SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
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Terrorism related fatalities in
Tripura, 1992-2002
|
Year
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
1992
|
59
|
18
|
21
|
98
|
1993
|
148
|
28
|
7
|
183
|
1994
|
206
|
22
|
10
|
238
|
1995
|
178
|
34
|
45
|
257
|
1996
|
140
|
31
|
18
|
189
|
1997
|
205
|
50
|
19
|
274
|
1998
|
214
|
25
|
26
|
265
|
1999
|
240
|
41
|
22
|
303
|
2000
|
453
|
16
|
45
|
514
|
2001
|
239
|
31
|
42
|
312
|
2002*
|
71
|
30
|
28
|
129
|
Total
|
2153
|
326
|
283
|
2762
|
Computed from official sources and English language media. |
* Data till August 25, 2002 |
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INDIA |
PAKISTAN
|
Do Peacemakers Make Peace? US Diplomacy and
Conflict on the Line of Control
Guest Writer:
Praveen Swami
Chief of Bureau, Mumbai,
Frontline
Conventional
wisdom has it that the United States' energetic diplomatic activity
in South Asia helps ensure that nuclear-armed India and Pakistan
do not go to war. Recent events along the Line of Control (LoC)
have once again underlined the impression, however, that United
States' peacemaking may in practice be encouraging sub-conventional
aggression by Pakistan - and protecting that country from a
proportionate response by India.
Speaking in Islamabad on August 23, 2002, military spokesperson
Major-General Rashid Qureshi - known for his obfuscation and
more than occasional dishonesty on the role of his Force during
and since the 1999 Kargil war - claimed that Pakistani troops
had beaten back a air-supported Indian military offensive in
the Gultari area, facing Drass and Kargil on the Indian side
of the LoC. Scores of Indian soldiers, he claimed, had been
killed in the Pakistani military response to 'Indian aggression'.
Qureshi made his remarks at the time when Deputy-Secretary of
State Richard Armitage was in New Delhi as part of a larger
mission to secure de-escalation along the LoC.
Two questions are key here. First, what actually happened? And
second, what did Qureshi hope to achieve by proclaiming that
the situation on the LoC was especially fragile?
Towards the end of July 2002, there was, in fact, a clash in
which India used air power against Pakistani Forces for the
first time since the Kargil war, but it was on the Indian side
of the LoC, and followed the discovery that Pakistani Forces
had occupied Indian positions. At 1:15 PM on July 29, eight
Mirage-2000 aircraft sorties were carried out against Pakistan-held
positions at Loonda Post, on the Indian side of the LoC in the
Machil sector. 1,000-pound precision-guided bombs were used
to obliterate four bunkers occupied by Pakistan, while 155-millimetre
Bofors howitzers were used to hit troops who had dug into forward
trenches prepared by Indian troops in earlier years. At least
28 Pakistan soldiers, Indian military intelligence officials
believe, were killed in the fighting.
It isn't entirely certain just when and how the Pakistan Army
managed to take Loonda Post, and those who might know aren't
talking. The affair, however, made two things clear. First,
India was willing to respond with massive force to any violation
of the LoC. If the Pakistan Army believed India would not be
willing to risk either horizontal or vertical escalation of
localised conflict, the expectation was belied. The fact that
the air strikes were carried out in broad daylight was an easy-to-read
Indian gesture underlining its determination.
There is, on the other hand, no evidence that the clash Qureshi
spoke about ever actually took place, though it is known that
the situation in the Kargil sector has been fraught since at
least May 2002. Earlier this summer, Indian troops reoccupied
Point 5070 in the Drass sector, a peak named, like others, after
its altitude in metres. Point 5070 dominates the strategically-vital
Mushkoh nullah (stream), to the east of Drass sub-sector, the
scene of some of the bloodiest fighting during the Kargil war.
Fighting continues over Point 5303 in the Marpo La area, to
the west of Drass. The conflict last lead, on August 19, to
intense artillery exchanges up and down the LoC in the Kargil
sector.
