Dhaka. But the latest seizure in Chittagong
is the biggest in the history of Bangladesh and marks the
emergence of the country as a major transit point for arms
smuggling in South Asia.
Crucially, reports indicate that, in this latest seizure,
the smugglers were unloading the weapons with help from
local police. An eyewitness, Kazi Abu Tayeeb, Ansar (paramilitary
force) Commander at the Chittagong Urea Fertiliser Limited
jetty where the arms were seized, has alleged that weapons
were being offloaded in front of local police officials
and the managing director, Mohsinuddin Talukder, of the
state-owned urea factory. The cargo handling reportedly
stopped only when a huge contingent of police, led by a
senior local police officer, reached the spot. But the two
arms traffickers along with the workers melted away in front
of police reinforcements.
The origin of this consignment of arms and its end-users
still remain a mystery, though unconfirmed and conflicting
reports are trickling in. However, if the previous record
of the Government is anything to go by, the truth may again
never be known. The Government has already started taking
steps to weaken the probe. The police officer who was reported
to have been overseeing the unloading of the consignment
at the CUFL jetty, hence one of the main accused in the
case, has been tasked by the Government to 'probe' the incident.
Local police units are also reported to have threatened
the Ansars (paramilitary force personnel) who revealed police
involvement in the gunrunning operation. Opposition parties
have alleged that the arms traffickers were patronized by
the ruling alliance, and that the involvement of Government
officials and elements in the local police gives substance
to this. Suspecting links of ruling Bangladesh Nationalist
Party to the smuggling of sophisticated arms into Bangladesh,
the opposition leader Sheikh Hasina has also demanded an
'international inquiry' into the incident. The Government,
on its part, appears to think that it has done enough, in
turn, by blaming the Opposition. The State Minister for
Home, Lutfozzaman Babar, has claimed that the weapons were
smuggled in as part of a 'conspiracy of subversion' and
did not rule out links to the April 30 deadline set by the
main opposition party, the Awami League, for the fall of
the Government.
The kind of arms and ammunition recovered, however, suggest
strong linkages with the growing force of radical Islamists
in the country. Ordinary criminals in Bangladesh do not
have a significant history of the use of such weapons, and
partisan political violence in the past has not graduated
to the level of sophistication reflected in the present
arms cache. Over the past decade, however, a number of extremist
Islamist groups have become active in Bangladesh, with at
least some of these linked to the international terrorist
network. The Al
Qaeda-allied group, the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami
(HuJI),
has a strong base in Chittagong. With a committed cadre
estimated at about 15,000 men, most of their training camps
are located in the Chittagong area. The Harkat maintains
six such camps in the hilly areas of Chittagong, and another
six training camps near Cox's Bazar. They are also reported
to be using camps vacated by the Rohingya refugees, and
a number of Rohingyas are known to be involved in the smuggling
of arms and ammunition in Bangladesh. Some other prominent
Islamist groups that have been active recently include the
Jama'atul Mujahidin, Shahadat-e-Al-Hikma, Hizbut Touheed
and Islami Shashontantra Andolan. Of these, the Jama'atul
Mujahidin has created training camps in 57 districts.
Opposition parties in Bangladesh believe that arms are being
smuggled into the country by the radical Islamists to subvert
democracy. Awami League General Secretary, Abdul Jalil,
is quoted by the local media as having stated that, "The
cache suggests a conspiracy to undermine the country's democratic
process." He also alleged that, "Arms were smuggled into
the country many times earlier in the same way, with visible
patronisation (sic) of the Government." Suspecting
the involvement of the Islamists, the Communist Party of
Bangladesh General Secretary, Mujahidul Islam Selim, demanded,
"Those who want to establish a Taliban-like
rule in Bangladesh and return to a Pakistani state should
be investigated immediately. The origins of such conspiracies
against sovereignty should be tracked down and crushed immediately."
Worker's Party President Rashed Khan Menon similarly stated
that, "Parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, which is using force
to establish a certain type of government… should be investigated
and we have to make sure that probe findings are not suppressed
again."
Across the border, there are concerns in India that the
arms and ammunition were intended for end-users among the
terrorist groups operating in India's troubled Northeast.
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)
- both of which have their top leadership in safe havens
in Bangladesh, have used the Bangladesh route for arms acquisition
in the past. Most significantly, in the June 27, 2003, arms
haul at a nondescript village in the northwestern Bogra
district, about 100 kilometers off the Indian border, the
Bangladesh police recovered 100,000 bullets and about 200
kilograms of explosives from an abandoned truck. The truck
owner - Jogesh Dev Barman, a top leader of the Tripura Cooperatives
Association, a front organization of the ATTF - was arrested
from a forest in the southeastern border district of Habiganj.
