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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 21, December 8, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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How not to Fight an Insurgency
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
If success
in counter-insurgency were to be measured by body counts
alone, the campaign has been going rather well in Nepal,
after peace talks broke down on August 27, 2003. In little
more than the three months following (August
27 to November 30), a total of 1,396 persons
have been killed in the fighting, 1,081 of them 'insurgents'.
The year 2003 has, in fact, been relatively benign, with
the first almost eight months passing with comparatively
small numbers of fatalities - January saw 115 killed, down
to 32 in February; between March and July, total fatalities
were just nine; and, as the 'ceasefire' went awry, and eventually
broke down, August saw 84 dead. The year total, consequently,
stood at 'just' 1,644 (up till November 30) as against 4,896
killed in 2002, 3,992 of them 'insurgents'. May 2002 alone,
in fact, saw as many as 1,023 killed, 975 of them 'insurgents'.
Indeed, if the period of the ceasefire is excluded, the
killing rates in Nepal since the insurgent attack on the
Army camp at Dang on November 23, 2001, have averaged far
more than the combined average of fatalities in all the
terrorist and insurgent movements across India - including
Jammu & Kashmir, supposedly 'the most dangerous place on
earth'. [The data
on fatalities in Nepal is, of course, far from
authoritative. The Nepalese Government has tended to be
secretive about the counter-terrorism campaigns and fitful
in its release of information. There are vast areas, moreover,
including the Far West, where the Government's own sources
of information would be unreliable, if not non-existent.
Present estimates are drawn from continuous monitoring by
the Institute for Conflict Management of official sources
and reportage in the English language Press of Nepal. The
categorisation of fatalities into 'insurgent', 'civilian'
and 'security forces' is, moreover, uncritical and relies
entirely on such reports. There is no independent verification,
for instance, that fatalities listed as 'insurgents' are,
in fact, drawn from the combatant ranks of the Maoists,
and not from non-combatant militia, sympathisers and civilian
populations. There is reason to believe that at least a
proportion of the violence on both sides is indiscriminate
and targets innocents].
Significantly, an overwhelming proportion of those killed
since 2001 - 79.44 per cent (6,030 of 7,591) - have been
'insurgents'. The exact strength of the Maoist cadres is,
of course, difficult to estimate, but Government figures
in early 2003 put their numbers at 5,500 combatants, 8,000
militia, 4,500 cadres, 33,000 hardcore followers and 200,000
'sympathisers'. The Maoists' own claims are higher, and
the Chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and
leader of the insurgency, Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda,
in a release on October 5, 2003, boasts of "the formation
of two divisions, seven brigades and 19 battalions", as
well as "around a hundred thousand strong people's militia
as a recruiting base" and the "mobilization of hundreds
of thousands of people along class, caste, nationality,
regional, gender questions around the people's war." Wherever
the numbers may lie, the fatalities inflicted on the Maoists
would tend to suggest that the Maoists are now in flight,
and the forces of the establishment are consolidating their
domination over the country's hinterland that had, for some
time, passed into the control of the insurgents.
A closer analysis of developments, however, reveals the
spectacle, rather, of a country hurtling towards chaos,
with the state and its agencies in headlong flight. With
the exception of the Army or paramilitary camp and column,
Kathmandu has no presence in increasing parts of the country.
According to the World Bank's 'Country Assistance Strategy
Progress Report, 2003,' more than one-third of Nepal's 3,900
village development committee (VDC) buildings have been
destroyed, 19 districts (of a total 75) are without telephone
service, 250 post offices have been ruined and six airports
have been closed. While hard numbers are unavailable, it
is safe to assume that most of the state's developmental
agencies in rural areas are now paralysed.
More significantly, there is little permanent presence of
enforcement agencies in the rural areas, as the police abandon
the smaller stations to consolidate into what US analyst
Thomas Marks describes as a 'defensible mass', usually at
the district headquarters. In Rolpa district, the terrorist
heartland, for instance, Marks discloses that, in 1996,
there were 33 police stations, with the largest manned by
75 men, but most of the others with a strength less than
20. When the post at Ghartigaun in western Rolpa was attacked
in 1999, for example, it had a complement of 19. Fifteen
were killed, the others wounded; the station was totally
destroyed and was never re-garrisoned. In 1998, two such
stations were abandoned; in 1999, a further 16 (including
Ghartigaun); in 2000, six more; in 2001, another four; and
in 2002, three - leaving a total of just two police station
for the entire population of nearly 211,000.
