Pakistan's Secret Power: The Inter Services Intelligence

Dr Bidanda M Chengappa

Pakistan has become synonymous with the ISI in India only because Islamabad has chosen to make terrorism an important instrument of its foreign policy. The ISI has been the cutting edge of this policy to wage a proxy war in this country for over a decade. As a result, India continues to counter the Pakistani covert war everyday in various parts of the country. The externally fostered internal security threat manifests in the killings of both security forces' personnel and citizens. The ISI has been involved in aiding and abetting cross-border terrorism initially in Punjab during the 1980s; subsequently from the 1990s it has moved its activities into Jammu & Kashmir and then into the Northeastern states. Over the years the ISI has been projected by the Indian press and political leadership as an ubiquitous and an unassailable creature. One view is that the ISI is often overestimated in the Indian press to provide an excuse for failures of Indian Intelligence agencies.

AIM

This paper attempts to explain the ISI's organisational structure, rise to power in Pakistan and its India-centric obsession. A discussion of the organisational structure would also necessarily cover other intelligence agencies, besides appointments, functions and links with foreign intelligence organisations. The ISI's rise to power has both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons which merit examination. The India-centric obsession is evident from its track record of the deep penetration into the Indian security system and its clandestine capabilities to collect critical details in the past.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

Pakistan's oldest intelligence agency is the Intelligence Bureau (IB) which was a colonial legacy. However the IB which is a quasi-police organisation with a civilian character did not quite deliver the goods during the 1947-48 India-Pakistan war over Kashmir. Perhaps the IB's inadequate military orientation led to incorrect assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Indian defense. This failure on the part of the IB inspired the military leadership to create the ISI as an adjunct of the armed forces to conduct both internal and external intelligence functions. It has an organisational mandate to handle both internal and external intelligence functions, which has enabled the agency to emerge as the numero uno among the various intelligence agencies in Pakistan.

In addition to the IB and the ISI, the military (the army, the air force and the navy) have their own intelligence directorates to provide tactical intelligence to wage war. To that extent, the charter of army intelligence is limited territorially and does not stretch beyond 50 kms of the International Border of the country. Now and again the army intelligence is also known to be involved in gathering political intelligence especially whenever a political leader is elected and has a degree of control over the ISI. During such periods the generals have no direct inputs from the ISI and therefore activate their army intelligence for the purpose.

The size of the ISI is estimated to be 25,000 strong with the human resource element predominantly from the armed forces, with a handful of civilians. The head of the ISI is designated the DG-I and all the Pakistani military attaches posted abroad report to this orgainsation. It also coordinates the activities of foreign military attaches posted at Islamabad. The ISI is also involved in the interaction between the army, air force and naval intelligence directorates. The ISI inducts 60 per cent of its officer corps and other ranks from the armed forces on permanent secondment while the remainder of the military personnel serve there only for fixed tenures.¹

Apparently the ISI is controlled either by the military or the political leadership depending on whichever is in power. The DG-I, as the head of the ISI is known, is an appointment made by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The DG-I reports to the Prime Minister considering the ISI has a political section to handle internal intelligence duties. However the army appears to dictate the policy towards India even when the country has an elected leader. To that extent it would be appropriate to state that the PM has a degree of control over the ISI's involvement in internal affairs which the Chief of Army Staff oversees the external role of the agency.

In today's information age wherein 80-90 per cent of intelligence is available from published or 'open' sources, the challenge for intelligence agencies lies in ensuring that the 10-20 per cent of their gathering of information through clandestine or 'closed' sources is corroborated through intelligence organisations of other friendly countries. Towards this objective the strengths of an effective agency would also be based on the nature of intelligence sharing arrangements it has with other foreign organisations. On this score the ISI has been able to develop institutional arrangements with some significant agencies of Western industrial democracies. South Asian countries, Islamic and East Asian states. The ISI has developed close linkages and intelligence sharing arrangements with the CIA, Chinese, French, Bangladeshi, Saudi Arabian (and other Gulf countries) and Sri Lankan intelligence agencies.

RISE TO POWER

The rationale for the evolution of the intelligence service into an extra-constitutional power centre is multi-faceted and encompasses military strategy, martial law, involvement in the clandestine nuclear programme, covert support to para-military operations in the Afghan jehad and linkages with fundamental parties. While some of these causes have internal dimensions some are completely external.

The ISI assumes importance in the national security scheme due to the Pakistani military planner's predilection for unconventional or commando warfare strategies.² The role of intelligence inputs both the operational planning and execution stages in unconventional warfare is extremely important. Therefore intelligence inputs are 'force multipliers' in military strategy.

