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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 33, March 3, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Footprints of Terror
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
On March
1, 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, one of the prime planners
of the 9/11
attacks on the US, was arrested in Rawalpindi. The US authorities
had been pursuing him at least since his 1995 involvement
in the abortive 'Operation Bojinka' conspiracy to simultaneously
blow up 12 American civilian airliners over the Pacific,
in which he collaborated with his relative, Ramzi Yousef,
who is currently serving a life sentence in America for
the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre. With a US $ 25
million reward on his head, this self proclaimed 'head of
Al
Qaeda's Military Committee' and close associate
of Osama
bin Laden is certainly a major catch for the
Americans. Within the context of the global war against
terror, however, this is just another very small step forward.
To understand why, it is useful to look at some other incidents
over the past weeks in Pakistan. On February 28, in the
latest in a long series of sectarian killings, three persons
from the minority Shia community were killed by unidentified
attackers in Karachi. On the same day, two policemen guarding
the American Consulate in Karachi were killed, when an unidentified
gunman opened fire on the police picket near the consulate
building. Five other police personnel and a civilian passer-by
were also injured in this incident. On February 22, nine
persons from the minority Shia community, including a seven
year old boy, were killed, and seven others wounded by three
motorcycle borne gunmen outside an Imambargah (mosque) in
Karachi. On February 16, former legislator and Muttahida
Quomi Mahaz - Altaf Hussain (MQM-A)
central leader Khalid bin Waleed was shot dead and his associate
and official gunman injured, again in Karachi.
Sheikh Mohammad's arrest has integral links with these acts
of terror, and the organisations that executed them. One
of the primary organisations responsible for the targeted
killings of minority groups and their leaders in Karachi
is the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),
and it was after two members of this group were arrested
and interrogated on information provided by some Shias from
Gilgit in the Northern Areas that another LeJ terrorist
was traced out in Quetta. It was this third LeJ operative
who eventually disclosed that Sheikh Mohammad had been hiding
out with him, but had escaped just before the raid. It was
on his information that the residence of Ahmed Abdul Qadoos
was raided in Rawalpindi, and Sheikh Mohammad was arrested.
Sheikh Mohammad has had an extended association with the
LeJ.
Sheikh Mohammad's arrest, the succession of sectarian killings
in Karachi, and the attacks on the US consulate are renewed
evidence that terrorism is alive and well in Pakistan. These
events need to be placed in the context of President Musharraf's
rather strident denials of Al Qaeda presence in the country,
and claims that terrorists were not being allowed to operate
from Pakistani soil. Sheikh Mohammad's arrest, indeed, validates
assertions that the Al Qaeda has substantially regrouped
and relocated in Pakistan, and has been facilitated in this
by a number of political and militant actors closely linked
to state agencies. The arrest of Ahmed Abdul Qadoos, who
is the son of a local Jamaat-e-Islami leader, and his quick
defence by the Jamaat, bears this pattern out. The Jamaat
is a major political force in the present establishment,
and has long been an inspiration for a number of extremist
militant affiliates.
President Musharraf's showcase arrests of the leaders of
banned terrorist groups, their subsequent release, and the
continued operation of these groups under new names needs
to be immediately revaluated, and pressure must be brought
to bear on Pakistan to place effective curbs on the operation
of these groups and connected individuals. It should be
noted here that virtually all the groups supposedly 'banned'
by Pakistan as terrorist organisations are now allowed to
function with impunity under new names. Thus, for example,
the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
now operates as the 'Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith'; the Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM)
is 'Al Furqan'; the Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irsahd is 'Jamaat-ad-Dawa';
the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP)
is the 'Tehrik-e-Islami'. Within the current circumstances
in Pakistan, consequently, where the state actively tolerates,
or even encourages and supports, certain patterns of terrorism,
it is not possible to effectively control others. There
is an ethos of terrorism, and this has enormously facilitated
the relocation of the Al Qaeda in this country. It is useful
to notice, also, that the footprints of virtually every
major act of international terrorism in the world in recent
years pass inevitably through this country, and it is precisely
this 'ethos of terrorism' that makes it the crucial link
in the inexorable growth of global terror.
There are many who believe that Sheikh Mohammad's arrest
constitutes a 'major blow' to bin Laden and the Al Qaeda.
At one level, this is certainly the case: the loss of a
top operative inevitably inflicts some damage on the operational
capabilities of an organisation. But such losses are far
from crippling - as the death of Mohammad Atef and the arrests
of Abu Zubaidah and Ramzi Binalshibh have already demonstrated.