The withdrawal of the agencies of the state is complemented
by the widening sphere of Maoist presence and activity.
Towards the latter half of 1999, 20 of Nepal's districts
were considered 'seriously affected' by Maoist violence.
By 2001, their number was up to 68. Now, all 75 districts
in the country, including the capital, Kathmandu, have witnessed
significant Maoist violence.
In some measure, of course, the Maoists have been forced
into a retreat into the mountains, and the 'parallel government'
they were almost openly operating in their heartland in
the Western and Central districts has been disrupted in
many areas. This has not, however, brought back the agencies
of the state, and much of Nepal has, in fact, been lost
to anarchy. Anarchy, however, is the insurgents' ally, and
the enemy of the state. As Mao - from whom the insurgents
in Nepal draw their ideology, strategy and tactics - observed,
"To gain territory is no cause for joy, and to lose territory
is no cause for sorrow… The important thing is to think
up methods for destroying the enemy."
While holding and losing territory matters little to the
insurgent, it is central to the enterprise and legitimacy
of the state. And not only must the state dominate regions
through the use of force, it must govern them, it
must provide the public goods and services, including most
significantly, security of life and property, that its citizens
expect in exchange for their allegiance. In this, Kathmandu
is failing the people of Nepal, creating the circumstances
for the collapse of the regime, notwithstanding the slaughters
the Army and para-military forces may inflict on insurgents
and their sympathisers. It is clear that the Maoist leadership
is far more aware of the strategic significance of current
developments than is the national leadership at Kathmandu
- both at the Palace and among the democratic parties. Prachanda
recently declared that, "From (a) tactical point of view,
at present the people's army is going ahead with primary
and decentralized resistance so as to feel the pulse of
the enemy, tire them out and to prepare ground for centralized
offensive."
That this 'ground' is being substantially prepared is borne
out also by the increasing damage inflicted on the structures
of governance, the national infrastructure and on the Nepalese
economy by the ongoing violence. Nepal's National Planning
Commission (NPC) estimates the direct damage to the impoverished
economy at between USD 300 million and 500 million. The
indirect damage would be many times this amount, with a
cumulative and disastrous impact on the capacity of the
state to respond to its peoples' aspirations in a country
where GDP stands at a bare USD 5.1 billion, with a population
of over 24 million. Tourist arrivals to the country - the
backbone of its external economy - have more than halved
since year 2000. The Maoists have inflicted enormous damage
on physical and critical infrastructure across the country.
Even where money is available for developmental projects
- international agencies continue to invest great faith
in pouring in substantial sums in aid towards 'development'
as a 'solution' to insurgency - the extension agencies of
the state simply do not exist in ever-widening areas across
the country, and entirely in the areas where they are most
needed, those worst afflicted by violence. The Maoists have
attacked the USD 20 million Jhimruk hydroelectric project
as well as other mini hydro power stations, telecommunications
repeater stations and sub-stations, airstrips in remote
districts, school buildings, water supply schemes, and road
construction, irrigation and bridge building projects, bringing
virtually all developmental works in rural areas to a complete
halt. The NPC puts the rehabilitation costs of damaged infrastructure
alone at over USD 400 million.
In the absence of the restoration, strengthening and extension
of the permanent institutions of governance, including the
critical institution for the maintenance of law and order
- the police station - no permanent resolution to the problem
of terrorism in Nepal is even possible. Nepal's hinterland
has to be recovered through governance - or will be lost,
first to anarchy, and eventually to a possible Maoist consolidation.
Regrettably, there is little evidence that such a recovery
is even possible. It is ironic that, while there appears
to be a strong and general consensus on 'negotiating a solution'
with the Maoists, the fractious democratic leadership of
the country and an obtuse Palace do not find it possible
to arrive at a 'negotiated solution' to their own aimless
and suicidal political disputes. But, absent a stable political
order in Kathmandu, and a consensus, not only on how to
deal with the Maoists, but more significantly on how to
restore (indeed, in many neglected areas, how to create)
the institutions of effective civil governance across the
expanse of the whole country, no progress is even conceivable.
The Palace-led Government has now created a Unified Command
structure to coordinate the counter-terrorism activities
of all state security forces - the Army, the Police and
the newly created Armed Police. A dubious decision has also
been taken to arm civilians to directly take on the Maoists
- provoking fears, either of a leakage of such arms to the
Maoists themselves, or of fratricidal civil wars and the
emergence of 'warlordism' in remote areas.
