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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 16, November 3, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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LTTE: A Maximal Proposal
Guest Writer: Jehan Perera
Media Director, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka
There was
little reason to doubt that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam's (LTTE)
proposals in terms of the interim administration they sought
for the contested North East of the country would be ambitious.
This was to be expected, as in the case of any first offer
in a negotiation. The surprise was not that the LTTE did,
in fact, make such maximalist demands. The surprise is that
they did it so well.
The long awaited LTTE proposals on the type of interim administration
they seek for the North East made their appearance on October
31, 2003, on which day the proposals were handed over to
the Norwegian facilitators to be forwarded to the Government.
This action underlined the central role that Norway continues
to play in the Sri Lankan peace process. The preamble to
the LTTE's proposals, described as proposals on behalf of
the Tamil people, also acknowledged with appreciation the
services of the Norwegian Government and the international
community.
The immediate reaction of journalists covering the release
in Kilinochchi was neither negative nor emotional. A key
reason for this was that the proposals had been prepared
with a great deal of thought about how they would be perceived
by the world at large. Hence, there were no immediate red
flags that could set anyone's blood boiling upon a quick
reading.
The LTTE has clearly refrained from frontally addressing
emotive issues. They made no mention either of their own
military or of the right of the Sri Lankan military to be
present in the North East; or of the Sinhalese settlements
in the North East. The LTTE's proposals also did not call
for a change in the national flag or anthem or the special
place accorded to Buddhism in the Sri Lankan Constitution.
Any mention of these could have generated an emotional response
from Sinhalese nationalists.
However, a closer scrutiny of the LTTE proposals would reveal
that they are maximalist in spirit, as indeed could have
been anticipated from an organisation that has waged a long
war for the cause of complete Tamil separation from Sri
Lanka. The proposals, in sum, call for the establishment
of an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) for the North
East in which the LTTE would have an absolute majority of
members. Thereafter, the proposals indicate that complete
autonomy is sought in virtually every aspect of the political
and economic life of the people.
The LTTE proposals call for separate institutions to be
set up for the North East in respect of the police, judiciary,
elections, taxation, local and foreign grants and loans,
and trade, among others. There is an assurance that internationally
mandated standards of human rights, accountability, multi-ethnic
representation and free and fair elections will prevail.
But all the institutions that are to be set up to ensure
such practices of good governance will be under the sole
control of the ISGA which will have an absolute LTTE majority.
In a society where the spirit of power sharing is yet to
be learned and practiced, obtaining an absolute majority
is a potential license for unilateralism. When this potential
is coupled with autonomy, the result can be a high degree
of control. It is noteworthy that the LTTE's proposals make
no provision for integration with nationally prevailing
structures. Viewed in this context, it is not surprising
that the Sri Lankan Government's response to the LTTE proposals
was cautious and restrained. The Government's immediate
reaction was to say that there were fundamental differences
between the LTTE's proposals and those submitted several
months earlier by the Government itself.
In its own proposals regarding an interim administration
for the North East, the Government specifically excluded
matters pertaining to police, land, revenue and security
from the purview of the interim administration. But in the
LTTE's counter proposals, all the above with the exception
of security are specifically considered to be the domain
of the ISGA. Further, in the Government's proposals, while
an absolute majority is conceded to the LTTE, provision
was made for a minority veto on matters that affected the
interests of the Muslim and Sinhalese communities living
in the North East.
On the ground the Muslims and Sinhalese of the East, who
presently constitute over 60 percent of the population in
this region, have strongly protested their inclusion into
an LTTE dominated administration. The Muslims in particular
have been vociferous about their opposition, as in the Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) they have a political party
that draws virtually all its strength from the East. The
SLMC's first response to the LTTE's proposals has been to
say that they do not meet Muslim aspirations.
The Government's cautious response to the LTTE's proposals
could also be due to its apprehensions about a backlash
against them from Sinhalese nationalists bolstered by opposition
political parties. Pro-war Sinhalese nationalists who call
for the military subjugation of Tamil nationalism last week
physically attacked leading Sinhalese and Tamil cultural
artistes who had gathered together for an inter-ethnic cultural
festival in Colombo. What this increasingly frustrated minority
needs is the politically motivated backing by the major
opposition parties to run amok and riot on the streets,
as has happened on past occasions when Governments appeared
to make concessions to Tamil demands for regional autonomy.
The unfortunate history of post-independence Sri Lankan
politics is that opposition parties have repeatedly seized
upon Governmental concessions to Tamil parties as betrayals
of the Sinhalese to mobilise popular opposition to the Government.
