Survey of Conflicts & Resolution in India's Northeast
Ajai Sahni^#

India’s Northeast is the location of the earliest and longest lasting insurgency in the country, in Nagaland, where separatist violence commenced in 1952, as well as of a multiplicity of more recent conflicts that have proliferated, especially since the late 1970s. Every State in the region is currently affected by insurgent and terrorist violence,¹ and four of these – Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura – witness scales of conflict that can be categorised as low intensity wars, defined as conflicts in which fatalities are over 100 but less than 1000 per annum. While there have been several governmental peace initiatives, multi-track diplomacy and Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) peace activities are at an incipient stage. Governmental policies do not encourage international interventions – direct or indirect – in any conflict resolution processes, though mediated developmental interventions are sanctioned.

The Region

Seven States comprise India’s Northeast: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.² These States cover a combined area of over 255,088 sq. km. (7.7 per cent of the country’s territory) and, according to the 2001 Census of India, a population of 38,495,089 persons (3.74 per cent of national population). The region is characterised by extraordinary ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, with more than 160 Scheduled Tribes³ belonging to five different ethnic groups, and a large and diverse non-tribal population as well. The ‘scheduled tribes’ only refer to the tribes listed in the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, and do not reflect the actual complexity of the ethnic mosaic of the region, which comprehends over 400 distinct tribal and sub-tribal groupings.

Contrary to widespread perception, however, the tribal population of the region constitutes only about 30 per cent of the total population, though the distribution is skewed. While the ‘non-tribals’ dominate Assam and Tripura, over 60 per cent of the population of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland is drawn from the Scheduled Tribes.⁴

The dichotomy between the ‘hills people’ and the ‘plains people’ has been a persistent feature of the life of the Northeast and Robbins Burling, in the context of ‘undivided Assam’ – which comprised most of what is India’s Northeast today – comments on the presence of ‘a minority of tribal mountaineers’ who could be distinguished from the ‘lowland majority.’ Nevertheless, as one group of researchers observes, the people of the hills and of the plains or valleys are radically different but have always been interconnected.

Indeed, the Northeast has been an area of great and continuous civilisational intercourse through history, and has been thought of as "a gateway of commerce and culture that linked India overland to east and Southeast Asia", and a "complex transition zone of linguistic, racial and religious streams."⁵ The ‘indigenous tribes’ of the Northeast represent successive waves of migrants, both from East and West, with many entering the region as late as the 19^th Century. The cultural mosaic was made more complex as a result of the British policy of ‘importing’ large numbers of administrators, plantation workers and cultivators from other parts of India.

However, this historical ‘connectedness’ was systematically undermined by the British policies of progressive segregation of tribal populations into virtual ‘reservations’ called ‘non-regulated’, ‘backward’ or ‘excluded’ areas that were administered under a succession of unique provisions between the years 1874 and 1935. These provisions excluded the tribal areas from the pattern of administration that prevailed in the rest of British India, from the operation of the codes of civil and criminal procedures and a wide range of laws that were thought to be unsuitable to the ‘stage of development’ of the populations of the hill areas of the Northeast, as well as from the gradual ‘democratisation’ that was taking place through the nationalist and eventually the Independence movement. An ‘Inner Line’ system that prohibited access to these areas to all ‘outsiders’, except those who obtained special permission from the government, created "a frontier within a frontier’, accentuating the political and cultural schism between the tribal areas and the plains.

Regrettably, such isolationist policies persisted in the post-Independence period under the mistaken motives of ‘protecting’ the tribal population against exploitation by ‘outsiders’. The cumulative impact of these policies was a deepening of fissures between tribal and non-tribal populations, as well as a contrived and unsustainable exclusion of these regions from the processes of modernisation and democratisation. Inevitably, with the progressive and natural erosion of these artificial barriers, the local populations were brought into increasing friction with migrant populations that were far better adapted to the institutions and processes of the modern world, giving rise to a proliferation of conflicts throughout the region.

The dichotomous administrative system both in the pre-and the post-Independence era, also produced wide variations between the pace of development in the hills and the plains, with the latter dominating the economic profile of the region, and the tribal areas lagging far behind. It is the wide swathe of the Brahmaputra Valley – comprising nearly 22 per cent of the region – that has long been the most economically active, with substantial plantation and industrial estates and reasonable infrastructure.