Indeed, with the tens of thousands who have been trained
by the Taliban - Al Qaeda - Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI) combine in camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
for over a decade, the 'sacrifice' of a few operatives is
not only easily absorbed, it is a necessary input in the
development of the organisation.
The fact is, the Al Qaeda and the Islamist terrorist Internationale
has immensely evolved since 9/11.
A continuing succession of terrorist strikes, including
a string of incidents in Pakistan, the attacks in Bali and
Mombasa, as well as continuous pre-emptive arrests across
Europe and America are testimony to the crystallization
of a truly decentralized, hydra-headed operation which will
continue to flourish as long as it retains its seeding grounds
and safe havens in nation states where the culture of violence
and the ideologies of terror are supported by the state
structure and a powerful social and political establishment.
THE NORTHEAST:
DEMOCRACY IN TROUBLED TIMES
Tripura:
A Vote against Violence
Guest Writer: Sekhar
Datta in Agartala
Principal Correspondent, The Telegraph
The Assembly
elections in Tripura did not turn out to be as 'tough' as
had been predicted by none other than the ruling Communist
Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) party secretary, Baidyanath
Mazumder. At one stage, the CPI-M led Left Front, appeared
to losing ground in the face of a determined assault by
the banned National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
militants and their political front, the Indigenous Nationalist
Party of Tripura (INPT). The INPT brought together two separate
political parties - the erstwhile Tripura Upjati Juba Samity
(TUJS) and Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura (IPFT), and
claimed to represent 'tribal interests' in the State.
There was also an intensive campaign of intimidation by
the militants in the hilly interiors, with the message going
out that additional security arrangements for the elections
would not protect the tribal electorate for long, and unless
the INPT won all the seats they were contesting, a blood-bath
would follow. This was why Left Front leaders, including
Chief Mnister Manik Sarkar had frantically pressed the Union
Home Ministry and Election Commission for additional forces
to ensure that the tribals could cast their votes. As a
result, more than 37,000 extra men, including Army contingents,
were deployed, in addition to the force already on duty
in counter-insurgency operations in Tripura, creating a
ratio of one security man for every 25 voters.
The overwhelming security had a major impact, and the tribals
in most of the constituencies, excluding a few booths in
each, turned out in large numbers to cast their ballots
and the CPI-M secured thirteen of the reserved twenty tribal
seats, wresting one from the INPT, the Bagma constituency
of south Tripura which had been won in five consecutive
elections since 1977 by Ratimohan Jamatya, who conceded
defeat this time by a small margin of 74 votes.
A profound quiet seems to have descended on Tripura, with
the Congress-INPT trying to come to terms with their electoral
reverses, and the ruling Left Front reviewing the realities
of the retention of power for a record fifth - and a third
consecutive - term. Before the election the direct threat
of militant intervention had cast a deep shadow over the
Left Front's prospects. It was the banned NLFT's guns which
had ousted the Front from power in the controversial Autonomous
District Council (ADC) elections in April-May 2000. 537
CPI-M tribal leaders and workers have been liquidated by
the militants over the past five years, and another 56 persons
- including security forces personnel and militants themselves
- had been killed in the current year.
Below the surface peace imposed by the heavy and unprecedented
deployment of security forces, it is evident that the militants
did influence polling in many of the reserved tribal seats.
Nothing illustrates this better than the defeat of senior
CPI-M leader and Tribal Welfare Minister Aghore Debbarma
in the Pramodnagar reserved Assembly constituency in Khowai
subdivision by a margin of less than 400 votes. Debbarma
had won in 1998 by 4,993 votes, and the Marxists have lost
this seat for the first time since 1952, allegedly because
of irregularities in two booths where tribal people were
forced by the militants to cast their votes in favour of
Animesh Debbarma, who is said to have close connections
with the NLFT rebels. A drastic reduction of the CPI-M's
victory margins in the tribal reserved constituencies in
Ramchandraghat, Asharambari and Krishanpur in Khowai subdivision,
the Simna constituency in the Sadar subdivision, and the
Charilam reserve constituency in the Bishalgarh subdivision,
were all eloquent commentary on the influence of guns. The
NLFT rebels saw to it that a large number of tribal workers
and supporters of the ruling front did not turn up to cast
ballots. In another traditional bastion of CPI-M, Kanchanpur,
the party candidate Rajendra Reang won by a single vote
against an NLFT collaborator of the same name, simply because
at least five booths in remote interiors bordering Bangladesh
had been inaccessible to the CPI-M nominee, who had lost
his father and a cousin to NLFT's bullets before the election.