The last occasion for this unsavoury practice was in Parliament
itself in August 2000, when many members of the present
Government behaved like louts, hooted and burnt copies of
the Draft Constitution that President Chandrika Kumaratunga
sought to present before Parliament. Today, alas, it is
the turn of President Kumaratunga and her party to get even
with those who wield the reins of the Government.
There is much to commend in the LTTE's proposals, in particular
their willingness to give weight to the principles of good
governance, representative democracy and accountability.
They are the result of a great deal of effort and provide
a basis from which to engage in dialogue with other parties
to the conflict, such as the Government and the Muslims.
The fact that the LTTE has invested so much time and effort
in a political endeavour is to be appreciated by those who
seek a peaceful solution to the ethnic conflict.
For nearly six months the LTTE focused its attention on
the production of its interim administration proposals,
holding a wide range of consultations with local and international
experts in its capital of Kilinochchi and also in numerous
foreign countries, including France, Northern Ireland, Denmark,
Norway and Switzerland. The document they have produced
is a concise exposition of Tamil thinking over which there
is, of course, the final authority of the LTTE. There is
no doubt that the proposals are maximalist in spirit; but
they are an opening offer in negotiations in which there
has got to be give and take.
With its proposals for an Interim Self Governing Authority
the LTTE has given concrete form to its expectations in
a manner that is essentially compatible with peaceful coexistence
in a united Sri Lanka. The fact that the LTTE has recognised
the right of the Sri Lankan Government to appoint members
to the ISGA, and has not challenged the right of the Sri
Lankan security forces to be present in the North East,
are specific indicators of a preparedness to accept a united
country.
Further, even with regard to the new regional institutions
they have proposed, such as the police and judiciary, there
appears to be an openness to dialogue with the Government
on how to set them up and on their composition. It is unlikely
that the Government will either have the ability or the
intention to set up new institutions that supersede the
existing ones during an interim administrative period. New
institutions that require legal and constitutional change
are more appropriate for the final political settlement.
It is noteworthy that, in the Sri Lankan Government's immediate
response to the LTTE's proposal, the Government's chief
negotiator, Prof. G.L. Peiris, noted that the international
community had strongly supported the peace process and emphasised
the principle of partnership. He also pointed out that the
joint statement issued in New Delhi at the end of Prime
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's visit to India earlier this
month had "made a definitive statement about the parameters
within which a negotiated political solution should be arrived
at." The joint statement made mention of the fact that the
two Governments expected the LTTE to be reasonable and comprehensive
in the proposals it made regarding the interim administration,
and stressed that its proposals should be linked to the
final settlement.
The linkage of the interim administration to the final solution
is important because it implies that there will be a progression
towards a federal and democratic system. At present, neither
of these exists in the North East. The interim administration
that is permissible, and realistic to achieve, at this stage,
will necessarily have less powers and democracy in it than
the final solution, which must see the full flowering of
democracy and sharing of power at all levels and for all
communities.
Perhaps the Ceasefire Agreement signed in February 2002
between the two parties with Norwegian facilitation can
be a model in respect of creating new working arrangements
during the period of the interim administration. It is an
agreement between the two sides that has enabled the LTTE
to take on new roles and work in Government-controlled territory
without the need for constitutional changes. There is certainly
a need for an ISGA until the final political settlement
is reached, but it will need to be compatible with a united
framework of governance.
Another Swing of the Pendulum
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
India's policy
on Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), on terrorism, and on the principal
sponsor of terrorism in South Asia - Pakistan - has often
been criticized for its inconsistencies. Over the past years,
however, an increasing consistency has been evident - though
perhaps not in any particularly constructive sense: the
consistency of a pendulum, swinging with insistent regularity
from one extreme to the other.
This fruitless cycle has been repeated in an endless succession
of 'peace initiatives' at the highest level - regularly
interrupted by escalating violence, military mobilization,
coercive diplomacy and belligerent political rhetoric -
certainly since the Prime Minister's 'Ramadan Ceasefire'
(cessation of offensive operations against terrorists) in
November 2000, and indeed, at different stages before. The
current set of initiatives is one more directionless link
in a chain that is steadily losing credibility, even among
those who watch these processes from a great distance. Thus,
the US Congressional Research Service has already dismissed
the current process as 'moribund', though a delusional Indian
media and a gaggle of 'experts' committed to what has been
called, in another context, the 'political realism of appeasement',
continue to wax eloquent on the 'confidence
building measures' announced.
