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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 49, June 23, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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The State as Suicide Bomber
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
General
Pervez Musharraf's visit to the US is a crucial moment in
the history of South Asia, and what transpires between him
and President George W. Bush at the scheduled conclave at
Camp David will substantially determine not only the direction
of future events and equations in this region, but also
the future of international Islamist terrorism. For it is
in America's handling of what Bernard Henri Levi has described
as "the most delinquent of nations" that the proximate future
of Islamist terrorism will be defined. Pakistan remains,
today, the primary "platform for terror", in Ambassador
Nancy Powell's words, and neutralizing this platform is
among the primary challenges of the global war against terrorism.
In dealing with General Musharraf, it will be useful for
his interlocutors to keep in mind - no doubt among other
and more expedient matters - that they are dealing with
the man who currently presides over the world's largest
network of terrorists, and over a state that has, for over
two decades, used terrorism as an integral instrument of
state policy - and still continues to do so from day to
day.
This terrorism is widely nuanced and exploits every possible
weakness in both adversary and ally. This is why America's
policies since 9/11, with their overwhelming reliance on
financial sops, have failed to significantly alter the character
of the Pakistani state, or to dismantle the infrastructure
of terrorism on its soil. Nor will provision of further
financial relief change anything, beyond giving Pakistan's
ruling elite another billion or two to fritter away on military
adventures and their quest for strategic extension through
Islamist extremism. Pakistan has been surviving on international
charity for much of its existence, and this has not strengthened
the country, or created a sound domestic production base
and economy. Pakistan is, at best, and temporarily, a 'rich
beggar', and cannot be expected to retain this status unless
it radically restructures both its politics and its economy.
There is little evidence, yet, of such restructuring, and
any transformations that may have occurred have only tended
to entrench the Islamist extremist elements even deeper
in the nation's politics.
And yet, despite the growing international recognition of
Pakistan's continued role in supporting and sustaining international
terrorism, there is virtual acceptance of the fact that
Musharraf will come away from Camp David with significant
'rewards' for 'helping America' in its war against terrorism.
It is useful, within this context, to assess what it is
the General will seek at Camp David, and the strategy he
would employ to secure what he wants.
The first component of the General's quest is 'more of the
same' - further financial aid in the form of a waiver of
bilateral debt to the tune of US $ 1.8 billion. America
had already written off $ 1 billion as a reward for Pakistan's
'support' in Afghanistan against the Taliban
and Al
Qaeda, and had also helped secure large external
inflows, concessional multilateral loans and grants that
have helped Pakistan build up foreign exchange reserves
of US $10.5 billion form a position of near bankruptcy.
The second crucial component is to force the acceptance
of a 'clear road map for resolution of the Kashmir conflict'
on what is being propounded as the 'Chenab' formula, which
envisages the division of Kashmir along religious lines,
with Muslim-majority areas going to Pakistan. This formula
would reconfirm Pakistan's underlying ideology of religious
exclusion - the two nation theory -, would confer a quantifiable
'victory' on its strategy of cross border terrorism, and
would further the Islamist fundamentalist enterprise within
the region.
The third component - currently being actively pursued -
is a renewed role in Afghanistan, as America struggles to
contain the revival of the Taliban movement. Pakistan is,
once again, offering to 'step in' to fill the power vacuum
by 'mediating' with Taliban survivors, as well as other
radical Islamist groupings such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
Hizb-I-Islami. With American frustrations in Afghanistan
mounting, the possibility of a revival of a surrogate Pakistani
influence in that country is being actively sought, and
threatens to give rise to another political travesty, if
the US succumbs to the imperatives of expediency.
Musharraf will also seek to negotiate a 'free hand' for
himself and his military regime in Pakistan. The rigged
elections of October 2002 have not produced the compliant
Parliament and State Assemblies that Musharraf had hoped
for, and these bodies are now creating problems on the General's
continuance as both President and Chief of Army Staff. In
addition, the Talibanised Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)
administration in the North West Frontier Province is proving
to be a source of both domestic and international embarrassment,
and there is significant speculation in Pakistan that Musharraf
would seek carte blanche for the suspension or dismissal
of these 'elected' bodies in case present political maneuvers
fail to secure his continuance with full powers, or if the
Parliament or Assemblies present him with unacceptable difficulties.
Finally, Musharraf would like to come away with a lifting
of the present embargo on military supplies to Pakistan,
and a substantial package of Arms, including the delivery
of a batch of 40 F-16s that have been sought by Pakistan
since the early 1980s.