Pakistani military strategy is primarily designed to cope with an imaginary Indian threat which involves military asymmetry, besides geographic compulsions. All these factors together have made the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) at Rawalpindi opt for unconventional warfare or special operations involving the use of both irregular forces like razarkars/Mujahideen and regular forces like the Special Service Group (SSG) commandos. The Pakistan Army used these unconventional warfare strategies in the 1947-48 Kashmir war, the 1965 India-Pakistan war and the more recent attack through infiltration at Kargil in 1999.³

The geographical compulsions, given the lack of strategic depth, also attribute to the need for unconventional warfare operations and warning intelligence inputs. The advantage of unconventional warfare is the ability to exploit the element of surprise through pre-emptive strikes against the enemy, besides the conduct of war on enemy territory becomes significant given the shortage of strategic space. Likewise advance intelligence about an impending enemy strike is also critical to provide early warning intelligence especially due to the strategic depth factor. It gives Pakistani military forces defending the borders the required lead time to mibilise themselves enemy action.

MARTIAL LAW

Perhaps the extended years of military rule can be seen as an internal dimension which enabled the ISI to become powerful in the country. Pakistan witnessed 25 years of military rule wherein the ISI was used as the 'eyes' and 'ears' of the government comprising the generals. Considering the generalship in power did not nurture a free press or political parties to prosper in the country there were no information channels available to the government. Neither did these military leaders fully trust the IB which was a quasi-police organistion with a civilian character.⁴ Given the fact that governance amounts to implementing a set of decisions based on information, its importance cannot be underplayed. Hence the ISI filled this information vacuum and in the process developed a proximity to the power centres.⁵ The ISI, therefore, not only indulged in information gathering but also in standard intelligence operations like propaganda dissemination, surveillance of political opponents, splitting political parties and assassinations.

It is imperative to understand the reason behind the phenomenal growth of the ISI within the national security decision-making structure, which amounts to unquestioned power in national affairs. Ironically, the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto is supposed to have empowered the ISI domestically. He formalised the agency's role in internal politics during the peak of his political glory in the mid 1970s and established a political cell in the ISI. At times the ISI and the IB have also collaborated with each other to generate political intelligence for the establishment.⁶ As evident from various journalistic writings, political commentaries or memoirs, neither military nor civilian regimes have hesitated to use the ISI for their personal or party interests.

Likewise the ISI's involvement with the clandestine nuclear dimension for the rise to power. During the Ali Bhutto regime, starting from the mid-1970s, the ISI was closely involved in the illegal procurement of material for the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme, which remains critical to the national security agenda. Clearly the ISI's role in such a critical programme would have given it immense importance among the national security institutions.

Thereafter from the early 1980s the ISI provided strong support to the Afghan mujahideen against Soviet occupation forces there and ultimately proved successful due to the material resources provided by the US. It is aptly stated that the victory was possible on account of "American weaponry and Afghan bravery". The import of the ISI involvement in Afghanistan is that the ISI involvement in Afghanistan is that the ISI developed close working relations with the CIA and Saudi intelligence organisations. More significantly the ISI developed enormous hands-on expertise to wage a proxy war in terms of handling logistics on an international scale, training Afghan guerillas in low intensity conflict operations (LICO) and intelligence-gathering activities under hostile conditions.⁷

The ISI has developed close linkages with various Islamic fundamentalist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. The ISI funds their activities like para-military training and procurement of arms to wage are against the Indian State. This ISI nexus with fundamentalist parties provides the agency with manpower which can be mobilised as 'street power' to agitate against or support a political party which has taken a decision with national, regional, political, social or economic ramifications.⁸ To that extent, the ISI has some leverage to influence decision making owing to its ability to operate through fundamentalist parties.

INDIA-CENTRIC OBSESSION

Pakistan's national security and foreign policy planners have a strong obsession with India. This obsession arises from the fact India is a secular democracy with an impressive industrial infrastructure, a promising economy, a large territory, population and military capability. Whereas, Pakistan as a national state has a poor record with more than half its existence under martial law, a pseudo-economic prosperity, inadequate industrial infrastructure, a fractured civil society owing to ethnic divisions and a failure to develop a strong national identity. As a result of all these factors, Pakistan being a small nation has over time experienced an insecurity syndrome vis-à-vis India.

Given the military and the diplomatic decision-makers' serious India-centric focus it is inevitable that the same is also reflected in the orientation of the intelligence community.