It is an unfortunate truth that violence is, and will long
remain, a necessary response to the depredations of terrorists
and insurgents in many parts of the world, and Nepal is
no exception. To the extent, however, that violence exhausts
the sum of the state's responses, it will prove futile,
even counterproductive. The objective of the state's use
of force must be the restoration of lawful governance, not
scoring a higher 'kill rate' than non-state hostiles. On
both sides of the present conflict in Nepal, regrettably,
a near exclusive belief in the efficacy of great slaughters
as instruments of social transformation appears to persist.
As long as this remains the case, Nepal can only look towards
a bloody and terrifying future.
Assam: Another Uncertain Accord
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati
With the
surrender of 2641 cadres of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)
at Kokrajhar on December 6, 2003, and the subsequent swearing
in of the 12-member interim Bodoland Territorial Council
(BTC) on December 7, an infamous chapter of Bodo insurgency
in Assam comes to a close. The formation of the new autonomous
self-governing body, BTC, after the failure of a similar
attempt in the form of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC)
in 1993, is yet another move to bring peace to Assam's Bodo
inhabited areas, which have witnessed violent agitations
and accompanying terrorist violence since 1987. After the
Mizo Accord of 1986, the formation of the BTC could be the
only and still qualified success story in the resolution
of an insurgency in India's northeast.
The BTC is being formed nine months after the signing of
a Memorandum
of Settlement (MoS) between the BLT leadership,
the Union Government and the State Government of Assam on
February 10, 2003. The main provisions of the MoS relate
to the creation of the BTC within the State of Assam under
the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, to fulfill
the economic, educational and linguistic aspirations, as
well as the claims of the socio-cultural and ethnic identity
of the Bodos in Assam (numbering 1,267,015 in the 1991 Census,
more than 44 per cent of the State's total population),
and to speed up the development of infrastructure in the
BTC area. The area of the proposed BTC will comprise of
3,082 identified villages, which will be divided into 4
contiguous districts after reorganization of the existing
districts of Assam, subject to clearance of the Delimitation
Commission.
With the formation of the BTC, the Bodo struggle for development
and good governance enters a decisive phase, creating new
and onerous challenges for an inexperienced leadership.
The transition of insurgent leaders into the arena of politics
is bound to create at least a few problems. The BLT has
already announced its intention of forming a political party
to manage the BTC affair. However, sooner or later, the
BLT leadership is bound to realize that running a democratic
administration is a far more difficult task than planning
ambushes against the security forces or killing civilians.
The distribution of spoils is also likely to create problems
for the BTC leadership. Till now, Bodo organizations like
the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and the Bodo People's
Action Committee (BPAC) sang in chorus with the BLT. Such
unity is bound to face serious challenges as realpolitik
takes over jungle camaraderie. The reality of life will
also strike hard at the 2,641 BLT cadres, only some of whom
can be accommodated within the limited BTC structure. With
the plum posts going to senior functionaries, the euphoria
of winning a war might give way to frustration. There have
been many cases in the past when peace deals have led to
the creation of new insurgent groups by disgruntled cadres.
The problem is accentuated by the fact that the State Government
has ruled against providing a rehabilitation scheme for
the BLT cadres, though a notification on November 27, 2003,
announced a general amnesty and withdrawal of cases registered
against persons related to the over-ground Bodo movement
since 1987. According to the notification, there are 452
cases registered against the persons connected with such
over-ground activity in as many as eight districts of Nalbari,
Dhubri, Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar, Darrang, Barpeta, Kamrup
and Sonitpur.
There is also need to guard against the notoriety of the
BLT cadres. During the outfit's parleys with the Union Government
since July 1999, BLT cadres indulged in large-scale extortion
and periodically orchestrated the selective elimination
of their opponents. To cite an example, on January 27, 2003,
suspected BLT cadres killed one of their former colleagues
and four members of his family, including two women, at
Duligaon in Dhubri district (the outfit subsequently denied
its involvement in the incident). There is every chance
of the BTC ending up institutionalizing such outlaws on
the line of the infamous SULFA (surrendered United Liberation
Front of Asom or ULFA)
cadres, who enjoyed State protection for a wide range of
illegal activities through the 1990s, under successive Assam
Governments.
Significantly, moreover, the pomp and show of the surrender
ceremony, accompanied by great exhibition of Bodo paraphernalia,
masks the rather poor acceptability level of the BLT leaders
even among their own tribesmen. Few among the Bodo people
know or are able to name any of the BLT leaders. Irrespective
of the hype, the BTC generated, even in the remotest of
the Bodo areas, people were uniformly skeptical of the leadership's
commitment to development.