It is in the last of these that Pakistan's strategy of negotiation
is most clearly demonstrated. During his present international
tour, in an interview to The Times in London, Musharraf
argued that, with a rise in India's defence spending, coupled
with restrictions on Pakistan's acquisition of military
equipment, a 'dangerous imbalance' was emerging in the force
levels between the two countries. In such circumstances,
he declared, "Pakistan would have no choice but to rely
on its nuclear weapons."
This pattern of continued nuclear blackmail has consistently
been at the heart of Pakistan's case for concessions, aid
and a heightened threshold of international tolerance for
its sponsorship and support to Islamist terrorism. To understand
how this works, it is useful to conceive of Pakistan as
a state acting as a suicide bomber, arguing that, if it
does not receive the extraordinary dispensations and indulgences
that it seeks, it will, in effect 'implode', and in the
process do extraordinary harm to others. Part of the threat
of this 'implosion' is also the specter of the transfer
of its nuclear arsenal and capabilities to more intransigent
and irrational elements of the Islamist far right in Pakistan,
who would not be amenable to the logic that its present
rulers - whose interests in terrorism are strategic, and
consequently, subject to considerations of strategic advantage
- are willing to heed.
This is the bluff that the Musharraf dictatorship has confronted
the Western world with, at least for the past twenty months,
and it is a bluff that the world has failed to call. It
has allowed the General to dismiss an elected government;
to rig elections; to continue supporting the operation of
terrorist groups from, and the existence of their infrastructure
on, Pakistani soil; and despite all this, to secure massive
financial and political rewards, instead of the natural
penalties that should have attached to such criminality
of conduct.
It is improbable that this bluff will finally be called
at Camp David, but it would be worse than myopic if President
Bush fails to heed the warning that came from Mike Evanoff,
the chief of diplomatic security at the US Embassy in Islamabad:
"This is the epicenter for terrorism. It really is. This
is the only country I know in the world that has so many
groups that are against the US or Western ideals."
ULFA: Decapitation Failure
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database
& Documentation Centre, Guwahati
On May 27,
2003, the heavily guarded Purbanchal complex at the Uttara
locality in Dhaka, provided by the Bangladesh Government
as a safe-house and coordination centre to the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA)
'Commander-in-Chief', Paresh Baruah, came under massive
attack in what is now seen as a decapitation strike engineered
by a faction within his own organization. There is also
some speculation that Indian intelligence agencies had penetrated
the ULFA inner circle, and that the attack may have been
executed by disgruntled ULFA cadres at their behest.
Baruah has been running ULFA's terrorist campaign in the
Indian State of Assam from his 'headquarters' at Dhaka for
well over 12 years, though the Bangladesh Government denies
the presence of any Indian terrorist leaders or cadres on
its soil. India has repeatedly given Bangladesh authorities
lists
of Indian terrorists and terrorist camps present on Bangladeshi
soil, only to be repeatedly stonewalled with
blank denials.
The May 27 attack has seriously embarrassed the Bangladesh
Government, particularly because some operatives of its
Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI), including
at least one Captain, as well as an operative of Pakistan's
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) were among the eight persons
believed to have been killed, though there is no official
confirmation of casualties. The attack also assumed exaggerated
significance in the succeeding weeks because it was widely
rumored that Baruah may, in fact, have been killed. Adding
to the speculation was the fact that Baruah made no response
to reports of the attack on him, as was his practice when
reports of such attacks had surfaced in the past, and was
completely out of contact with his associates and links
in Assam [there have been at least three reported attempts
on Paresh Baruah's life during his sojourn at Dhaka].
Any doubts on his survival have, however, now been dispelled,
and he has revived telephonic contacts with several associates
and links in Assam and outside, including some prominent
journalists. Baruah has also claimed responsibility for
a series of recent attacks, including an attack in Tinsukia
district in which two Central Industrial Security Force
(CISF) personnel were killed on June 20, a series of rocket
propelled grenade (RPG) attacks in the Bijni police station
area of Bongaigaon district on June 21, and the killing
of an Army officer in the Darrang district on June 17. Speaking
from Dhaka, Baruah asserted that his operations in Assam
would continue. In fact, it is becoming increasingly clear,
from the handouts released simultaneously in Manipur, Assam
and Tripura, and also from a series of attacks on security
forces' installations, that a region-wide 'Operation Freedom'
- the 'first ever coordinated military offensive', has been
launched since June 17 by the ULFA, the Manipur People's
Liberation Front (MPLF) and the Tripura People's Democratic
Front (TPDF) in these three States.