Both these offensives, particularly the effort to recapture
Point 5303, have been hampered by Pakistani fire from Point
5353, the highest feature in the Drass area. The mountain was
occupied by Pakistan after the end of the Kargil war, as a result
of local tactical errors by the Drass-based 56 Brigade, which
were compounded by high-level command failings, provoked by
the political need not to concede that a crucial position had
been lost. The Indian Army, which has lost seven soldiers and
nine civilian high-altitude porters in the fight, has been arguing
for the use of full-blown artillery and air strikes to regain
the position, which gives Pakistan the ability to bring accurate
artillery fire to bear on a section of the Srinagar-Leh highway.
So far, aware of the possible consequences, the Union Defence
Ministry has blocked calls for an assault on Point 5353, but
patience is wearing thin.
Qureshi, it seems probable, may have resorted to his Gultari
fiction in order to prevent precisely such an assault. His fiction
did serve to suggest that any localised conflict along the LoC
could spiral out of control - or, indeed, that Pakistan would
seek to ensure it did. This stance is at par with the tactical
thinking that led to the Loonda Post occupation. Pakistani strategists
apparently and deliberately ignored the prospects of a major
Indian response, and the potential for the conflict to widen,
given that both armies currently have troops massed along their
frontiers. They did this, secure in their belief that American
'peacemaking', however well-intentioned, provided a kind of
insurance policy for ill-considered and irresponsible military
adventures.
Armitage, to his credit, does not appear to have fallen for
the Pakistan military's loud protestations. If they are actually
serious about de-escalating tensions along the LoC, however,
the Deputy-Secretary and his policy-establishment colleagues
do need to think carefully about just what they are doing in
South Asia, and how their actions impact on the regional conflict
and its potential for resolution.
Tripura: The Politics
of Ethnic Terror
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
On August
20, 2002, terrorists belonging to a faction of the National
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT),
killed 20 personnel of the paramilitary Tripura State Rifles
(TSR) in a daylight ambush at Hirapur, in the West Tripura
district [Map]
of this troubled State in India's Northeast. Clearly acting
on inside information, the militants had attacked 25 Security
Force (SF) personnel traveling in a single truck, on their
way to a hospital where they were taking three of their
number for treatment. A shortage of vehicles had resulted
in the truck traveling unescorted, against established norms
in the area.
The Hirapur ambush was among the worst ever attacks on the
security forces in Tripura, but terrorists, particularly
belonging the NLFT and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF),
have long wreaked havoc in the State, and more than 129
persons, including 71 civilians and 30 SF personnel, have
already lost their lives to terrorist violence this year.
In addition to the August 20 incident, the NLFT alone has
been responsible for at least five major attacks - among
a large number of smaller strikes - in 2002.
The persistent
violence in Tripura occurs within the context of a deepening
nexus between major political parties and terrorist groups.
Terrorist groups in the State also have strong connections
with other insurgent organisations in the region. These
groups, often aided by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI), exploit the 865 kilometre-long porous border with
Bangladesh to establish their hideouts beyond Indian territory.
The State has emerged as a major corridor for pushing arms
into the Northeast, with groups such as the NLFT procuring
arms and ammunition from South East Asian countries such
as Thailand and Singapore, and depositing them at Cox Bazaar
in Bangladesh, one of the major illegal arms centres in
the region. Terrorists groups in the State are deeply criminalised
and have transformed abduction into a lucrative industry.
The State, which has barely 8.29 per cent of the Northeast's
population, accounts for over 70 per cent of all abductions
in the region.
The State Government has long argued its inability to contain
the militancy in the State without greater support from
the Centre, and Chief Minister Manik Sarkar has repeatedly
blamed the withdrawal of the Army from counter-insurgency
operations for the worsening situation. Three Army battalions
had been engaged in counter-insurgency operations when they
were abruptly withdrawn from the State in the wake of the
Kargil war in Jammu & Kashmir in 1999. Worse, the total
force guarding the extended and troubled border with Bangladesh
has also been halved. Sarkar disclosed that nine of the
18 BSF battalions patrolling this border had been withdrawn
by the Centre, making it much easier for the militants to
strike and flee into their safe havens across the border.