Yet, for all its efforts, the INPT could add only one more
seat to their tally of five in the outgoing Assembly. In
south Tripura, which has been relatively free from the militant
menace over the past three years, the Left Front has made
a near clean sweep, winning 13 out of 14 seats including,
three of the four reserved tribal seats.
The overriding issue in the elections was militancy, and
the Congress alliance with a party backed by militants polarised
the voting. Even in its strongholds, the Congress party's
margin of victory - as in the plains areas, dominated by
the majority non-tribal voters - was dramatically reduced
in most constituencies, including the four seats in Agartala
town. The adoption, virtually in toto, of the INPT-NLFT
line by the Congress was the main reason for this loss of
support. INPT leader and ex-militant, Bijay Kumar Hrangkhawal's
speech in Geneva in July last year, where he had spoken
in favour of the banned militants by describing their genocidal
politics as a 'struggle for self-determination' and his
questioning of the erstwhile princely Tripura's merger with
the Indian Union had a very adverse impact on the non-tribal
voters. To worsen matters Hrangkhawal appeared to be dictating
terms to the Congress in a public rally held at Agartala
in September last. But the state Congress leadership never
protested or even appeared to have a voice against Hrangkahwal
and his henchmen. All through the campaign, the Congress
leadership, dependent for political survival on the majority
non-tribal voters, kept on echoing the INPT line. At the
election rally addressed by Party President Sonia Gandhi
at Agartala on February 23, she shared the dais with Bijay
Hrangkhawal and PCC president Birajit Sinha (who belongs
to the minuscule minority Manipuri community), with former
chief ministers and veteran Congress leaders standing below
the dais. As could be expected, this did not impact well
on voters, who voted the Left Front back to power despite
a state-wide anti-incumbency wave as a result of the earlier
regimes failure to curb insurgency and rising unemployment.
The Left Front has, thus, rightly characterised the electoral
outcome as a 'vote against militancy and terrorism'. The
tribals, who have been the worst victims of militancy in
recent years, have given a mandate for peace by coming out
to vote despite intimidation. If militant intervention could
have been totally checked, it is clear that the INPT would
have been hard put event to hold on to their strength of
five in the sixty-member Assembly.
Nagaland:
Advantage Insurgency?
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database
& Documentation Centre, Guwahati
When the
74 years-old veteran politician and former Chief Minister
S.C. Jamir returns to the 10th State Assembly in Kohima,
he will not be sitting at his familiar chair. Indeed, it
is clear that it will require a great deal of conscious
political efforts before the fractured verdict of the people
can be translated into a stable arrangement for governance,
though it is now apparent that a non-Congress regime is
set to take the seat of power in the State after an interregnum
of 20 years.
The sidelining of the Congress party will not only delight
its rivals - the Nagaland People's Front (NPF), a new political
entity which took shape few months before the elections,
and the the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which put up an
'impressive show' by winning seven seats in the State -
but also the dominant insurgent group in the State - the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM).
The NSCN-IM, in the 13th year of its present avatar,
is currently engaged in negotiations with the Union government.
There were several allegations, mostly from the Congress
Party in Nagaland, regarding the interference of the militant
group in the electoral process. The NSCN-IM Chairman, Isak
Swu, had, after a round of negotiations with the Union Government
at Delhi in January 2003, asserted that his organisation
would not involve itself or interfere in the election process.
Nevertheless, the shadow of the group loomed large over
the voting process, as armed-cadres threatened candidates
and voters, abducted supporters and workers of political
parties, and generally to ensure that the Jamir Government
did not come back to power.
There were also cases of NSCN-IM cadres campaigning openly
in favour of the BJP candidate - as in the Longkhim-Chare
constituency in Tuensang, the largest among Nagaland's seven
districts - and also threatened villagers not to vote for
the Congress candidate. The BJP candidate, A. Imtilemba
went on to record a handsome victory. Similarly in the Meluri
constituency under Phek district, NSCN-IM cadres abducted
four youth and threatened to kill them if the villagers
dared to vote for the Congress. The NPF candidate Yitachu
won handsomely over his Congress rival. In Phek constituency,
gun-toting NSCN-IM cadres moved from house to house, warning
people not to vote for the Congress party. The NPF candidate
Kuzholuzo won with a victory margin of 9,084 votes. All
these seats had been won by candidates of the Congress party
in the last elections in 1998.