Brigadier (retd.) Syed Al Tirmazi, a former ISI officer writes:

"Pakistan is India's immediate neighbour and according to Chanakaya's philosophy we can never be its friends. For us, the men in uniform are those directly charged with the responsibility of defending the geographical and ideological frontiers of Pakistan. India is and shall remain our enemy number one. India's scheming, machinations, subversion and espionage activities against Pakistan have to be fought at every front and with all the strength at our disposal."⁹

In this context it is interesting to note that Pakistan's intelligence institutions have terrific track record of effecting deep penetration of the Indian establishment. Pakistani intelligence has managed to obtain information in advance about Indian military and diplomatic plans. There are two instances when Pakistani intelligence obtained accurate indication and warning intelligence about Indian military operational plans and one case regarding diplomatic inputs.

The first instance refers to the 1965 war when Pakistan's IB was able to get advance intelligence about the Indian aerial bombardment offensive a full four days prior to the Indian Air Force (IAF) strike.¹⁰ The IB officer claims he had a 'mole' in the Indian High Commission in Islamabad who was able to inform him in advance about the IAF offensive.

The IB got to know of the Indian air strike on 2 September 1965, which was scheduled for 6 September 1965. It is another matter that the then Director IB AB Awan did not really take the input as seriously as he should have and instead rebuked the officer for providing the same.

Similarly in the case of the 1971 India-Pakistan war over Bangladesh the ISI had the complete Indian military operational plans in August the same year.¹¹ The Indian plans were originally only confined to the capture of some territory along the India-East Pakistan border purely to rehabilitate the East Pakistani refugee there. However, subsequently as the Indian military campaign progressed in the Eastern sector the initial objectives were enlarged to seek the surrender of the 90,000 strong Pakistani Army garrison stationed there under Lt. General AAK Niazi. While Pakistan did experience a military defeat, its intelligence operations to obtain sensitive information certainly proved to be successful.

While the foregoing instances refer to Pakistani offensive intelligence operations to obtain military information before the onset of Indian-Pakistan wars, it is important to note that the ISI has a successful track record even during peacetime. According to an unconfirmed version, Pakistani intelligence had clandestinely collected a 'top secret' document of an Indian cabinet meeting.¹² This document contained the minutes of the meeting chaired by the Prime Minister to discuss policy towards Pakistan. Coincidentally, the Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq had arrived in New Delhi the same day for a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister the following day. So the Pakistan High Commissioner at New Delhi supposedly briefed Zia was able to figure out the Indian line sufficiently in advance and accordingly rehearse his response.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Though the ISI was originally conceived as a defense intelligence agency it also performed a parallel function - to report on the pulse of political affairs to the government. This dual role enabled the agency to evolve into an extra-state power within the country. The ISI therefore emerged as the supreme intelligence agency among the other players on the national scene. Its external focus for the first three decades of nationhood, till the 1970s, remained India-centric due to the national leadership's deep-seated complex vis-à-vis India.

Perhaps the ISI's pre-occupation with the Afghan jehad, during the 1980s, helped to deflect this uni-directional focus from India. The agency through its involvement against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan had an appropriate occasion to strengthen its relationship with the American, Chinese and Saudi intelligence services. The ISI was able to improve its skills through closer interaction with these foreign intelligence organisations. More importantly, Pakistan's secret service developed a greater degree of external orientation than before.

The ISI as the hardline element in the Pakistani establishment does not enable the development of friendly bilateral relations with India. The ISI, for instance, would not be inclined to promote India-Pakistan trade ties, as this would facilitate a greater level of people-to-people contact between the two sides. Ultimately such friendly relations between the peoples of these two countries would only serve to marginalise the political problem plaguing the state-to-state relationship which centers on the Kashmir issue. The objectives of the ISI are primarily focussed on the disintegration of the Indian State. Clearly it follows that the ISI is an important impediment in the promotion of cordial relations between the two subcontinental neighbours. As long as the army calls the shorts and 'guided', 'limited' or Islamic democracy does not develop in Pakistan, the prospects for promoting peace and security on the subcontinent seem to be a distant dream.

REFERENCES

Public Opinion Trends (Pakistan) Vol. XVIII no 5, 8 January 1990, p. 78.
Jasjit Singh, "The Army in the Power Structure of Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, October 1995, pp. 875-876.
Bidanda M Chengappa, Pakistan's Compulsions for the Kargil Misadventure, Strategic Analysis, October 1999, pp. 1071-1082.
Mushahid Hussain and Akmal Hussain, 'Pakistan: Problem of Governance', Delhi, Konark Publishers, 1993, pp. 74.
Bidanda M Chengappa, "The ISI Role in Pakistan's Politics", Strategic Analysis, February 2000.
Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 279.
Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1992.
KM Arif, Working with Zia, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1995, pp. 69.
Brigadier (Retd.) Syed Al Tirmazi, Profiles of Intelligence, Combined Printers, Lahore, 1995, pp.89.
Ibid., pp. 14-15.
n. 8, pp. 32.
n. 9, pp. 291.