The Investigation of the Bogra weapons haul was handed over
to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) on July 16,
2003. However, investigators have failed to 'trace the masterminds'
or to identify the intended end users. There has been no
progress in the investigation even after some of the operators
were taken into custody. Bangladesh intelligence sources
indicate that that the 'godfathers' behind the smuggling
of ammunition and explosives were not named in the charge
sheets under pressure from political high-ups. The local
police, on the other hand, insist that the CID made no real
efforts to arrest the smugglers. Charge sheets in the four
cases filed on the Bogra seizure were hurriedly submitted
to the Court, apparently to victimise political opponents
rather than to arrest the actual perpetrators. All charge
sheets stated that the ammunition and explosives were smuggled
into Bangladesh by Awami League leaders and blamed them
for conspiring to unseat the Government by spreading disorder.
An unnamed CID official has reportedly alleged that statements
of only three of the arrested persons were recorded by the
Court under section 164, but that no one mentioned the names
of the smugglers in their confessionals.
There is, consequently, a strong possibility that the present
consignment may also have been intended for use of terrorists
active in India's Northeast, particularly the ULFA, the
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
or some of the groups operating in Tripura, including the
ATTF. After the Bhutanese crackdown on terrorist groups
earlier located in that country, these outfits have regrouped
in Bangladesh and have been planning to strike in the run-up
to the national elections in April-May. Sources indicate
that a meeting of top ULFA leaders was held in Dhaka on
March 4 at the house of a 'prominent personality' in the
Gulshan-II area. The meeting was reportedly attended by
ULFA 'Commander-in-Chief' Paresh Barua and the head of the
military wing, Raju Barua, in a bid to reorganize forces
after their expulsion from their camps in Bhutan.
Some former Bangladeshi Generals have suggested that the
specifications and volume of the present consignment suggest
that they were to be used against a regular military force.
Intelligence officials believe that the consignment was
possibly headed towards Assam in Northeast India, from the
Golden Triangle or Southeast Asia, with Bangladesh as a
transit point. In mid-2000, an Arakan rebel called Selim
was arrested in Chittagong, and later confessed that he
was involved in arms smuggling. He also disclosed that arms
from the Thai and Myanmar insurgent networks were smuggled
into Bangladesh through Chittagong Port and the Chittagong
Hill Tract (CHT), and that these were then sold in the underground
market. A pattern of arrests and seizures has gradually
helped identify a number of established routes. Arms brought
into Chittagong are transported up to Bhutan. The route
from Kalikhola in Bhutan to Cox's Bazar, passes through
north Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya and into Chittagong. The
terrorists cross the hilly terrain of Bhutan through the
forest of Buxa Tiger reserve, the banks of the Sankosh river,
then move to Cooch Behar (Bengal), from where they enter
Assam. From Assam, they move to Tura (Meghalaya), and then
to Cox's Bazar. The return route is marginally different
with the point of entry into India from Chittagong located
at Mancachar in Assam.
At least 37 illegal arms smuggling syndicates are reported
to be active in Chittagong, controlling the illegal arms
market and the supply to terrorist groups. A number of Rohingya
and Arakanese groups are also involved in the arms smuggling.
Around 60 kilometres of the border area at Teknaf in the
Cox's Bazar district, where there is little Government security
presence, is one of the main routes for arms smuggling.
The gunrunners face little resistance here and maintain
several offices in the port city of Chittagong, the hill
districts of Khagrachhari and Bandarban, Cox's Bazar and
Dhaka, where they maintain close contacts with various terrorist
groups.
Though authoritative confirmation of the intended end-users
of the latest seized consignment of weapons may never be
available, it is clear that the movement of such volumes
and types of arms and ammunition constitute a serious threat
to security, both in Bangladesh and in India. Though Bangladesh
recently allowed US arms inspectors to visit CHT to inspect
seized arms and ammunition and to trace smuggling routes,
nothing significant has changed, as demonstrated by this
latest seizure. Such exercises at 'transparency' seem to
be intended to placate donors ahead of the upcoming Bangladesh
Development Forum (BDF) meeting, and possibly to satisfy
the US that Bangladesh was 'doing enough' to provide security
to its nationals.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
March 29-April
4, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
1
|
5
|
7
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
8
|
4
|
7
|
19
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
3
|
1
|
4
|
8
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
4
|
Meghalaya
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
14
|
6
|
19
|
39
|
NEPAL
|
10
|
9
|
20
|
39
|
PAKISTAN
|
0
|
5
|
0
|
5
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Largest
ever
arms
and
ammunition
seizure
in
Chittagong:
In
the
largest
ever
arms
and
ammunition
seizure
reported
in
Bangladesh,
security
forces
recovered
10
truckloads
of
submachine-guns,
AK-47
assault
rifles,
other
firearms
and
bullets
at
the
Karnaphuli
coast
in
Chittagong
on
April
2,
2004.