It was, nevertheless, the possibility of Baruah's willingness
to enter into negotiations with the Indian Government that
may have triggered the abortive attack on him. Baruah had,
for some time now, been speaking to various associates about
a 'confederal' arrangement with the Union Government as
the basis of a possible resolution of the conflict in Assam.
Trouble has been brewing on this count for some time now,
though it is not entirely clear where each of the individual
ULFA leaders - particularly 'Chairman' Arabinda Rajakhowa;
Deputy Commander-in-Chief, chief of military operations
and the head of the near-autonomous 'Enigma Force', Raju
Baruah; and 'Foreign Secretary' Sashadhar Choudhary - stand
on the issue. Nevertheless, trouble has been reportedly
been brewing for some time between Paresh and Raju Baruah,
and sources indicate that decision-making power had been
taken away from Raju Baruah over more than the past month
and a half. Raju Baruah is currently said to be 'under treatment'
- but in fact in quasi-detention - at the Mirpur Military
Hospital. Paresh Baruah is known to have consented to the
possibility of talks if the 'General Body' of the ULFA approved,
though he said he would not participate in such negotiations.
Raju Baruah is known to have strongly opposed talks, and
is believed to have been publicly chastised by Paresh Baruah.
There is also a sharp divide within ULFA cadres on the question
of the organisation's subordination to the ISI and DGFI's
agenda, with Paresh Baruah inclining to a relatively independent
line - though, given his operational dependence on these
agencies, this does not go far - and Raju Baruah and Sashadhar
Choudhary greater acceptance of a subsidiary role. Finally,
an extended conflict over a division of the spoils - estimated
in the billions of rupees - that have accumulated with the
organisation as a result of extortion and a wide range of
illegal and quasi-legal operations, and over which Paresh
Baruah exercises absolute control, is known to have vitiated
relations at the leadership level.
Each of these conflicts will be aggravated by the abortive
May 27 decapitation attempt, and factionalism within the
ULFA can be expected to grow significantly as a result.
It is a measure of the rising suspicion within the insurgent
leadership that, for almost three weeks after the attack,
Paresh Baruah's location - or even the fact of his survival
- was entirely unknown to his closest associates.
Other indications of mounting pressure on ULFA have emerged
from reports regarding the launching of a major military
operation against the insurgents' camps in Bhutan. While
both Bhutanese and Indian authorities have refused to confirm
such operations for obvious reasons, the Indian Army reportedly
launched a major campaign against ULFA camps across the
Bhutan border on June 20, ten days before Bhutan's King
Jigme Singye Wangchuk's deadline for the ULFA to vacate
Bhutanese soil. Paresh Baruah's continuance at the helm
of the ULFA is considered by most observers to be essential
to the insurgent group's survival. No other leader commands
the loyalty of cadres, or the limited popular following
that still adheres to the group, and Baruah's removal from
the scene would signify the beginning of the end for this
rudderless movement that has afflicted the people of Assam
for over two decades now.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
June 16-22, 2003
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Civilian
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Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorist
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Total
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BANGLADESH
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1
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0
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2
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3
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INDIA
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Assam
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2
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3
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31
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36
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Jammu
&
Kashmir
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13
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3
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20
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36
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Left-wing
Extremism
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3
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5
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5
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13
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Manipur
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0
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3
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2
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5
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Tripura
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5
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0
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0
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5
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Total (INDIA)
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23
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14
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58
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95
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NEPAL
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1
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0
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3
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4
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PAKISTAN
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1
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0
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0
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1
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Six Hmar
terrorists killed in Assam encounter:
Six Hmar People's Convention - Democratic
(HPC-D) terrorists were killed in an encounter
with the security forces that occurred following
a search of the outfit's hideout near Phylen
village in Cachar district of Assam on June
20, 2003. An AK-47 rifle, two other rifles,
four country made rifles, two country made
pistols along with an unspecified quantity
of ammunition and some incriminating documents
were seized from the encounter site. Sentinel
Assam, June 21, 2003.