The NSCN-IM's objective of preventing a Congress win coincided
not only with the aspirations of political parties and the
individual leaders (most notably the NPF leader Neiphiu
Rio) who had left the Congress a few months ago to fulfil
their personal ambitions, but also with those of civil society
organisations such as the Church, the Naga Hoho (the apex
tribal council), the Naga Students' Federation (NSF) and
some 'human rights' organisations in the State. All these
groups, overtly sympathetic with the NSCN-IM's objectives,
shared Swu's perception that the Jamir government was 'a
stumbling block' on the path of a solution to the Naga conflict.
Most of these organisations issued 'election guidelines'
urging people to 'vote for candidates who would take the
peace process forward'. On the ground, the message was understood
to mean: 'Do not vote for the Congress'.
The verdict, consequently, appears to hand out a raw deal
for the Congress, though the party continues to be a potent
force in the State, as the single largest party with 21
seats in the 60-member Legislative Assembly. It is the case,
however, that few expected the Congress to repeat its 1998
performance of winning 53 seats in the Assembly when all
major political parties, with the exception of the Congress,
had responded to a general call for boycott of the electoral
process by the Naga Hoho. The manner in which the party
has been removed from power, however, is a pointer to the
drift that has been allowed to take effect. This will have
larger implications for a possible solution to the Naga
conflict in the foreseeable future. The installation of
a non-Congress regime places the NSCN-IM in the boots of
its bete noire, the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K).
The NSCN-K was seen to be close to the Jamir government,
and was once described by the NSCN-IM as a 'security provider
to the Chief Minister' - a position it now finds itself
stripped of. This is certain to affect the sporadic utterances
for unity and reconciliation between the factions, and would
create conditions for an increase in internecine clashes.
The election results will also embolden the Isak-Muivah
faction, which will incline further to buoy up its dream
of a larger and independent Naga homeland. Handicapped by
ambivalent mandate in the Assembly, the new regime is, consequently,
bound to find itself in the unenviable position of trying
to live up to the expectations of many and conflicting players,
in the jungle and the streets alike.
Meghalaya:
Fractured Mandate
Animesh Roul
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
The issues
of political stability and development dominated the 7th
Legislative Assembly elections in the State of Meghalaya
ahead of the polls on February 26, 2003, after years of
political chaos, instability and violence. Meghalaya has
had four Chief Ministers and six governments over the preceding
five years, since the elections of 1998. With constant political
uncertainty and a growing menace of terrorism, the overall
security situation in the State had become increasingly
volatile.
The election results have hardly improved the situation,
and the people's verdict in Meghalaya has created conditions
for another bout of coalition politics and horse-trading.
The fractured mandate has made the Indian National Congress
(INC) the single largest party with 22 seats, followed by
the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) with 14, in a 60-seat
Assembly. Various State and regional parties fared poorly,
with the United Democratic Party (UDP) managing to win nine
seats; the Meghalaya Democratic Party (MDP) four seats and
the Hill State People's Democratic Party (HSPDP) two seats.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Khun Hynniewtrep
National Awakening Movement (KHNAM), the political wing
of the Khasi Student's Union (KSU), have also won two seats
each, with Independents cornering the remaining five. Virtually
all the winning parties have been part of the outgoing ruling
coalition, the Meghalaya People's Forum (MPF). There is,
however, a catch in the new arrangement, since there were
no pre-poll alliances this time between the INC and the
NCP, or among the State parties.
What is encouraging, however, is that, in spite of general
apprehensions, Meghalaya had a relatively peaceful election,
unlike Tripura and Nagaland. Four persons were injured in
different parts of the State in poll-related violence, and
re-polling had to be ordered in three polling stations -
Madanrting in East Khasi Hills, Nongtalang in Jaintia Hills
and Capasipara in the Garo Hills due to technical snags
in Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and incidents of vandalism
on February 28, 2003. It would, however, be incorrect to
conclude that the voters in the State were free from fear.
Although the influential Achik Baptist Dalgipa Krima (ABDK),
head of all Baptist churches in the Garo Hills, issued its
poll guidelines for peaceful and focused franchise in the
State and urged all members of society to pray for a peaceful
and successful election, the terrorism-related death toll
touched 15 (including 13 civilians) between the date of
the announcement of the polling schedule and the elections.
