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Dhaka's aid to Northeast rebels
Time to nail the lie
The gloves are finally off. What has
long been known to those who deal with terrorism in India has at last
been bluntly articulated by the country’s Deputy Prime Minister: Bangladesh
actively supports militants acting on Indian soil, providing them with
safe havens, logistical backing and material resources, in a myopic
policy that has not only done India substantial injury, but undermined
democracy and governance in Bangladesh as well. In this, Bangladesh’s
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) has actively and vigorous
collaborated with Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and
with all hues of Islamist extremist groups within Bangladesh, as well
as with a range of ideologically incompatible terrorist organizations
operating in India’s Northeast. This has been done under the cover of
‘deniability’, the practice of diplomatic falsification, and the broader
lack of awareness in the ‘international community’ regarding conflicts
in the South Asian Region.
Unsurprisingly, the Bangladeshi response
to L.K. Advani’s statements has been the standard ‘outrage’ and denial
that is expressed whenever such issue are raised. Bangladesh, consequently,
dismissed Advani’s remarks as "totally baseless and irresponsible,"
adding that it hoped that the "high ranking leadership of India
will not make such comments in future for the sake of friendly relations."
Such outrage was, similarly, expressed
after a succession of independent journalists and highly regarded international
publications, including the Far Eastern Economic Review, the
Economist and Time, documented the increasing entrenchment
of Islamist extremism and the activities of Al Qaeda survivors and affiliates,
in Bangladesh.
These reports and Advani’s statement,
however, are not enough. It is now necessary to nail the lie, finally
and inexorably. Aggressive political postures and journalistic exposés
are important, but will not suffice. It is necessary, now, to build
up, and persistently and effectively project, a systematic case based
on hard evidence, to demonstrate to the world that Bangladesh has embarked
on a path that constitutes a danger, not only to its neighbours, but
to the world at large; that its refusal to adhere to basic civilisational
norms in its domestic and international policies can only be ignored
at great peril. What is required, consequently, is a coherent policy
and institutional mechanism for the dissemination of key information
and intelligence to the media, international fora, and intelligence
agencies of countries that have common concerns regarding terrorism.
This is not a question of ‘playing’ or manipulating the media and international
opinion. It is an integral part of the war against terrorism. Terrorism
thrives on ambiguity, in spaces where information is insufficient. Evidence
is as important in the war against terrorism as guns and fighting men.
Agencies such as the ISI and the DGFI must not be allowed to continue
with their terrorist agenda under the cover of deniability and the diplomatic
niceties that prevent nations from calling a spade a spade – and a sponsor
of terrorism a sponsor of terrorism. This is too vital an issue to allow
concerns of politeness to prevail over the truth. Our quest for ‘good
relations’ with our neighbours cannot extend to brushing the sponsorship,
or even tolerance, of mass murder and terrorism under the carpet. If
Bangladesh cannot adhere to the norms of civilized international relations,
it must be made to confront the natural consequences of its waywardness.
There is a long history of hostile acts
by Bangladesh towards India, particularly after the assassination of
Shiekh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, and the political revival and progressive
consolidation of Pakistan backed Islamist extremist forces – led by
many who collaborated with the Pakistan Army in the genocide of 1971
– in the country. One must not forget, or leave still unpunished, the
utter savagery of the torture and murder of 16 Border Security Force
personnel by the Bangladesh Rifles in April 2001. And while the internal
causes of the high levels of violence in India’s Northeast can neither
be denied nor ignored, the persistence and proliferation of terrorist
movements depends entirely on active or passive support from our neighbours.
It is useful to note here that Advani also found it necessary to point
out that Bhutan was "not taking enough action" to prevent
terrorists operating from its soil. The recent and utterly disgraceful
incident at Dadgiri village in Kokrajhar, where NDFB militants came
across the Bhutan border and committed a massacre within sight of a
Bhutanese border post, and then crossed back without let or hindrance
from that country’s security personnel, is a case in point.
India has, for far too long, sought
to buy peace with uncooperative neighbours through conciliation and
appeasement – but a search for friendship cannot extend to the tolerance
of terrorism. For terrorism to win, it has been noted, "it must
slowly escalate, inuring its victims to accepting higher and higher
casualties without really responding… The terrorist’s only theory of
victory is for his enemy not to really fight."
India can no longer continue with this
policy of paralysis – accepting casualty after casualty till these number
thousands at the end of each year. All the instrumentalities of international
law, of coercive diplomacy, of economic and trade sanctions, and eventually,
where necessary, the direct application of military force, must be harnessed
to defeat the rising tide of international terrorism, and to demonstrate
unambiguously that states which sponsor and support terrorism will not
benefit – and will, indeed, greatly suffer – as a result of their choice.
(Edited version published in Sentinel, Guwahati,
November 11, 2002.)
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