A seemingly formidable challenge is posed by the non-Bodo
umbrella organization, the Sanmilita Janagoshthiya Sangram
Samiti (SJSS), which stands opposed to the Bodo aspirations
for autonomy. Insurgent groups such as the United Peoples'
Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
do not favour the granting of Scheduled Tribe (ST) status
to the Bodos living within the Karbi Anglong district, an
assurance to which effect is given in the MoS.
The most difficult challenge, however, comes from the active
Bodo militant outfit, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB),
which finds itself marginalized with the finalisation of
the BTC deal. The NDFB, fighting for an independent 'Bodo
hadat' (Bodoland), has already issued statements asking
people not to support the BTC, which they claim is not in
the interest of the Bodo people. The Union Minister of State
for Home Affairs, Swami Chinmayananda was also reported
to have said on December 6, 2003, that, "the security forces
would do everything to ensure that they (BLT cadres) were
not victimized by the still active militant groups." The
grossly diminished military strength of the NDFB may, within
this context, prove to be an advantage for the BLT as well
as a matter of relief for the Union Government.
There has been some speculation whether the formation of
the BTC would lead to the United Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA)
and the NDFB renouncing the path of violence. The State
Chief Minister, on December 6, 2003, took the opportunity
to invite the ULFA and the NDFB to move in this direction,
saying, "There is no problem so big that can not be resolved
through talks." However, while there is a possibility of
individual NDFB cadres deciding to give up arms (21 of them
surrendered recently), the group as a unit is likely to
continue resisting attempts for peace. Given the fact that
the BTC is an all-BLT affair, there would be little hope
for the NDFB leadership or surrendered cadres to be accommodated
in it. In the longer run, however, the performance of the
BTC would decide the future and utility of violent groups
like the NDFB. The possibility of ULFA agreeing to a peaceful
resolution of the conflict in the State also remains remote.
Under the circumstances, the BLT men who will take charge
of the BTC will need support and patience not only from
their own tribesmen and the non-tribals in the BTC area,
but also from the State Government. There are a number of
unresolved issues, such as the demarcation of the geographical
boundary of the proposed Bodoland Territorial Area District
(BTAD), comprising four districts - Kokrajhar, Chirang,
Baska, and Udalguri (the last three are yet to be formed
by the State Government) and the inclusion of additional
villages. These will need the cooperation of the State Government
for a peaceful and early resolution.
There is a great deal at stake for the Union Government
in the success of the BTC experiment. In addition to the
resolution of the BLT brand of insurgency, the formation
of the BTC could also be a test case before a plausible
deal with the NSCN-IM
in Nagaland can be hammered out, excluding the Khaplang
faction and the Naga National Council (NNC). Peace and development
under a BTC manned by former BLT cadres in Bodoland may
go some way in convincing the Central Government of the
possibility of a durable peace in Nagaland, even if non-NSCN-IM
(National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah faction)
opinion is ignored.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
December 1-7, 2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
3
|
0
|
5
|
8
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
9
|
0
|
9
|
18
|
Delhi
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
6
|
4
|
27
|
37
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
15
|
4
|
40
|
59
|
NEPAL
|
1
|
14
|
140
|
155
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Bolivian
police
arrests
16
Bangladeshis
for
suspected
terrorist
links:
According
to
Agence
France-Presse,
the
Bolivian
police
have
arrested
16
Bangladeshis
carrying
false
documents
on
suspicion
that
they
might
be
linked
to
terrorist
groups.
Interior
Minister
Alfonso
Ferrufino
was
quoted
as
saying
that
they
were
arrested
at
the
Santa
Cruz
airport
in
eastern
Bolivia
on
December
4,
2003,
during
a
joint
operation
with
French
intelligence
officers.
Ferrufino
said
French
authorities
had
requested
the
16
suspects
be
detained
on
information
"that
would
link
these
people
to
terrorism."
Hindustan
Times,
December
5,
2003.
17
NLFT
terrorists
killed
in
factional
clashes
in
Bangladesh:
According
to
a
delayed
report,
17
terrorists
affiliated
to
the
Biswamohan
Debbarma
faction
of
the
proscribed
National
Liberation
Front
of
Tripura
(NLFT)
were
killed
in
a
series
of
internecine
clashes
on
November
29
and
30,
2003,
in
one
of
the
group's
camps
at
Shazek
Hills
in
the
Chittagong
Hill
Tracts
of
Bangladesh,
near
the
Amarpur
subdivision
of
the
South
Tripura
district.