The current 'peace process', like its predecessors, is doomed
to inevitable failure, in the first instance, because, it
does not reflect the realities of the ground, or any radical
shift in the fundamental positions, either of India or Pakistan.
Thus, any negotiations, within this context, would seek
only to advance the tactical objectives of the engaging
parties. The possibilities of a fundamental and strategic
shift in the Pakistani perspective, and tactical agenda
are remote. Pakistan - and the elites that control power,
not just the present regime, in that country - remains entirely
committed to its founding ideology of Islamism and religious
exclusion, and consequently, to undermining the integrity
of the secular, democratic Indian nation state (characteristics
that India would be entirely unwilling to compromise or
dilute). Evidence of Pakistan's unwavering strategic perspectives
- despite broad tactical variations - can be discovered
in relation to recent events and policies in another theatre:
Afghanistan. In the wake of the 9/11 incidents and US pressure
on Pakistan to join the 'global coalition against terror',
Pakistan was widely seen to have performed a u-turn on its
Afghan policy, and to have 'abandoned' its long standing
quest for 'strategic depth' through interference in the
internal affairs of that country. Proof of the Pakistani
'u-turn' has been vociferously asserted through a steady
dribble of Al
Qaeda cadres handed over to US Forces, though
it is far from clear how much of this trickle is voluntary
or coerced. Nevertheless, as the American attention wavers,
there is mounting evidence that Pakistan is reviving its
earlier policies on Afghanistan, using various proxies to
put the Hamid Karzai regime under pressure, and offering
its 'services' to America to help mobilize forces - including
the remnants of its surrogate, the Taliban,
incredibly being repackaged as a 'moderate Taliban' - that
could 'help fill' the existing power vacuum in the uncontrolled
areas beyond Kabul's sway. Clearly, while Pakistan has executed
dramatic policy shifts to cope with the exigencies and imperatives
arising out of the post-9/11 scenario, its fundamental strategic
perspectives remain tied to the pre-9/11 world, and to the
original ideological impulses of its creation. This fact
underpins its responses in J&K, and with regard to its wider
support to terrorism in various theatres in India as well.
The most probable assumption, consequently, is that the
current 'peace process' will simply be used by Pakistan
as an instrumentality to focus attention on what it calls
the 'core issue' of Kashmir. As a result, an extended process
of 'negotiations' may be entered into, but would remain
no more than a charade (the obvious mischievousness of some
of Pakistan's 'counter-proposals', indeed, the rather shrill
rhetoric on both sides, seems to suggest that the shared
intent is more theatrical than substantive). Terrorist activities
on Indian soil would, consequently, be sustained; would
be calibrated to the exigencies of both bilateral and international
developments; and would tend to be held at maximal levels
at which 'credible minimal deniability' can be maintained.
Over the coming weeks, state support by Pakistan to terrorist
organizations, and their visible presence and activities
on Pakistani soil, may temporarily be driven deeper underground;
as the 'peace initiative' is seen to progress, some symbolic
- but necessarily ineffectual - action may again be taken
against some of the groups to demonstrate Pakistan's 'seriousness'
in 'tackling terrorism'; but terrorist activities in J&K
and other parts of India would be retained at the maximum
possible within the limits of international tolerance. Increasingly,
moreover, assertive elements in the Army and the Inter Services
Intelligence, as well as fundamentalist political and extremist
groupings in Pakistan, would tend to promote and consolidate
independent capacities to promote the jehadi agenda; past
experience, however, has demonstrated that Musharraf would,
nevertheless, retain control, since most of the jehadi groups
are, in fact, held firmly 'by the scruff of their necks'
by the Army. Such groups will also continue to cement alliances
with various other Islamist extremist entities, such as
the al Qaeda and the Taliban, active or present in Pakistan,
as well as with the organized criminal underground. At the
stage where Pakistan finds itself losing out in the propaganda
war over the 'peace process', these entities can be expected
to immediately escalate violence to engineer major terrorist
strikes in India at a stage where the blame for a 'breakdown'
can passed on to alleged Indian intransigence.