The Chief Minister is also reported to have provided the
Union Government with a list of 51 terrorist camps in Bangladesh,
including 32 of the Biswamohan Debbarma faction of the NLFT,
three of the NLFT Nayanbasi Jamatia faction, and 16 of the
ATTF, spread across the Sylhet, Habigunj and Laulavi Bazar
districts and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The ruling Bangladesh
National Party (BNP) is known to have been deeply supportive
of these groups during its last tenure, and acted in collusion
with the ISI to help set up these camps and facilitate insurgent
activities against India. The ruling Left Front government
at Tripura apprehends that the insurgency in the State will
escalate following Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's
recent visit to Dhaka. It is significant that the Hirapur
massacre was executed by the Nayanbasi Jamatia faction of
the NLFT, and this was confirmed by Jamatia himself in Fax
messages to newspapers and an interview to the BBC from
Srimangal in Bangladesh. Chief Minister Manik Sarkar says,
"We have been repeatedly urging the Central Government to
take up the matter of Tripura militant groups having camps
in Bangladesh with Dhaka."
Safe havens in Bangladesh and the ISI's machinations apart,
the real obstacle to peace in the State lies in the deep
vested interests that are now entrenched both within the
political scenario and in the operations of militant groups.
The unyielding polarisation between the tribal population
and the non-tribals has been exacerbated, at once, by electoral
politics and by extremist atrocities. There is now incontrovertible
evidence of a deepening nexus between major political parties
and terrorist groups. The NLFT is said to have close links
with the Congress (I), while the ATTF is aligned with the
ruling Left Front. There are clear indications that terrorism
in the State - with its disproportionate emphasis on criminal
activities such as abduction and extortion - is substantially
supported and sustained by political patronage.
Insurgency in the State of Tripura has its roots in demographics,
and this is the only State in India's Northeast that has
been transformed, in recent history, from a predominantly
tribal to a predominantly non-tribal State. Tribal terrorist
groups specifically target the non-tribal population, whom
they call 'settler refugees'. Insurgent violence in the
State dates back to the first Communist Party of India (CPI)
led movement in 1948-51, but assumed its current contours
of tribal vs. non-tribal violence through a succession of
militant organisations and movements since the creation
of the now defunct Tripur Sena in the early 1970s.
With State Assembly elections due again in February 2003,
the volatile ethnic politics, and its exploitation by short-sighted
political groupings in Tripura, can be expected to create
a crescendo of violence in the State. It is hardly unexpected
if this is encouraged further by the interventions of unfriendly
neighbours in the South Asian region.
NEWS BRIEFS
|
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Civilian
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA |
35
|
27
|
41
|
103
|
Assam |
4
|
2
|
2
|
8
|
Jammu & Kashmir |
11
|
25
|
31
|
67
|
Meghalaya |
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Nagaland |
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Tripura |
20
|
0
|
0
|
20
|
Left-wing extremism |
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
NEPAL |
1
|
0
|
67
|
68
|
Provisional data compiled
from English language media sources.
|
Terrorists
massacre 10 civilians in J&K: Suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
terrorists massacred 10 civilians in two separate incidents in
the Thana Mandi and Manajakote areas of Rajouri district of Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) on August 23, 2002. In the first incident, approximately
10 terrorists attacked Dudansaballa village in Thana Mandi and
killed eight persons, including three women. In another incident,
two more civilians were killed at Hayatpur and Kalaali villages
of Rajouri. Terrorists also reportedly left behind a note, which
warned people against participation in the forthcoming J&K Legislative
Assembly elections and against getting recruited in the police.
Daily
Excelsior, August 25, 2002.
India conveys its concern on cross-border terrorism to US:
India on August 23, 2002, informed the visiting US Deputy Secretary
of State, Richard Armitage, that Pakistan was not keeping its
commitment to permanently end cross-border terrorism in Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) and was attempting to push in terrorists to
disrupt the forthcoming State Legislative Assembly Elections.
Speaking to media after the meeting, a Ministry of External Affairs
spokesperson said, "There exists a consonance between the two
sides in the assessment of the current trends in J&K." Press
Trust of India, August 24, 2002.
Five persons killed by NDFB terrorists in Assam: Four security
force (SF) personnel and a civilian were killed in an Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) blast caused allegedly by National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (NDFB) terrorists at Maladhara in Assam's Goalpara
district on August 21, 2002. 17 SF personnel were also injured
in the attack. Assam
Tribune, August 22, 2002.