The
report,
quoting
senior
police
officials
in
Tripura,
said
that
six
more
NLFT
cadres
have
since
entered
Indian
Territory
after
deserting
their
camps
and
have
contacted
the
authorities
in
Tripura
to
surrender.
Northeast
Reporter,
December
7,
2003.
Islamist
Extremists
attack
Hindu
temples
in
Tangail
district:
Hindu
priests
have
reportedly
shut
down
at
least
ten
temples
in
central
Bangladesh
after
they
were
allegedly
ransacked
by
suspected
Islamist
extremists.
According
to
the
Bangladesh
daily
Ittefaq,
these
attacks
were
carried
out
in
three
remote
Hindu
villages
in
the
Mirzapur
upazila
(sub-district)
of
Tangail
district.
Khaleej
Times,
November
29,
2003.
INDIA
2641
BLT
cadres
surrender
in
Assam:
2641
cadres
of
the
Bodo
Liberation
Tigers
(BLT)
led
by
the
outfit's
chairman
cum
commander-in-chief,
Hagrama
Basumatary,
surrendered
on
December
6,
2003,
at
Kokrajhar
in
Assam,
paving
the
way
for
the
formation
of
the
interim
Bodoland
Territorial
Council
(BTC).
They
also
deposited
615
arms,
including
138
.303
rifles,
11
self-loading
rifles,
64
AK-series
rifles,
three
light
machine
guns
and
110
hand-made
cartridge
guns.
A
12-member
interim
BTC
headed
by
Basumatary
was
sworn
in
by
the
Lower
Assam
Division
Commissioner,
Emilly
Choudhury,
in
presence
of
the
Deputy
Prime
Minister
L.K.
Advani,
Governor
Lt.
Gen.
(Retired)
Ajai
Singh
and
Chief
Minister
Tarun
Gogoi
on
December
7.
Assam
Tribune,
December
8,
2003;
December
7,
2003.
NEPAL
25
Maoists
killed
in
Kailali
district:
Defense
sources
were
quoted
as
saying
that
25
Maoist
insurgents
and
six
security
force
(SF)
personnel
were
killed
in
a
clash
between
the
insurgents
and
SFs
at
Bandaul
and
Pandaun
in
the
Kailali
district
on
December
3,
2003.
Thirteen
SF
personnel
were
also
injured
in
the
incident.
Nepal
News,
December
4,
2003.
PAKISTAN
Six
terrorist groups
proscribed in
Pakistan occupied
Kashmir: Authorities
in Pakistan occupied
Kashmir (PoK)
have reportedly
outlawed six terrorist
groups on December
4, 2003. The six
groups are Islami
Tehreek-e-Pakistan
(formerly known
as Tehreek-e-Jaferia
Pakistan [TJP]),
Millat-e-Islami
(formerly known
as Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan [SSP]),
Khuddam-ul-Islam
(formerly known
as Jaish-e-Mohammed
[JeM]),
Hezb-ut-Tehrir,
Jamiat-ul-Furqan,
and Jamiat-ul-Ansar.
Pakistan's Interior
Ministry had indicated
on December 5
that it had asked
officials in PoK
to initiate action
against the six
groups banned
by President Pervez
Musharraf in November.
Jang,
December 5, 2003.
|
Fatalities in
Nepal since the break up of Cease-fire on August 27, 2003
|
Maoists
|
Security
Forces
|
Civilians
|
Total
|
August 25-31 |
31
|
11
|
2
|
44
|
September
1-7 |
93
|
16
|
6
|
115
|
September
8-14 |
67
|
22
|
19
|
108
|
September
15-21 |
118
|
13
|
21
|
152
|
September
22-28 |
74
|
9
|
9
|
92
|
September
29-October 5 |
95
|
8
|
21
|
124
|
October
6-12 |
147
|
9
|
2
|
158
|
October
13-19 |
98
|
3
|
13
|
114
|
October
20-26 |
60
|
13
|
14
|
87
|
October
27-November 2 |
58
|
31
|
15
|
104
|
November
3-9 |
75
|
3
|
4
|
82
|
November
10-16 |
74
|
18
|
8
|
100
|
November
17-23 |
32
|
5
|
10
|
47
|
November
24-30 |
59
|
9
|
1
|
69
|
Total |
1081
|
170
|
145
|
1396
|
Source: Computed
from official sources and reportage in the English language
press of Nepal. |
|
The South
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terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
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on related economic, political, and social issues, in
the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project
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and the
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Asia Terrorism Portal.
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