The space for covert sponsorship of terrorism in South Asia
- by both state and non-state entities - is seen to have
substantially expanded after a temporary post-9/11 contraction,
particularly since the beginning of the US campaign in Iraq,
and increasingly since the apparently mismanaged 'peace'
there. The future of terrorism in South Asia is integrally
linked to the stabilization of both Afghanistan and Iraq,
and perceptions of US vulnerabilities in these theatres
will encourage traditional sponsors of terrorism in South
Asia to escalate terrorist campaigns, not only against rivals
within the region, but increasingly against US and Western
interests as well. The continuous succession of strikes
against US Forces in Iraq; the growing disorders in Afghanistan;
the rising and manifest consternation in the US regarding
the increasing toll in American lives; and the growing significance
of events in Iraq in US domestic politics and President
Bush's re-election prospects next year, are all creating
complex incentives for an escalation in terror across the
world. The ideologues and campaign managers of Islamist
extremism are becoming convinced that the world's sole superpower
- though it cannot be confronted directly in conventional
conflict - is nevertheless vulnerable to the 'war of the
flea'. The destruction of the capacities and infrastructure
of terrorism, consequently, now becomes the most urgent
imperative of the global war against terrorism. Unfortunately,
there is little evidence of significant diminution in these,
despite the steady stream of 'victories' chalked up through
the arrest or neutralization of individual terrorists.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
October 27-November
2, 2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
2
|
0
|
4
|
6
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
4
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
11
|
8
|
32
|
51
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Tripura
|
8
|
0
|
1
|
9
|
West
Bengal
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
20
|
8
|
40
|
68
|
NEPAL
|
15
|
31
|
58
|
104
|
PAKISTAN
|
1
|
2
|
0
|
3
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
Highlights:
October 2003 'Peace Initiative'
Indian Offer of Confidence
Building Measures and Pakistan's Response
Indian
Proposal
|
Pakistani
Response
|
Restoration
of cricketing and other sporting links. |
Accepts
and hopes it to begin soon. |
Launching of a bus
service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad in Pakistan
occupied Kashmir (PoK). |
Accepts in principle
but with a rider that check points should be manned
by the United Nations (UN) officials and people
should travel with UN documents. |
Holding of second
round of talks for restoration of air links and
overflights. |
Accepted and second
round of talks to be held on December 1and 2. |
Discuss resumption
of rail links after aviation talks and increasing
the services of Delhi-Lahore bus service. |
Asked not to link
air and rail services talks and favours early resumption
of Samjhauta Express. No to increase of bus service
but proposes Lahore-Amritsar bus service. |
Setting up of links
between the coast guards of the two countries on
the pattern of Directors General of Military Operations
|
Accepted. |
Stop arrests of
fishermen within certain specified areas in the
Arabian Sea. |
Setting up of a
regime under which even if they are arrested, they
would be released in a month or so. |
Issue visas in cities
other than New Delhi and Islamabad. |
Accepted in principle
but wants mission strength to be restored to 110,
as existed before December 2001. |
Permit citizens
above 65 years to cross Wagah border on foot. |
Accepted. |
Launching of ferry
service between Mumbai and Karachi. |
Can be discussed
during the composite dialogue. |
Bus or rail link
between Khokrapar in Rajasthan and Munnabao in Pakistan's
Sindh province. |
Can be discussed
during the composite dialogue. |
Free medical treatment
for 20 more ailing Pakistani children in India. |
Offers treatment
to 40 Indian children at Heart Institute in Karachi
and disabled persons, widows and the victims of
rape affected by "operations of agencies". Offers
100 scholarships for graduate and post-graduate
students from the state of Jammu and Kashmir |
Mutual increase
in the staff strength of respective High Commissions
in Delhi and Islamabad. |
Wants to increase
it to 110, as existed prior to December 2001. |
INDIA
Delhi
High
Court
upholds
death
sentence
for
two
Jaish
terrorists
in
Parliament
attack
case:
The
Delhi
High
Court
on
October
29,
2003,
dismissed
the
appeals
of
Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
terrorists
Mohammed
Afzal
and
Shaukat
Hussain
Guru
against
their
conviction
under
the
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Act
(POTA)
in
the
December
13,
2001,
Parliament
attack
case
and
upheld
the
death
sentences
awarded
to
them
by
a
lower
court.
However,
the
Court
acquitted
two
other
accused
in
the
same
case,
S.A.R.
Geelani,
a
Delhi
University
lecturer
and
Afsan
Guru,
wife
of
Shaukat
Hussain
Guru,
on
the
basis
of
insufficient
evidence.
The
Hindu,
October
30,
2003.
NEPAL
United
States
declares
Maoists
a
'security
threat':
The
United
States
on
October
31,
2003,
declared
the
Communist
Party
of
Nepal-Maoist
(CPN-M)
to
be
a
threat
to
US
national
security
and
froze
its
assets
as
part
of
a
package
of
sanctions.