The
arms
and
ammunition
were
reportedly
stuffed
in
1,500
wooden
boxes
and
were
being
unloaded
from
two
vessels
at
the
Chittagong
Urea
Fertilizer
Limited
(CUFL)
jetty.
A
report
quoting
unofficial
estimates
said
that
the
consignment
included
10,000
arms,
2,000
grenades
and
300,000
bullets.
While
an
unnamed
police
officer
has
reportedly
linked
the
cache
to
an
international
syndicate
of
arms
smugglers,
five
persons
have
been
arrested
in
this
connection.
The
Daily
Star,
quoting
a
witness,
reported
that
arms
smugglers
were
unloading
the
cache
with
'help
from
local
police'.
The
witness
Kazi
Abu
Tayeeb,
ansar
(paramilitary)
commander
at
the
CUFL
jetty,
alleged
that
the
weapons
were
being
offloaded
in
front
of
police
officials
and
the
managing
director
of
the
state-owned
urea
factory.
Daily
Star,
April
4,
2004.
Foreign
Minister
rules
out
handing
over
ULFA
leader
to
India:
Speaking
to
the
media
in
Dhaka,
Foreign
Minister
M.
Morshed
Khan
ruled
out
the
possibility
of
handing
over
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA)
leader
Anup
Chetia,
who
is
now
in
jail,
to
the
Indian
authorities.
He
reportedly
said,
"Law
will
take
its
own
course.
The
government
should
refrain
from
taking
any
measure
which
disrupts
the
judicial
process."
Ruling
out
the
possibility
of
signing
an
extradition
treaty
with
India,
he
added,
"I
have
no
knowledge
of
any
negotiation
going
on
at
any
level
between
the
two
countries
on
such
a
treaty."
Independent
Bangladesh,
April
1,
2004.
INDIA
No
violation
of
cease-fire,
says
Northern
Command
chief:
The
Army
has
said
that
the
cease-fire
on
the
borders
between
India
and
Pakistan
was
holding
and
that
infiltration
has
decreased.
"The
Line
of
Control
(LoC)
is
peaceful.
There
has
been
no
violation
of
cease-fire.
Both
sides
ensured
that
peace
and
tranquility
is
maintained,"
Lt.
Gen.
Hari
Prasad,
General
Officer
Commanding-in-Chief,
Northern
Command,
told
reporters
in
Srinagar
on
March
30,
2004.
While
stating
that
infiltration
had
come
down
considerably,
he
also
pointed
out
that
it
was
not
an
unusual
phenomenon
during
this
season.
The
exact
position
about
infiltration
could
be
judged
in
May-June
when
the
snow
melts
on
the
mountain
peaks,
he
added.
Daily
Excelsior,
March
31,
2004.
NEPAL
100
political
activists
injured
during
protest
march
to
Royal
Palace
in
Kathmandu:
At
least
100
activists
of
the
five
agitating
political
parties,
including
six
leaders,
were
reportedly
injured
when
a
protest
march
towards
the
Royal
Palace
in
Kathmandu
on
April
2,
2004,
turned
violent
after
security
personnel
allegedly
used
force
to
prevent
protestors
from
entering
the
restricted
zones.
Central
leaders
of
Communist
Party
of
Nepal
(Unified
Marxist
Leninist,
CPN-UML)
Amrit
Kumar
Bohara,
Iswor
Pokharel
and
Jhalanath
Khanal;
Lilamani
Pokharel
and
Dilaram
Acharya
of
United
People's
Front;
and
Ram
Chandra
Poudel
and
Dr
Ramsharan
Mahat
of
Nepali
Congress,
were
among
those
injured.
Meanwhile,
chief
of
the
Maoist
insurgents,
Prachanda,
issued
a
press
statement
extending
his
support
to
the
ongoing
agitation
saying,
"Monarchy
has
tended
to
take
the
nation
back
to
the
18th
century."
He
also
welcomed
the
call
issued
by
the
agitating
parties
to
initiate
talks
for
peace.
Himalayan
Times,
April
3,
2004.
PAKISTAN
MQM-Haqiqi
Chief
Afaq
Ahmed
arrested
in
Karachi:
Afaq
Ahmed,
chief
of
his
own
faction
of
the
Mohajir
Qaumi
Movement
(MQM-H),
was
arrested
from
the
Defence
Housing
Authority
area
in
Karachi
on
April
3,
2004.
A
spokesperson
for
the
Sindh
Government
said
"Afaq
is
wanted
in
several
cases
of
murder,
kidnappings,
assault
on
public
servants,
rioting,
etc."
Meanwhile,
MQM-H
spokesperson
Kamran
Rizvi
claimed
that
"Our
850
members
and
workers
are
in
jails,
several
have
been
killed
and
35
kidnapped.