DGFI probing reported attack on ULFA
'chief' Paresh Baruah in Bangladesh:
According to a media report on June 19,
2003, the Bangladesh Director General of
Field Intelligence (DGFI) is believed to
be probing the reported attack on United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
'chief' Paresh Baruah on the outskirts of
Dhaka on May 27, 2003. Baruah reportedly
escaped unhurt. The report quoting arrested
ULFA cadres in Assam further said that differences
have increased between Baruah and the ULFA
'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa over the leadership
issue and division of millions of rupees
extorted through various sources. The DGFI
has also reportedly arrested several ULFA
cadres said to be loyal to Rajkhowa for
interrogation. The
Hindu, June 19, 2003.
Infiltration continues along Line of
Control, says Defence Intelligence Agency:
The Indian Army on June 18, 2003, refuted
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's claim
in London on June 17 that no infiltration
was taking place along the Line of Control
(LoC). Talking to the media in Delhi, Lt.
Gen. Kamal Davar, Director General of the
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), said
the support structures for infiltration
in terms of launching pads and covering
fire by the Pakistan Army, has seen no perceptible
change. He also said that, with the opening
of passes, infiltration to the north of
Pir Panjal range had also commenced. Gen.
Davar pointed out that the ground situation
in Jammu and Kashmir had not undergone any
perceptible change in the recent weeks and
terrorist infrastructure, sponsored and
supported by Pakistan, continued to facilitate
cross-border terrorism. Daily
Excelsior, June 19, 2003.
Canada bans three Sikh terrorist outfits
and Pakistan based LeT and LeJ: Canada
on June 18, 2003, proscribed three Sikh
terrorist groups allegedly involved in the
bombing of the Air India flight, Kanishka,
that crashed off the Irish coast in 1985
killing 329 passengers onboard. While announcing
the ban, Solicitor General Wayne Easter
said that the Sikh groups banned include
Babbar Khalsa (BK), Babbar Khalsa International
(BKI)
and the International Sikh Youth Federation
(ISYF).
He further declared that Canada has also
banned two Pakistan-based terrorist groups,
the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).
Rediff,
June 18, 2003.
Fresh evidence provided to Bangladesh
on presence of Indian terrorists there,
says BSF: While speaking in Jammu on
June 17, Border Security Force (BSF) Additional
Director General A.K. Mitra reportedly stated
that India had again provided to Bangladesh
fresh evidence of the presence of 99 terrorist
training camps on its soil. The terrorists
from these camps allegedly operate in the
States of Northeast India and Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K). He reportedly said, "We recently
submitted fresh authentic evidence of 99
terrorist training camps in Bangladesh to
Bangladesh Government, as these camps are
sponsoring terrorism in North-East and have
links with J&K." He also said that the Government
is awaiting a reply from Bangladesh on the
issue. These camps are mostly located in
the forest and hill areas on the Bangladeshi
side along the border with the Indian State
of Tripura, he added. Indian
Express, June 18, 2003.
PAKISTAN
Accounts of
15 terrorist groups and individuals frozen: The Federal
Government has reportedly frozen Rupees 621.41 million of 15
terrorist groups and individuals in nine banks and has refused
Income Tax exemptions to 10 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
The News has indicated that official documents also made
available to the Parliament, revealed that bank accounts of
many individuals and organisations stand frozen, including that
of Osama
Bin Laden, Al-Rashid Trust (ART),
Rabita Trust (RT),
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).
The report added that while approximately Rupees 4,742 was found
in two accounts of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Jaish-e-Mohammed
account had Rupees 900 and one of bin Laden's account was worth
approximately Rupees 17,817. Jang,
June 21, 2003.
Nothing happening across Line of Control, claims President
Musharraf: President Pervez Musharraf while rejecting Indian
allegations of cross-border terrorism claimed in London on June
17, 2003, that, "It's simply not true. It's my word against
theirs. There is nothing happening on the Line of Control (LoC).
Now let us not be blackmailed on this issue by the Indian side…
Whatever is happening is indigenous." Later, Musharraf told
reporters after his over one-hour talks at 10-Downing Street
that the British Premier Tony Blair was "very conscious of the
necessity of initiating the dialogue process." Responding to
a question, Musharraf pointed out that a resolution of the Kashmir
issue depends on Pakistan, India and the people of Jammu and
Kashmir. He added that the British Prime Minister "can facilitate
and encourage us going towards a solution." Musharraf arrived
in London at the start of a four-nation tour including United
States, Germany and France. Jang,
June 18, 2003.
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The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
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terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as
on related economic, political, and social issues, in
the South Asian region.
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South
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