In
the
declaration,
US
Deputy
Secretary
of
State
Richard
Armitage
said,
"CPN-M
has
committed,
or
poses
a
significant
threat
risk
of
committing,
acts
of
terrorism
that
threaten
the
security,
foreign
policy,
or
economy
of
the
US".
The
State
Department
also
proscribed
two
of
the
party's
aliases
-
the
United
Revolutionary
People's
Council
and
the
People's
Liberation
Army
of
Nepal.
Nepal
News,
November
1,
2003.
PAKISTAN
Foreign
Secretary
Riaz
Khokhar
submits
response
to
Indian
CBMs:
Pakistan
on
October
29,
2003,
made
a
response
to
the
Indian
confidence-building
measures
(CBMs)
and
hoped
that
discussions
would
lead
New
Delhi
to
resume
a
sustained
and
composite
dialogue
with
Islamabad
on
all
contentious
issues,
including
the
Kashmir
issue.
Referring
to
the
Indian
proposal
of
introducing
a
bus
service
between
Srinagar
and
Muzaffarabad,
Foreign
Secretary
Riaz
Khokhar
said
that
there
should
be
checkpoints
manned
by
the
United
Nations
(UN)
on
the
Line
of
Control
(LoC)
and
people
traveling
on
such
a
bus
service
should
carry
UN
documents.
Pakistan,
he
said,
was
offering
scholarships
for
100
Kashmiri
students
for
studies
in
graduate
and
post-graduate
courses
in
professional
institutions.
Pakistan
has
also
offered
to
treat
"disabled
Kashmiris
and
help
widows
and
victims
of
rape
affected
by
various
operations
launched
by
security
agencies."
Pakistan,
Khokhar
said,
accepted
the
proposals
pertaining
to
the
resumption
of
the
Samjhauta
Express
train
between
Lahore
and
Delhi,
sports
ties,
visa
camps
with
provision
of
necessary
infrastructure
and
staff,
land
border
crossing
by
people
in
the
age
group
of
65
and
above,
and
setting
up
of
a
hotline
between
Pakistan's
maritime
agency
and
Indian
coast
guards
to
ensure
humanitarian
and
expeditious
assistance
to
arrested
fishermen
of
either
country.
Regarding
the
Indian
proposal
for
a
Mumbai-Karachi
ferry
service
and
opening
a
land
route
between
Munabao
and
Khokhrapar,
he
said
that
these
issues
should
be
left
for
consideration
whenever
the
two
sides
decided
to
resume
dialogue.
Jang,
October
30,
2003.
SRI
LANKA
LTTE
demands
complete
control
over
North-East
in
its
Interim
Administration
proposal:
The
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE)
on
November
1,
2003,
demanded
an
"Interim
Self-Governing
Authority
for
the
North
East
(ISGA),"
with
majority
powers
for
itself
and
complete
control
over
regional
administration
"until
a
final
settlement
is
reached
and
implemented."
This
was
enumerated
in
the
outfit's
Interim
Administrative
proposals
which
were
handed
over
to
the
Sri
Lankan
Government
through
the
Norwegian
facilitators.
While
setting
a
five-year
deadline
for
"a
final
settlement,"
of
the
ethnic
conflict,
the
LTTE
said
that
"if
no
settlement
is
reached
and
implemented''
by
then,
the
interim
body's
"independent
election
commission''
would
"conduct
free
and
fair
elections
in
accordance
with
international
democratic
principles
under
international
observation''
to
choose
the
members
of
the
ISGA.
The
LTTE's
demands
reportedly
include
"all
powers
and
functions
in
relation
to
regional
administration
exercised
by
the
Government
in
and
for
the
northeast''
including
revenue,
law
and
order,
land
and
marine
resources.
Further,
it
has
sought
control
over
finances
with
powers
over
domestic
and
international
borrowings
and
to
"engage
in
or
regulate
internal
and
external
trade."
Meanwhile,
the
Sri
Lankan
Government
has
described
the
LTTE's
offer
as
one
that
"differs
in
fundamental
respects''
from
the
one
that
it
submitted
to
the
outfit
on
July
17.
The
Government
has
also
reportedly
indicated
that
it
would
request
Norway
to
schedule
an
"initial
meeting''
in
the
coming
weeks
to
"pave
way
for
the
resumption
of
talks''
early
next
year.
The
Hindu,
November
2,
2003.
|
The South
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and the
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Asia Terrorism Portal.
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