For much of the British period, undivided Assam was thought of as the "north-east frontier of Bengal", and its economy and politics were largely dictated from and linked to this westerly direction. Partition was, consequently, an extraordinary disaster for the Northeast in particular: the separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) resulted in the abrupt severance of inland water, road and railway communications, as well as the loss of access to the Chittagong port, crippling crucial economic linkages and driving up costs of all commodities. Partition also brought with it unceasing waves of unwanted migration that disrupted, and continue to disturb, existing demographic equations. It was shortly followed by the Chinese takeover of Tibet and the increasing ‘hardening’ of the previously ‘soft borders’ with Burma/Myanmar, sealing off the region in the Easterly direction as well. B.G. Verghese sums up the cumulative impact of the chain that commenced with the cataclysmic events of 1947:

The Northeast region has critical strategic significance and, as is often remarked, remains tenuously connected with the rest of India through a narrow corridor, the ‘chicken’s neck’ or ‘Shiliguri Corridor’, in North Bengal, with an approximate width of 33 kilometres on the eastern side and 21 kilometres on the western side.⁷ This constitutes barely one per cent of the boundaries of the region, while the remaining over 99 per cent of its borders are international – with China to the North; Bangladesh to the South West; Bhutan to the North West; and Myanmar to the East.

Widespread conflict marks the region, and Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura are severely disturbed (See Table 1). In addition, the Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh witness the spillover effect of insurgencies from the neighbouring States, particularly Nagaland, Assam and Manipur. Meghalaya also grapples with political uncertainties and problems posed by two militant outfits, the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)⁸ and the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC),⁹ which were banned by the Central government on November 16, 2000. Mizoram has remained largely free from terrorist violence since the political resolution of the insurgency in this State in 1986,¹⁰ but the activities of the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) have given cause for concern, and have inflicted some civilian and security force (SF) casualties.

Illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals into India and the use of Bangladeshi and Bhutanese territory by insurgents operating in India’s North East are a grave security concern for the region.

Circumstances in the theatres of conflict in India’s Northeast go against the general presumption of a direct and self-evident conflict of interests between the government and its various agencies, on the one hand, and the terrorist groupings, on the other. A complex collusive arrangement between various legitimate power elites and terrorist groupings exists in every single terrorism-affected State, and this arrangement facilitates a continuous transfer of resources into the ‘underground economy of terrorism’. In contrast to the common perception of terrorist activity as violent confrontation with the government, there is a more insidious subversion of the established order through a consensual regime against a backdrop of widespread breakdown of law and order, and terrorist groupings have demonstrated their preference towards ‘systemic corruption’, rather than the dismantling or destruction of the prevailing political order.¹¹

Table 1: Fatalities in insurgencies and terrorist conflicts in India’s Northeast, 1992-2001

Cumulative Total (All Categories) M: Militants; SF: Security Force Personnel; C: Civilians.

A substantial proportion of the current proliferation of armed groups representing various tribal and ethnic identities in the Northeast is the result of the demonstration effect of the ‘success’ of other such groups in the past. Such ‘success’ is not necessarily measured in terms of any political gains but, increasingly, in terms of the financial gains of widespread criminal operations that are undertaken by all militant groups in the Northeast (as in other theatres of conflict in India). The collusive character of many of the terrorist movements in the region, in terms of their linkages with overground organisations, legitimate businesses, the State bureaucracy and the political leadership enormously reduces the actual risks of militant activity and also provides secondary incentives for the creation and operation of armed gangs.

Internal conflicts in India’s Northeast are overwhelmingly conceptualised within the framework of unique ethnic identities that are threatened by, and in confrontation with, the nationalist state, which is often seen as a representative of an inchoate cultural ‘mainstream’. While some of the conflicts in the region certainly fit into this general framework of interpretation, few, if any, are completely explained by it; others, moreover, are entirely unrelated to this reductionist scheme of ‘freedom struggles’ by ethnic minorities against the ‘homogenising state’. Indeed, even where militant groups direct their rhetoric and their violence against the symbols of the state, the underlying motives and ideologies are more correctly interpreted in terms of conflicting tribal identities and histories of internecine warfare based entirely on tribal, sub-tribal, or tribal-outsider rivalries and corresponding competition over limited resources, especially land. It is, consequently, appropriate to analyse and assess conflicts in the Northeast in terms of three basic ‘faultlines’:

1. Tribal groups vs. the state
2. Tribal vs. tribal (Internecine)
3. Tribal vs. non-tribal

In any single conflict, moreover, more than one of these elements would tend to overlap, giving rise to complications both of analysis and of resolution. The multiplicity of tribal and sub-tribal groupings in each of the States in the region, and continuous re-alignments between some of these, create further difficulties.