This trend demonstrates the situation on the ground and
the alarming deterioration of the law and order machinery
in the State.
Despite repeated threats from underground organizations
and sporadic incidents of violence before and during election,
the total voter turnout was encouraging at 70.38 percent,
though lower than the 74.52 per cent in 1998. The War-Jaintia
Assembly Constituency (AC) topped the list with an 83 percent
voter turnout, while Malki-Nongthymmai AC of East Khasi
Hills district recorded the lowest turnout, at 44.90 percent.
Even the seven ACs of the Jaintia Hills district witnessed
high turnouts in the face of threats issued by the Assam-based
Karbi National Volunteers (KNV)
and United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS),
who have been fighting for greater autonomy for the Karbi
tribe in eastern Assam. On February 8, in one of the macabre
incidents of pre-poll violence, KNV terrorists killed six
villagers in Jaintia Hill district after severely torturing
them. The KNV had earlier warned the villagers of the area
bordering Assam not to participate in the poll process.
Although both the homegrown terrorist outfits, Achik National
Volunteer Council (ANVC)
and Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC),
maintained a low profile during the polls, the Election
Commission had declared some 500-odd polling stations (out
of a total 1,543 booths) 'sensitive' and stepped up security
measures accordingly. While the HNLC rejected the electoral
process under the 'Indian administration', the ANVC is believed
to have collusive ties with some political parties in the
State. However, instead of any large-scale violence or interference
during the elections, the ANVC continued with its abduction-for-ransom
activities relentlessly. On Election Day itself, security
forces rescued four abducted persons, including one Subsidiary
Intelligence Bureau (SIB) officer, from Damalgiri near Tura.
The general perception in Meghalaya is that the fractured
mandate will fuel instability and could also give a fillip
to terrorist groups operating in the State. While some sort
of coalition will, eventually, be cobbled together, the
possibility of a stable alliance committed to peace and
development remains remote.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
February 14-March
2, 2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
INDIA
|
19
|
6
|
14
|
39
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jammu &
Kashmir
|
6
|
0
|
10
|
16
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
10
|
0
|
1
|
11
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Tripura
|
3
|
6
|
0
|
9
|
NEPAL
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
PAKISTAN
|
3
|
2
|
0
|
5
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Elections
conclude in three Northeastern States: Counting
of votes for the Assembly elections held on
February 26 in the three Northeastern States
- Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura - began on
March 1. While no political party got clear
majority in Meghalaya and Nagaland, the Left
Front retained power in Tripura. In Nagaland,
results for 58 of 60 Assembly seats were available
by March 2, of which the Indian National Congress
(INC) won 21 seats, the Nagaland People's Front
(NPF) 19 and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
seven seats. The rest were won by other political
parties and independent candidates. In Meghalaya,
results for all the 60-member Assembly were
announced. INC won 22 seats, Nationalist Congress
Party (NCP) 14 and the remaining 24 were won
by other political parties and independent candidates.
In Tripura, which witnessed pre-poll violence
largely perpetrated by the National Liberation
Front of Tripura (NLFT), the Left Front, led
by the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M)
retained power by winning 40 seats in the 60-member
Assembly. Rediff,
March 1 and 2, 2003
15 Nepal Maoist insurgents arrested in West
Bengal, Bihar: Police in separate raids
in the States of West Bengal and Bihar arrested
15 Maoist insurgents of Nepal. Six Maoists were
arrested from Howrah railway station, Kolkata
on February 26 and 27 for allegedly distributing
leaflets in Nepali, calling for mobilization
of the people for a 'violent and subversive
struggle' for restoration of democracy and holding
of early 'constituent assembly elections' in
Nepal. Earlier, on February 25, the Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Special
Task Force (STF) of the Bihar Police, in a joint
operation, unearthed a hideout of left-wing
extremists - Naxalites - of the Maoist Communist
Centre (MCC) in Patrakar Nagar locality, Patna,
and arrested four Nepalese Maoist insurgents
and three MCC Naxalites, including MCC 'Commander-in-Chief'
Pramod Mishra's son Subhash alias Suchit. Separately,
based on information provided by the arrested
Maoists, the STF, on February 27 arrested four
more insurgents from the Gandhi Maidan area,
Patna. Times
of India, March 1, 2003; Hindu,
March 1, 2003
NLFT terrorists kill five BSF personnel on
election-day in West Tripura: Five Border
Security Force Personnel (BSF) personnel and
a civilian, returning from poll duty, were killed
in an ambush allegedly laid by the National
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) terrorists,
at Snatarampara, West Tripura district, on February
26, on the day of the Assembly elections. Assam
Tribune, February 27, 2003
Naxals kill five of a family in Arwal district,
Bihar: Suspected left-wing extremists -
Naxalites - killed five members of a backward
caste family in Khadasin village, Karpi police
station-limits, Arwal district, on February
25. Times
of India, February 26, 2003
NEPAL
Talks
with Maoist insurgents likely from March 9:
Government negotiator in the peace talks with
the Maoist insurgents Minister Narayan Singh
Pun said, on March 2, the first round of talks
is likely to be held from March 9 to 12 in Kathmandu.