Terrorism figures prominently at SAARC Foreign Ministers meet
in Nepal: The 23rd session of South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Council of Ministers, which began
in Kathmandu, Nepal, on August 21, 2002, voiced concern over the
resurgence of terrorism in new forms and its viciousness in the
region and beyond. The meeting called for redoubling efforts to
combat the problem in all its manifestations. At the meeting,
India's External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha while rejecting
Pakistan's fresh offer for resumption of dialogue without pre-condition,
added that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf must honour his
commitment to end cross-border terrorism. Earlier, on August 20,
ahead of the Foreign Minister's meeting, Foreign Secretaries of
SAARC countries agreed to amend their respective national legislation
to synchronise them with international laws against terrorism.
Press
Trust of India, August 21, 2002; The
Tribune, August 22, 2002.
50 extremists arrested in Bihar: 50 extremists, including
left-wing extremists - Naxalites - of the People's War Group (PWG),
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), Communist Party of India--Marxist-Leninist
(CPI-ML), besides cadres of the Ranvir Sena (a private army of
landowners), were arrested in Jehanabad district of Bihar on August
21, 2002. A large cache of arms and ammunition, including rifles
looted from police, were recovered from them. Times
of India, August 22, 2002.
Deputy Premier discusses cross-border terrorism during UK visit:
Cross-border terrorism, curbing the flow of funds from Islamist
extremists in the UK to terrorists operating in the Indian State
of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and increasing bilateral cooperation
to counter international terrorism, figured prominently during
Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani's three day visit to UK, which
began on August 20, 2002. In an interview to Britain's Channel
Four Television in London, he said India considers itself "at
war" with Pakistan over J&K, though there is no formal declaration
of hostilities. He added that there was no point in resuming talks
with Pakistan until it terminated cross-border terrorism. Press
Trust of India, August 21, 2002.
20 SF personnel killed by suspected NLFT terrorists in Tripura:
20 security force (SF) personnel were killed and four others injured
in an ambush laid by suspected National Liberation Front of Tripura
- Nayanbasi faction (NLFT-N) terrorists at Hirapur in the West
Tripura district of Tripura on August 20, 2002. Outlook,
August 20, 2002.
30 Maoist insurgents killed in Rolpa district: Security force (SF) personnel killed 30 Maoist insurgents on August 20, 2002, in Thawang village, Rolpa district. One SF person was also killed and three others injured, while 60 Maoists sustained injuries during the operation. Nepal News, August 21, 2002.
Infiltration
continuing across LoC, says US Deputy Secretary of State: US
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said in Islamabad on
August 24, 2002, that some terrorist infiltration was continuing
across the Line of Control (LoC). However, he also said that Pakistan
had assured him that it was not responsible for this. "I can say
nothing has changed from the assurances I was given last June
when I was here. And there are some obvious infiltrations across
the Line of Control, but our friends in Pakistan assured me it
is not something sponsored by Pakistan." Armitage added that he
had received assurances that Pakistan was doing its best to stop
terrorists from crossing into the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Dawn,
August 25, 2002.
Osama, Omar may be in Pakistan, says President Musharraf:
President Pervez Musharraf said in an interview on August 19,
2002, that Osama bin Laden and Taliban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar
could be hiding in Pakistan's western border-tribal belt. However,
he observed, it was more likely they were hiding in Afghanistan.
"I won't entirely rule it out," he said, of the chances of the
two being assisted by sympathizers in the tribal belt that borders
Afghanistan. He also said terrorists may still be crossing the
Line of Control (LoC) into the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.
"The possibility is there... it's like the Afghan border, only
much worse." Dawn,
August 21, 2002.
LTTE de-proscription on September 6, 2002: Media reports from Sri Lanka indicated that the ban on Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would be lifted for a month. A formal announcement in this regard is expected to be made on September 6, 2002, ten days ahead of direct talks between the government and LTTE to be held in Thailand. Tamilnet, August 25, 2002.
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that will bring you regular data, assessments and news brief on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region. SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal. |
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