Within such a context, mobilisation of populations along issues relating to exclusionary and conflicting tribal identities has become a basic feature, both of electoral politics and of more extreme movements, across the Northeast region.

With the increasing proliferation and easy availability of small arms and training, and the widespread failure and corruption of the political leadership in the region, increasing polarisation of tribal identities and a mushrooming of ‘copycat’ militant organisations and movements can be expected in the foreseeable future.

Assam

The insurgency that commenced in 1979 has been characterised by escalating violence and a simultaneous erosion of popular support over the past years. Large numbers of cadres have surrendered, and no more than four districts in the State are now seriously afflicted by terrorist activities. Nevertheless, acts of terror continue to inflict significant casualties, as the movements, with vast financial empires at stake, acquire an increasingly criminal character, disengaged from any consistent ideological objectives. The year 2001 saw 606 insurgency-related killings, as against 758 in 2000. In year 2002 the figure stood at 98 by April 30. A large number of militant groups have emerged in the State, and a disturbing trend is the constitution of a number of Muslim fundamentalist militia backed by Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

Data

Background

Insurgency in Assam primarily emerged out of one main issue, i.e. the deportation of illegal migrants from Bangladesh (previously East Pakistan). Since India’s Partition in 1947, a continuous flow of illegal migrants across the borders has disturbed the local demography and popular sentiments against the ‘foreigners’ led to a mass movement seeking the detection of illegal immigrants, their deletion from the voters’ list and their deportation to Bangladesh. The movement commenced in July 1979 under the leadership of the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP). Talks between the Indian government and the agitators broke down over the disagreement regarding the cut-off date for the definition of ‘foreigners’. Towards the end of 1979, the agitation took a violent turn despite the promulgation of President’s rule in December that year.

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was established on April 7, 1979, at Sibsagar, under the leadership of Paresh Baruah (Chief of Staff) along with Arabinda Rajkhowa (Chairman), Anup Chetia (General Secretary) and Pradeep Gogoi (Vice Chairman, under detention since April 8, 1998). While secession from India was its declared goal, and the leadership made some attempts to distance itself from the popular anti-foreigner plank, the ULFA operated, initially, in close co-ordination with the AASU-AAGSP’s agitation. The agitation ended in August 1985, with the signing of the Assam Accord with the Centre, and its leaders formed the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and engaged in electoral politics. From this point on, the political distance between the ULFA and the AGP has grown continuously.

The Bodos, a major tribe and among the earliest settlers in the State, initiated a second stream of insurgency on the issues of the dispossession of their tribal lands by Bengali and Assamese settlers, as well as neglect of the Bodo language and culture. Kokrajhar and parts of the Goalpara districts are the focus of Bodo discontent. The All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) had existed since 1967, but emerged as a potent force under the leadership of Upendranath Brahma only in the 1980s. Towards the latter half of the 1980s, the Bodos started demanding a separate State within India. In 1988, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) was founded and it initiated a ‘guerrilla war’.

The Indian government managed to broker a ‘Bodo Accord’ in February 1993, and the Bodo Volunteer Force (BVF), the armed wing of the ABSU, laid down arms, paving the way for the establishment of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC). However, one section of the BVF rejected the Accord and formed the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) [now known as Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)] in 1996. This organisation remained active in the districts of Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Nalbari, Barpeta, Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang and Dhemaji until its cease-fire agreement with the Indian government on March 29, 2000. Subsequently, the BLT has continued negotiations with the governments, both the State and the Union for the creation of a Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) comprising the Bodo dominated areas of Lower Assam.

The latter half of the 1990s saw the mushrooming of militant organisations along tribal, religious and cultural fissures. The culture of violence propagated by the ULFA and the Bodo outfits seems to have set a pattern for a number of copycat insurgent groups. Currently, there are as many as 34 insurgent groups listed in the State, though the ULFA is the main player. Among other terrorist outfits, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), Dima Halim Daoga (DHD), and Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) are prominent. The NDFB operates in the Bodo-areas of the State and the UPDS dominates the Karbi-Anglong and North Cachar districts. Most of the other groups listed are currently dormant.

Violence in the State has resulted in substantial internal migrations, though no firm estimates of the actual numbers exist.

Conflict Dynamics

The ULFA was dormant in the initial years of its existence, but its activities gained momentum in the latter half of the 1980s. By 1986, it had established contacts with the ISI, w