"We have left it up to the Maoists to decide
the date for the official talks," Pun said.
He further said that the two sides would consult
political parties "to solicit their views."
Earlier, insurgents chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal
alias Prachanda talked to Premier Girija Prasad
Koirala, on February 25, and sought his cooperation
in resolving the insurgency problem. Nepal
News, February 26, 28 and March
2, 2003
PAKISTAN
9/11 mastermind
among three Al Qaeda terrorists arrested in Rawalpindi:
Three Al Qaeda terrorists, including the suspected mastermind
behind the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States
(US), Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, were arrested in Rawalpindi on
March 1. Kuwaiti-born Muhammad, who is on the most wanted list
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US, is regarded
as a key Al Qaeda lieutenant and organizer of the September
11 attacks in the US. The US government had announced a $25
million reward for information leading to his capture. Muhammad
is a relative of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, now serving a life sentence
for involvement in the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing. On March
2, Muhammad was handed over to the US authorities. Jang
March 2, 2003
Two policemen killed in attack on US Consulate in Karachi:
Two policemen guarding the United States (US) Consulate
in Karachi, Sindh, were killed on February 28, when an unidentified
gunman opened fire on the police picket near the consulate building.
Reports said five other police personnel and a civilian passer-by
were also injured. According to Sindh police chief Syed Kamal
Shah, the assailant was immediately arrested following the incident
and he is being interrogated. Jang
March 1, 2003
Three persons killed in sectarian violence in Karachi:
Unidentified terrorists attacked a coffee shop on M A Jinnah
Road, Arambagh police station-limits, in Karachi and killed
its owner and his kin, on February 27-night. The victims belong
to the minority Shia community. Speaking to media persons, Deputy
Inspector General of Police (DIG)-Operations-Tariq Jameel said
it appeared to be an act of sectarian killing. In a separate
incident, two unidentified gunmen killed a Public Call Office
(PCO) owner in FB Area, Joharabad police station limits, Karachi,
on the same day. Reportedly, this, too, was an act of targeted
killing. Dawn,
February 28, 2003
|
Party Position
in Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura in Assembly Elections held
on February 26, 2003
Party Name |
Meghalaya
|
Nagaland*
|
Tripura**
|
CON
|
WON
|
CON
|
WON
|
CON
|
WON
|
Indian National Congress
(INC) |
60
|
22
|
60
|
21
|
42
|
13
|
Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) |
28
|
2
|
38
|
7
|
21
|
0
|
Nationalist Congress
Party (NCP) |
54
|
14
|
7
|
0
|
12
|
0
|
Communist Party of India
(Marxist) (CPM) |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
55
|
37
|
United Democratic Party
(UDP) |
45
|
9
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
Indigenous Nationalist
Party of Twipra (INPT) |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
18
|
6
|
Janata Dal (United)
(JD-U) |
0
|
0
|
13
|
2
|
4
|
0
|
Samata Party (SAP) |
3
|
0
|
4
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
Nagaland Peoples Front
(NPF) |
0
|
0
|
54
|
19
|
0
|
0
|
Meghalaya Democratic
Party (MDP) |
18
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
Independent
(IND) |
58
|
5
|
17
|
4
|
50
|
0
|
Others |
67
|
4
|
32
|
4
|
52
|
3
|
Total |
333
|
60
|
225
|
58
|
254
|
59
|
Source:
Computed from reportage in the English language press
of India.
NOTE: Three states have 60 seats each in the Assembly
CON = Seats Contested
* Results
for the two seats are awaited.
** Result
of a constitutency was withheld.
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