Our
headquarters
'Baitul
Hamza'
has
been
razed
to
the
ground.
All
these
acts
are
a
political
victimization."
Dawn,
April
4,
2004.
Lashkar-e-Toiba
terrorists
arrested
in
Iraq:
The
Hindu
has
reported
that
during
early
March
2004,
U.S.
forces
in
Iraq
arrested
a
Pakistani
national,
Dilshad
Ahmad,
a
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT)
operative
hailing
from
the
Bhawalpur
area
of
the
province
of
Pakistani
Punjab.
Ahmad
had
played
a
key
role
in
the
Lashkar's
trans-Line
of
Control
operations,
serving
between
1997
and
2001
as
the
organisation's
'commander'
of
the
forward
camps
from
where
infiltrating
groups
of
terrorists
are
launched
into
Jammu
and
Kashmir.
Ahmad
is
also
believed
to
have
played
a
key
role
in
building
the
infrastructure
for
the
dozens
of
Lashkar
cells,
which
have
since
carried
out
bombings
in
several
major
Indian
cities.
The
report
added
that
at
least
four
other
Lashkar
operatives
are
also
known
to
have
been
arrested
in
the
intelligence-led
operation
that
ended
in
Ahmad's
arrest
in
Iraq.
The
Hindu,
April
1,
2004.
Foreign
Office
clarifies
President
Musharraf's
statement
on
Kashmir
'deadline':
Foreign
Office
spokesperson
Masood
Khan
on
March
31,
2004,
clarified
some
remarks
attributed
to
President
Pervez
Musharraf
about
a
'deadline'
to
India
for
a
composite
dialogue
on
the
Kashmir
issue.
He
was
commenting
on
reports
in
a
section
of
the
media
about
President
Musharraf's
address
to
a
select
group
of
journalists
and
intellectuals
recorded
on
March
30.
The
reports
said
that
Musharraf
had
given
a
deadline
of
July-August
for
the
composite
dialogue
process
with
India
to
succeed,
especially
on
the
Jammu
and
Kashmir
issue,
and
otherwise
the
peace
process
could
get
derailed.
In
an
interview
to
Pakistan
Television,
Khan
said,
"The
interpretation
of
the
President's
remarks
is
not
correct.
The
President
did
not
use
the
word
'deadline'
at
all."
Jang,
April
1,
2004.
Eight
British
citizens
of
Pakistani
origin
arrested
in
London
for
terrorist
links:
Police
in
London
arrested
eight
Muslims
believed
to
be
of
Pakistani
origin
along
with
a
cache
of
explosives
during
raids
on
March
30,
2004.
The
eight
men,
all
British
citizens,
were
detained
under
the
Terrorism
Act
2000
for
suspected
involvement
in
planning
a
terrorist
attacks,
said
Peter
Clarke,
head
of
the
Metropolitan
Police
anti-terrorist
branch.
Daily
Times,
March
31,
2004.
SRI
LANKA
President
Kumaratunga's
alliance
emerges
as
single
largest
party:
President
Chandrika
Kumaratunga's
United
People's
Freedom
Alliance
(UPFA)
polled
4.22
million
of
the
total
votes
cast
during
the
April
2,
2004,
General
Elections,
to
emerge
as
the
single
largest
party
with
105
seats.
Prime
Minister
Ranil
Wickremesinghe's
United
National
Front
(UNF)
polled
3.5
million
votes
to
secure
82
seats,
according
to
official
results
announced
by
the
Elections
Commissioner
on
April
4.
The
Ilankai
Tamil
Arasu
Katchi
(or
Tamil
National
Alliance,
TNA)
was
placed
third
with
633,654
votes
securing
22
seats
followed
by
the
Jathika
Hela
Urumaya
who
obtained
552,724
votes
for
nine
seats,
the
Sri
Lanka
Muslim
Congress
(SLMC)
186,876
(five
seats)
and
the
Up
Country
People's
Front
49,782
(one
seat).
The
Hindu,
April
5,
2004.
|
Sri Lanka Parliamentary
General Election - 2004 Results
Political Party/
Independent Group |
District
Basis Seats
|
National
Basis Seats
|
Total
seats
|
United People's Freedom
Alliance (UPFA) |
92
|
13
|
105
|
United National Party
(UNP) |
71
|
11
|
82
|
Illankai Tamil Arasu
Kachchi (TNA, Tamil National Alliance) |
20
|
2
|
22
|
Jathika Hela Urumaya
(JHU) |
7
|
2
|
9
|
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
(SLMC) |
4
|
1
|
5
|
Up-Country People's
Front |
1
|
0
|
1
|
Eelam Peoples Democratic
Party (EPDP) |
1
|
0
|
1
|
|
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